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The American Political Science Review

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REASON, VALUE THEORY, AND THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

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I

No serious consideration of the theory of democracy needs explanation or apology today. The scope and limitations of the present treatment of the subject, however, should be made clear at the outset. The object of this article is to deal with the political philosophy of democracy, or, more precisely, with attempts to ground democratic doctrine on first principles of right. Clearly this does not constitute a complete treatment of democratic theory. Such a treatment would have to deal, *inter alia,* with the practical operation of democratic processes under varying conditions. Probably the bulk of any full-length discussion of the theory of democracy should be devoted to such matters. Yet, essential though these considerations are, the problem with which this paper deals is of fundamental importance. For, in general, it may be said of all the "practical" arguments about democracy that whatever validity they have must depend upon some theory of ethics, upon some assumption as to the things that are valuable in this world. In other words, I shall not here concern myself with arguments that in practice democracy is less objectionable than other forms of government, because I feel the inadequacy of such arguments considered by themselves.[1] Rather, I intend to examine the validity of arguments

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[1] The position to which I am taking exception is well exemplified by Professor Joad. He writes: "The democrat does not, at any rate in the twentieth century, regard democracy as an ideal form of government, but as the least objectionable form of government that is practicable. It is not a best so much as a second-best, embraced because of the frailties of human nature and accepted less for its own merits than for fear that worse may befall if it be rejected. Thus no systematic defense of democracy is possible, for the reason that democracy is not itself the product of a systematic theory." C.E.M. Joad, *Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics* (New York, 1938), p. 770.

To guard against misconceptions, I should add that it *may* be possible to support to the effect that democracy is the *ideally* best form of government. Not merely that Platonic and other rival ideals are unattainable, but that democracy is more desirable, is the proposition to be maintained.

A further delimitation of subject-matter will be observed. No attempt will be made to examine the validity of theories which rely upon intuition as to values or ethical principles. Rather, I shall be concerned with the search for a rational and empirical foundation for democratic theory.

The great figures in the history of democratic theory have generally rested their arguments upon ethical doctrines or rationalistic assumptions about human nature which today find little support. For this reason, it is well to review their arguments in the light of current philosophical skepticism and political "realism." I shall attempt, therefore, to reappraise the ethical basis of democracy, having regard both to typical political theorists and to modern ethical thought.

The elements of the democratic ideal which have been subjected to attack are well known. They are the supremacy of reason and the objectivity of values. As Max Lerner remarks, "the rational, right-thinking man has as surely ceased to be regarded the center of our intellectual system as the earth has ceased to be regarded the center of our planetary system."[2] Skepticism and relativism have eroded away the pillars of truth and righteousness, of reason and objective values, from beneath the structure of democratic theory. It is the precise nature of this erosion that I propose to examine.

The attack upon the "rational, right-thinking man" takes a variety of forms. The type of anti-rationalism which concerns us here does not question the validity of the reasoning process when used as an instrument for the satisfaction of desires. What it does is to deny that man is in any sense "governed" by reason, and to assert with Hume that reason is and should be the tool of the pas-

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democracy as a "second-best" form of government on the basis of a different, and possibly more easily substantiated, theory of ethics than that which is required to support it as the ideal form of government. I shall not deal with that question in this article.

[2] Max Lerner, *Ideas Are Weapons* (New York, 1939), p. 5. See also John H. Hallowell, *The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology—with Particular Reference to German Politico-Legal Thought* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1943), Chap. I, and the same author's "The Decline of Liberalism," in *Ethics*, Vol. 52 (1941–42), pp. 323–349.

sions. In other words, writers of this school challenge man's ability, and especially his proclivity, to harness desire to purpose.

A large part of what is often referred to as the "rationalism" of democratic theory is the assumption that most men possess this proclivity in a degree far greater than now appears to be the case. And when we speak of human irrationality we may refer to failure to deliberate, or to miscalculation of the consequences of contemplated action, or to mistaken evaluation of certain anticipated experience, or to determination to satisfy an instant craving in spite of the realization that the person performing the action will later regret it. We now know that men behave in these irrational ways more than was once supposed, and we also know that it is possible, by deliberately playing upon emotions and prejudices, greatly to increase the probability of irrational behavior. This is the substance of the second form of the anti-rationalist attack.

In reply to this line of argument, it may be pointed out that men like to appear to be rational. The very persistence of rationalization proves that human beings feel a strong compulsion to justify their acts by showing that they are logically related to a socially acceptable end. Having once committed themselves to a position, most men will stick to it even though doing so goes against their interest, rather than be convicted of inconsistency. When this human characteristic is taken into account, the force of the criticism of rationalism may be said in the current military phraseology to have been "contained," that is, a basis exists for a theory demanding a certain degree of rationality in human nature.[3]

As Lerner points out, it is not only man as "rational," but also man as "right-thinking," that is under attack. It is the fashion in many quarters today to deny altogether the existence of objective values. The most extreme version of this theory is utterly nihilistic. If value is completely an individual affair, there is no basis for discussion of values. It becomes meaningless to say "you ought" to do so and so, or that a certain form of government is "better" than another. It appears to be such a view that is entertained by Mr. Lawrence Dennis, when he declares: "The Fascist scheme of things is an expression of human will which creates its own truths and values from day to day to suit its changing purposes.[4]

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[3] See Arthur O. Lovejoy, "Reflections on the History of Ideas," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 1 (1940), pp. 3–23, at pp. 17–19.

[4] Lawrence Dennis, *The Coming American Fascism* (New York, 1936), p. 105.

Values, however, may be relative to the nature of men and still be universally, or generally, binding upon men. And this is all that is required for a theory of democracy. It may be held, for example, that values are relative to desire, while maintaining that there is a large measure of coincidence of ultimate human desires. Within this area of coincidence, then, it would be possible to talk and reason about questions of right and wrong. It is important to notice the distinction between these positions, because by means of ignoring it the teachings of relativistic moral philosophers are frequently applied in the field of political theory in a way which their authors would not countenance. An appraisal of the implications of this view for democratic theory must await an examination of theories of democracy.

The attempt will be made here to discover just what assumptions as to the nature of reason and what theories of ethics are presupposed by theories of democracy. As a result, it should be possible to adduce the minimum assumptions in these fields upon which a theory of democracy can be firmly established, and to determine whether the democratic ideal can be supported without dependence upon intuitively derived values.

One further preliminary matter needs to be disposed of: What is meant by "democracy"? This is not the place to become involved in a lengthy consideration of definitions. Let it be summarily and dogmatically stated that the essentials of democracy are here assumed to be equality of ultimate power in determining major issues of public policy for all sane adults, equality before the law, and the guarantee equally for all of certain rights and liberties which are generally judged requisite for the maintenance of the first two essentials and for the basic minimum of individual freedom.[5]

What are the requirements of an ethical theory which will furnish an adequate support for democracy? First of all, a theory which is to show why people generally should accept a democratic ideal must provide a universal, or nearly universal, principle of evaluation and basis of obligation. Secondly, this must be a basis of *political* obligation. It must provide an answer, that is to say, to the question why people should generally support the (democratic) state even when there appears to be a conflict between such action and their individual interests. Finally, the theory must directly support democracy as the ideal form of government. This it can do only by providing an equalitarian principle—one applicable to the claim of equality of rights and of ultimate political power. By their fulfillment or non-fulfillment of these qualifications, we may judge the various theories of democracy.

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[5] Two phrases commonly associated with the basic idea of democracy—"equality or rights" and "human dignity"—do not appear here, but it is believed that their substance is included.

After brief reference to Natural Rights theories, I shall deal in turn with the political theories of Utilitarianism, Idealism, and Rationalism, and with the application to politics of the ethical theories of R. B. Perry and W. T. Stace. Purely intuitionist theories (both of value and of ethics) are ruled out at the start, as has been indicated above.

II

The Natural Rights theories of democracy may be dismissed briefly. At the root of them all is the doctrine of equality: that all human beings are from birth entitled to equal rights (not, of course, that people are all equal in ability or necessarily that their enjoyments and possessions should be equal). This proposition is for the most part assumed to be self-evident. Where proof is attempted, it adds nothing of substance to the arguments of later writers whom I shall consider more fully.

The reliance of the Natural Rights theorists upon *a priori* principles was treated with disdain by the Utilitarians, especially by Bentham and James Mill. Little time need be spent retracing the familiar ground of the all-too-simple Benthamite reasoning. Happiness (an excess of pleasure over pain) is the end of man. (This proposition is assumed to be self-evident or based upon the believed fact that men always act with a view to increasing their own happiness.) Society's end is the "greatest good for the greatest number." In calculating this "greatest good," "each is to count for one and none for more than one," although nowhere is this equalitarian principle, so reminiscent of the derided Natural Rights school, justified.

The weakness of this philosophical basis, as well as of the defense of democracy which was built upon it, became apparent to the younger Mill, and he strove valiantly to reconstruct the tottering edifice. While admitting at the start that questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof in the ordinary sense, Mill nevertheless believed it possible to adduce rational considerations capable of commanding intellectual assent to the first principle of

Utilitarianism.[6] This is the principle that happiness, meaning pleasure unattended by pain, is the *summum bonum*. Mill's attempted "proof" took the line of trying to show that actually all men do desire happiness and that all their actions can be accounted for by reference to this simple fact. "Human nature," he declares, "is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness."[7] The promotion of happiness, therefore, is the only relevant test by which to judge human conduct. Mill remains a psychological hedonist.

He goes on, however, to contend that there are different kinds of pleasure, that some are preferable to others, as is testified by common experience, and that all who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating both the pleasures attendant upon employing the higher (mental, moral, and esthetic) faculties and those of lower origin express a marked preference for the former.

It still remains to be proved that the individual should seek to advance the happiness of others as well as to pursue happiness for himself. Although Mill is not satisfied with Bentham's easy assumption that there is never any conflict of interest between the individual and society as a whole, his attempts at proof leave a great deal to be desired. First, he argues that, as each person's happiness is a good to that person, it follows that the general happiness is a good to the aggregate of all persons. But this is sophistry. Anything that adds to my happiness will, to that extent, add to the general happiness; but it does not follow that anything that adds to the general happiness will increase my happiness. Secondly, Mill argues, altruistic feelings are the natural outgrowth of a powerful sentiment, the "social feelings of mankind," "the desire to be at unity with our fellow-creatures."[8] Consequently, rendering service to others and to society as a whole is a great source of pleasure. Once more, however, the problem of the case where public and private interest clash is left unsolved. Mill's third argument is based upon the superiority of the higher pleasures. The noble character, Mill contends in true Platonic vein, is in fact always happier than the ignoble. But, since he goes on to admit that some noble characters abjure their own happiness for the sake of others, his reasoning once more falls short of proof, even on his own assumptions as to the facts.[9]

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[6] John Stuart Mill, "Utilitarianism," in *Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government* (New York, 1910), p. 4.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[8] Mill, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

The major weaknesses of the philosophical basis of Mill's political theory to this point can be reduced to two. First, the psychological hedonism which remains basic to his doctrine, despite his modifications of the Benthamite formulation, is at best an oversimplified and inadequate account of the facts. I eat because I crave food, not because I crave pleasure and calculate that I can get it by satisfying my appetite. The Benthamite reasoning is overrationalistic in assuming that all our actions are preceded by such a calculation. Second, Mill's attempt to show that each of us ought to pursue the happiness of the whole as a means to our own pleasure fails to cover cases where a real sacrifice of pleasure is called for—fails, that is to say, to reduce altruism to egoism.

But, accepting this part of the theory for a moment, let us examine how Mill applies it to the discovery of the ideal form of government. Here he was far from content with his father's rationalism. Rulers are governed as much by the habitual sentiments of their class and by the traditions of their office as by their selfish interests. Nor is accountability necessarily the best way of obtaining an identity of interest between ruler and ruled.[10] Representative government is indeed the ideal, but not because the measures it adopts will certainly be sounder than those which would be adopted by another form of government. It is the effect of citizenship upon the citizen which is most significant, for the first criterion of a good form of government is the degree to which it promotes the general mental activity and raises the moral tone of the community. Mill's defense of representative government on the ground that it forces people to give thought to matters of practical importance to the well-being of society, and that it acts as a school of public spirit, is familiar ground.[11] It remains a powerful argument. If today it sounds in any degree intellectualistic and unrealistic, it must be remembered that, while we are inclined to contrast the educative and moralizing effect of democracy with what it might be, Mill was thinking of the opposite case where the citizen has absolutely no responsibility for civic affairs. Mill's insistence upon this "developmental" argument for democracy constitutes his most original contribution to the subject. It stems directly from his admission of qualities of pleasure and from the supreme value which he placed upon the "higher" faculties.

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[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 10–15.

[10] John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic* (2 vols., 10th ed., London, 1879), Vol. II, pp. 484 ff.

[11] John Stuart Mill, "On Representative Government," Chap. III, in *Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government* (New York, 1910).

The greatest weakness of this part of his theory, however, consists in the tacit assumption of the equalitarian principle, which, like the earlier Utilitarians, he hardly bothered to support. Yet, if anything, it is more incumbent upon John Stuart to prove this principle than it was upon his father; for, the admission of varying qualities of pleasure having been made, it would be an easy step to argue that the happiness of those whose higher faculties are well developed should count for more than that of others. In accordance with this line of reasoning, an aristocratic form of government well might provide a greater total development of the higher faculties than a democratic government in which the abler and more altruistic members of society were discouraged from political activity by the hopelessness of accomplishing anything in opposition to the ignorant and selfish majority. Mill's failure to defend the principle of basic human equality of right left the whole structure of his defense of democracy floating in mid-air.[12]

III

In some respects, the Idealist political philosophers may be thought of as representing a reaction against Utilitarianism. True, they put greater reliance upon a reason which is alleged to be integral to the human will, which is indeed the law of the will's fulfillment, but they are also less rationalistic in the sense of assuming that human conduct responds readily to rational appeals to self-interest.

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[12] The later development of Utilitarian ethics and its application to democratic theory is omitted because of its reliance upon intuitive principles. Henry Sidgwick, for example, might well have developed a theory of democracy on the foundation of his ethical Utilitarianism. That system, however, as Sidgwick was careful to point out, rested upon the intuitively derived principles of "prudence," "justice," and "rational benevolence" (Henry Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics* (7th ed., London, 1907).

The same remarks apply to the Ideal Utilitarianism of Hastings Rashdall. See his *The Theory of Good and Evil* (2 vols., 2nd ed., London, 1924), especially Bk. I, Chaps. VII–VIII. The utilitarianism of W. T. Stace as set forth in *The Concept of Morals* (New York, 1937) seems to me to belong in a different category and will be dealt with in connection with the theory of Ralph Barton Perry (see pp. 867–875 below).

Rights, declares Hudson, are "conditions of the best realization of what human beings are ultimately capable of becoming."[13] Not happiness but the fullest possible realization of the self constitutes, for the Idealists, the *summum bonum.* The most fundamental and inexpugnable of our instincts or desires is the desire, the will, to satisfy all our drives and to develop all our capacities. From the conflict between this will and many of our passing wants arises the feeling of obligation. Indeed, this fundamental will to be one's completest self is the basis of all obligation. Furthermore, man can achieve his fullest self-realization only by making a rational adjustment of his various desires rather than by satisfying one or a few at the expense of complete frustration of the others. The Good is therefore rational, from the point of view of the individual. More than this, the Good is also socially rational, for it involves a course of conduct which brings harmony rather than conflict among the various members of society. This is both because pursuit of ends which involve competition and conflict *ipso facto* leads to a great deal of mutual frustration, and also because the development of the mental and moral capacities will in fact be found to be the best way of avoiding internal as well as social conflicts. Service to society provides the greatest opportunities for realization of one's capacities, for the most complete satisfaction.[14]

While open to serious challenge,[15] this aspect of Idealist political theory avoids some of the pitfalls of Utilitarianism. The psychological assumptions are more realistic. Let us consider for a moment the extent to which unsupportable rationalistic assumptions enter into their case for the universality of value-judgments. As long as it is conceded—and it can hardly be denied—that man has the power to reason, that he does sometimes modify his impulses in the light of reflection, that he has an ineradicable impulse to reduce his conflicting desires to harmonious order, and to seek to justify his acts in terms of a social purpose which extends outside himself and includes the whole of society—as long as these conditions are conceded to exist, the ethical foundation of the theories in question is not shattered by the fact that man's proclivity to harness desire to purpose by the use of reason is not as powerful as once was thought.

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[13] Jay William Hudson, *Why Democracy?* (New York and London, 1936), p. 62. This recent formulation of idealistic political theory is relied upon heavily in the following paragraphs because it is perhaps the most careful statement of the case for democracy based upon Idealist philosophy. Among moderns, Idealist democratic theory can be traced back at least as far as Rousseau. However, most Idealists, like T. H. Green, who gave the first full expression of ethical theory by an Idealist in English, have not devoted themselves at all fully to a consideration of the theory of democracy.

The theory of rights described above has been adopted by political theorists who consider themselves far removed from the Idealists. Mr. Laski, for instance, defines rights as "those conditions of social life without which no man can seek, in general, to be himself at his best." Harold J. Laski, *A Grammar of Politics* (London, 1925), p. 91.

[14] Hudson, *op. cit.*, pp. 70–76, and William Ernest Hocking, *Man and the State* (New Haven, 1926), Chap. XXI.

[15] A major difficulty arises out of the fact that even the development of mental and moral capacities may depend upon material goods of which there is a limited supply and which therefore "admit of being competed for." In so far as Idealists attempt to meet this difficulty, it is generally by arguing that the fully developed self is characterized above all by good will.

The real question, then, relates to the extent to which human desires can be harmonized both within individuals and within society as a whole. This, in turn, depends upon the validity of the contention that the greatest—that is, the most intense and lasting—satisfactions are derived from conduct which is socially harmonious rather than competitive. In principle, at least, this is an empirical matter, capable of verification. On this proposition, rather than upon the rationality of man, the center of attention should be focussed, for, if it is sound, there is a firm foundation for rendering universal value judgments, even though man's irrationality may often lead him to act against his own real interest.

To be sure, the theory as thus far related is not a theory of democracy. It is essential to such a theory, however, for without a basis for rendering judgments of right and wrong an ethical basis of democracy would be impossible. Democracy cannot be grounded upon first principles of right if there are no such things. Furthermore, the consilience of real wills which the Idealists believe exists provides an easy opening for democratic theory by removing a serious obstacle; it is not necessary, according to this account, to sacrifice one group to another, for each can achieve the fullest self-realization possible for him by acting in ways which will promote the greatest possible self-realization of all others.

It remains, however, to deduce some principle of equality before this philosophy can be developed into a completely democratic theory. This Idealists do in various ways. First, they argue that all men and only men are possessed of reason and a moral nature,—the latter because reason makes possible deliberate choice in the light of calculated consequences. The importance of this common factor is so great, it is contended, that all other differences pale into insignificance beside this basic equality. A slight variant of this argument is the contention that because men's capacities are measureless it is impossible to compare one man with another in terms of fundamental worth, for worth must be measured by reference to potentiality rather than realization. This argument may be reinforced by the additional point that an individual can attain his fullest development, or self-realization, only if he is presumed to be capable of indefinite growth. Or, it may be said, it is the nature of the rational impulse itself to strive for a harmony which is all-inclusive, and to recognize the validity of the claim for equal consideration. Finally, this argument may be cast in less rationalistic mold by leaving out reference to the "rational impulse" and merely asserting that human nature is so constructed that an individual self can achieve its most fully satisfied condition only by coöperation with others and by sharing their purposes, only in a society in which all other individuals are recognized equally with it as ultimate centers of value, or as ends-in-themselves.[16]

Granted the Idealist arguments regarding the nature of the Good and the equality principle, it is comparatively easy to erect an ethical case for democracy as the ideal form of government. The self whose realization is the object of all endeavor is a self which is conscious of community of interest with all other men. But how better can such a consciousness be developed than by popular participation in and responsibility for government? Nothing can more surely induce men to become increasingly rational than the opportunity to exercise reason in regulating matters affecting their own vital interests. And this is precisely what democracy involves. Furthermore, morality by its very nature cannot be imposed, but must be self-developed. Everyone, therefore, should share in the control of the state, which is the supreme organization for the regulation of human conduct.[17]

At this point, the theoretical and practical arguments easily merge. If all men are to be treated as ends-in-themselves, which is to say as presumptively equal, some way must be found to validate that presumption. It does not mean, of course, that all men must have the same opportunities in the sense, for example, that all men might claim the same education regardless of their abilities. On the other hand, the bare principle of equality of consideration is not enough. It leaves so much to the evaluation of what each person's needs and abilities merit that a system which does not provide some guarantee of the fair application of the principle of equal consideration can hardly be called democratic. It would seem, therefore, that the presumption of equality which is basic to democracy requires, ideally, that the tests used in determining whether certain individuals are worthy of opportunities in excess of those which are open to all must be such as meet with well-nigh universal assent. Nothing less can insure a fair application of the equality principle.

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[16] Hudson, *op. cit.*, pp. 73–79; William Ernest Hocking, *The Lasting Elements of Individualism* (New Haven, 1937), p. 35; A. D. Lindsay, *I Believe in Democracy* (London, 1940), pp. 11–12; Marie Collins Swabey, *Theory of the Democratic State* (Cambridge, 1937), p. 19.

[17] Hudson, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

With reference to the Idealist theory of democracy as a whole, it may be said in summary that its unproved assumptions are not rationalistic in the sense in which we have been using that term. They do not depend upon any particular degree of rationality of human conduct. Rather, they gain their force from the fact that in some measure, at least, man has the capacity and desire to achieve a rational ordering of his own life. The validity of the Idealists' case depends upon the accuracy of their belief as to the means to the fullest human satisfaction. This may be tested both by observation of others and by introspection. Certainly the discovery that man uses his reason in large measure to satisfy his passions does not seriously undermine these arguments. The question is how he can most fully satisfy his passions, including his passion to be rational.[18]

With only slight modifications, the theory just described can be, and has been, adopted by others, who are not philosophical Idealists, but who perhaps may best be described as Rationalists. This may be said, for instance, of L. T. Hobhouse, a modern exponent of the Liberal tradition and a violent antagonist of Bosanquet's brand of Idealist political philosophy. Hobhouse dropped out the metaphysics of self-realization and talked instead about a harmony of interests as the *summum bonum*. Like the Idealists, he believed that men should pursue this harmony because in that way they can achieve the greatest satisfaction of their conflicting demands. Like them also, he believed that individual harmony can best be achieved through social harmony. The social harmony must not be imposed from above, but achieved from below by the "self-directing power of personality;" for the full and harmonious development of personality requires above all the development of "will, of personality, of self-control, or whatever else we please to call that central harmonizing power which makes us capable of directing our own lives."[19]

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[18] To be sure, Idealists might seek further support for their arguments by reference to their general metaphysical position regarding the relation of the individual self to God, or the Absolute; but the theory, as stated above, can stand alone.

Finally, once more in agreement with the Idealists, he held that "the impulse to establish harmony in the world of feeling and action—a harmony which must include all those who think and feel —is the essence of the rational impulse in the world of practice," "the persistent impulse of the rational being."[20] No reasoning can be valid which opposes this principle, because it is integral to the reasoning faculty itself.[21]

IV

If we shift our attention from the Idealists and Rationalists to more recent ethical theory, we find a difference, partly in temper and partly in substance. Moral philosophy is less inclined than it once was to identify the good with self-realization or with an abstract rationality. This is particularly true of Professor Perry and his followers. The Good is still held by philosophers of this school of thought to be derived from interest, as was the case in a sense with Utilitarians, Idealists, and Rationalists, but it is no longer maintained that all interests can be rationally integrated. Good is defined directly in terms of the satisfaction of interest, without the interposition of a metaphysical and somehow transcendent

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[19] Hobhouse, *Liberalism* (New York, 1911), p. 123.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 130. Since Hobhouse nowhere fully develops a justification of democracy, one can only surmise that he would support the principle of equality along lines similar to the Idealists. There is at least a hint of such an approach in the passages quoted above.

[21] H. J. Paton's coherence theory of Good appears to me to be substantially the same as Hobhouse's theory of the Rational Good as far as concerns its application to the theory of democracy. On the problem of individual *versus* social good, note, for example, his statement that although goodness ultimately resides in the actions of individuals, "the goodness of an individual seems to belong to him primarily when he wills to make himself a vehicle of the whole, when he wills his actions and determines his life as an element in the wider coöperative activity of the whole." H. J. Paton, *The Good Will* (London, 1927), p. 307.

"self," and without attempting to measure the good by any standard outside of the individual, such as "social harmony."[22]

At first glance, it might appear that a theory which makes the Good a function of interest would be disastrous to liberal democracy. As Professor Perry himself has said, "the canker at the heart of modern liberalism is the suspicion that its hallowed morality is only one prejudice among others."[23] It should be clear from our discussion of other theories, however, that this need not be the case. If in fact there is some constancy and universality about the nature of human desires, or interests, then it follows that to that extent values are constant and universal. The complete relativism of Westermarck obscures this important fact by its definition of value in terms of that which is thought valuable, thus opening the door to an infinite regress and evading the important task of examining the empirical question of what experiences in fact do prove to be most valuable or satisfying.

How great is the area of common or harmonious interests then becomes an empirical matter, to be determined by investigation. Although reason does not always produce harmony, it is a tool which may be used to discover new ways of satisfying the maximum of desires harmoniously.[24] Furthermore, man has also the faculty sometimes referred to as the "practical reason," by means of which he can and does evaluate and regulate certain desires in the light of others and of his more settled purposes.[25]

Certain corollaries may be deduced from the principle of maximizing satisfaction which will be of assistance in making evaluations. Thus it may be suggested (1) that the more durable satisfactions are to be preferred to the less durable, other things being equal; (2) that the more basic and intense satisfactions are to be preferred to the more superficial; and (3) that the more harmonious satisfactions are to be preferred to the less harmonious. Accordingly, it would appear that the satisfactions to be derived from love, wisdom, health, sense of workmanship, devotion to beauty, and economic security are better than those derived from tyrannical power over people, bigotry, acquisitiveness, military prowess, and racial or nationalistic pride.[26]

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[22] See Ralph Barton Perry, *General Theory of Value* (New York and London, 1926), p. 115.

[23] Ralph Barton Perry, *Shall Not Perish from the Earth* (New York, 1940), p. 21.

[24] Perry, *General Theory of Value*, p. 88.

[25] See Arthur E. Murphy, *The Uses of Reason* (New York, 1943), pp. 97–105, and W. T. Stace, *The Destiny of Western Man* (New York, 1942), pp. 264 ff. and especially p. 278.

In other words, it once more appears that the individual can in general gain the fullest satisfaction, and hence the greatest good, by seeking to fulfill his needs in ways that do not conflict with the needs of others and by developing those capacities which are least competitive in nature, such as the intellect and the desire to serve others, whether through the advancement of science or political leadership, or even more direct forms of social service. Unlike the theories we have previously surveyed, however, this theory does not assert that there will never be an irresolvable conflict between individual interests. A satisfaction which produces harmony may be preferred because of superior durability or intensity. When such conflicts appear, we must either import some other principle—basically intuitive—or we must give up and say that in such instances there is no ethical solution. The latter is Perry's position.[27] How serious such an admission would be for the theory of democracy depends entirely upon the nature and extent of such conflicts. It is at least conceivable that they might be few and unimportant enough to create relatively inconsequential hiatuses in the network of ethical imperatives supporting the structure of democratic doctrine. The area in which human purposes are consilient and ultimate interests common and sharable, or at least non-competitive, may turn out to be very large.

In a world in which competition and conflict are so prevalent and such abundant sources of crises, it is easy to overlook the extent to which man is a social animal. A little reflection, however, will demonstrate that he is dependent upon society even more for satisfaction of his psychological needs than for that of his physical needs. He is sympathetic, as well as ambitious, as Rousseau pointed out, and as even Hobbes, in a moment of weakness, admitted. His simplest joys are multiplied on being shared or enjoyed in company. He requires human affection—what more barren than a life without it?—and needs, as well, to give affection to others. While this is most commonly and intensely experienced within small circles, there seems to be no limit to the extent to which happiness can be increased by widening the circle of sociality. In fact, men find happiness in the bare fact of the happiness of others; and the sufferings of others, other things being equal, are painful to him.[28] Furthermore, the socializing effects of the sympathetic nature of man are buttressed from an unexpected source—his approbativeness. To win the respect and commendation of others, it may safely be asserted, is a universal yearning of human nature. Surely to minister unto the needs of others, to care for them, to seek to advance their interests, and in general to treat them as ends-in-themselves, are the surest ways to win their approbation. Life in the sort of society which is produced by such behavior is also, in itself, a source of intense and enduring satisfaction.[29]

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[26] Melvin Rader, *No Compromise—the Conflict between Two Worlds* (New York, 1939), pp. 82–83. Cf. Perry's standards of intensity, preference, and inclusiveness. *Op. cit.*, Chap. XXI.

[27] Perry, *General Theory of Value*, p. 655.

To be sure, men frequently derive satisfaction from behavior which is anti-social and which denies all consideration for the behavior of other men. The case for the inferiority of these modes of behavior must rest upon a judgment that in general and in the long run, either because of their intrinsic nature or because of the reactions they produce on the behavior of others, such kinds of behavior will produce less satisfaction than those described in the preceding paragraphs.

Up to this point, in discussing the application to democracy of Perry's ethical theory, nothing has been said about a principle of equality, or of the ultimacy of the individual. As to the latter, there can be no question. Perry's theory stems entirely from the individual and his satisfaction. Nothing can be more ultimate in his ethical system. On the matter of equality, in the sense in which we have found it implied in democratic theory, Perry's position has not been expressed so clearly. It should be noted, however, that the arguments set forth in the preceding paragraph (which are not Perry's, but are entirely compatible with his position) seem to imply not only that human beings will normally achieve the greatest satisfaction by conduct which promotes community, but also that the achievement of community can be accomplished only by treating all human beings as potentially equal—that is to say, by setting up that presumption of equality which I have argued constitutes the essence of the democratic spirit, and so the justifying principle of political democracy (see above, p. 866).

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[28] See W. T. Stace, *op. cit.*, Chaps. XI and XII, especially pp. 262–277, and also *The Destiny of Western Man* (New York, 1942), Chap. XII.

[29] Cf. the statement by Arthur E. Murphy that "when men coöperate freely, through their reasonable acknowledgement of mutual responsibilities, as members of a 'kingdom of ends,' a level of conduct is achieved which is of peculiar value, a moral order which makes sense of much in human nature that without it would remain frustrated and unfulfilled." Arthur E. Murphy, *The Uses of Reason* (New York, 1943), p. 117. See further the whole of Pt. II, Chap. I.

Perry himself may be said to support this position, at least by implication. The argument runs something like this. As has already been pointed out, your values and mine are ultimately incommensurable on the basis of Perry's position. The only way to resolve a conflict, then, is to remove it. The only real solution is one which receives the concurrence of all.[30] It does not follow from this, of course, that there must be such a solution, and Perry is careful to say that there may not be. But we are all under obligation to seek such a solution, for in the resulting completely harmonious society we should find our completest satisfaction—our *summum bonum.*

There are indeed passages in which Perry seems to look beyond the principle of satisfaction of interests for support of the democratic principle of equality. In a recent popular defense of democracy, for example, he appears to fall back upon the argument of the Idealists and the Rationalists that a basic equality of right is derivable from the fact that every man has in some degree, actually or potentially, the faculty of reason.[31] Elsewhere, in a much earlier work, Perry bases the democratic postulate, or something very close to that postulate as it has been defined in this article, upon the notion of justice.[32] He nowhere clearly tells us why we should be just. The relationship between the theory of *The Moral Economy* and *The General Theory of Value* is not made clear. A possible line of argument, of course, would be to contend that as a matter of fact one who leads a just life can obtain more complete satisfaction than one who does not.[33] It is not at all clear, however, that Perry is willing to go this far.

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[30] Perry, *op. cit.*, pp. 669–674.

[31] Perry, *Shall Not Perish from the Earth*, p. 29.

[32] Ralph Barton Perry, *The Moral Economy* (New York, 1909). Notice this passage: "Justice imputes a certain inviolability to the claims of that unit of life which we term loosely a human, personal, moral, free, or rational being. There is some sense in which you are a finality; making it improper for me simply to dispose of you, even if it be my sincere intention to promote thereby the well-being of humanity" (p. 64). And again: "Discussion involves mutual respect, in which each party acknowledges the finality of the other as a vehicle of truth. This, I believe, is that moral equality, that dignity and ultimate responsibility attaching to all rational beings alike, without which justice cannot be fulfilled" (p. 66).

[33] Speaking, in *The Moral Economy*, of presumptive equality, Perry wrote: "I . . . mean that there is an idea that the best life is for all; and that if there are many that

In summary, then, it appears that the relativistic ethics of Perry—if such it can be called—is so far from being nihilistic that it provides as firm a foundation for democratic theory as any we have examined. It provides a basis for obligation which, if not universal, is wide indeed, and a doctrine of presumptive equality at least as water-tight as those examined previously.

V

Before attempting to bring together our findings in general, it would perhaps be well to establish more clearly the relationships between the various writers considered. For example, a word should be said about Mr. Stace. His theory has been treated as though it were fundamentally the same as that of Perry. From the point of view of the purpose of this article, I believe that treatment sound; but it needs explanation. Unlike Perry, Stace believes that happiness is the final source of value, the *summum bonum*. However, happiness comes from satisfaction, although not all satisfactions, he holds, are equal in producing the durable condition of well-being known as happiness. Furthermore, his analysis of the conditions leading to the maximization of happiness, as has already been pointed out, is similar to Perry's analysis of the conditions for maximizing satisfaction and, if anything, even more favorable for democratic theory.

What about the relationship between Perry and Stace on the one hand and the Idealists and Rationalists on the other? Here again the differences prove of little significance for our purposes. Whether we talk about self-realization, the rational impulse, satisfaction, or happiness (as those terms are defined by the writers in question), our notion of the Good is definitely tied to human nature. By any of these tests, the basic facts regarding the physical and psychological needs of man and the ways in which he reacts and the feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction (happiness or unhappiness, harmony or disharmony, oneness with his conception of his highest self or the reverse) which attend on certain behavior on his part and that of others are the relevant facts for determining

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are incapable of entering into it, then they must be helped to be capable. And I mean, furthermore, that *this idea works irresistibly.* It commands the support of the whole army of interests. It will never be abandoned because it makes for the increase of life on the whole; and hence no social order will henceforth be stable that is not based upon it." Especially the last sentence suggests that Perry is arguing only that more people find satisfaction in a just society than in an unjust one.

right conduct. This is an empirical matter. True, the evidence is so extensive and so intangible that at many points it is impossible to obtain a judgment that is much better than conjectural. The encouraging fact, however, is that on a great many points the judgment of mankind, and especially of those who have given particular attention to such problems, shows remarkable agreement. Our review of the principal non-intuitionist theories of ethics of recent times indicates such a concurrence of judgment regarding the principles basic to democratic theory.

The answers to the questions posed at the outset should now be evident and capable of brief formulation. Those questions were: What are the minimum assumptions for a valid democratic theory of the state? And how is such a theory affected by skepticism about the "rational" and "right-thinking" man? It has been argued here that the answer to the first question must be approached as follows. One who would defend democracy as the ideally best form of government must first find some standard of right which is universally applicable, or nearly so, and then must prove that the realization of the Good entails an important measure of individual liberty, of freedom to make significant choices, for all. The last phrase is vital. Adherence to the principle of presumptive equality is the final test. From these premises it is a fairly simple matter to establish the case for democratic government as a necessary condition to the democratic way of life which the premises imply.[8]

The search for a universal standard of right and for a basis for the equality principle has led to the conclusion that no cosmic scheme of values is required for our purposes. By finding in the general characteristics of human nature a basis for principles of right conduct, the need for universality has been met. There is also persuasive empirical evidence for two propositions regarding what kind of conduct most fully satisfies the requirements of human nature. First, such satisfaction is derived from conduct which contributes to harmonious social living. This adds to the basis for obligation a basis for political obligation, as explained above. Secondly, recognition of the principle of presumptive equality is also essential to such satisfaction. This completes the requirements for an ethical theory which can support a theory of democracy.

It is true that it is by no means agreed that there are not instances where there is no way of reconciling clashes of interest. Furthermore, there are probably also cases in which an individual might be able to obtain greater satisfaction by violating the principle of equality than by acting in accordance with it. If this is correct, it can only be concluded that for such a person, in such an instance, action in accordance with the postulates of democracy is not ethically required. To conclude otherwise would involve making some assumption for which no rational justification is evident. But this conclusion need not alarm supporters of democracy. If the empirical judgments which have been set forth above are correct, in the vast majority of cases good behavior will be democratic behavior. The exceptions will be so few that they need not cause serious concern.[34]

What, then, of the attack upon the "rational, right-thinking" man? If by "right-thinking" is meant a man who somehow knows and tends to follow principles of conduct rooted in some cosmic sense of values, it appears that no such assumption is essential to democratic theory. Hence this attack need not concern us. The fact of human irrationality is not incompatible with the theory here set forth. That theory requires that man should be able to calculate and to deliberate, should have the faculty of mediating between conflicting interests, and of subordinating immediate impulses to settled purposes; but these are all matters of common observation, although frequently their full significance is overlooked.

One corollary of our examination of the effect of skepticism upon democratic theory needs to be pointed out. If our argument to the effect that democracy can be adequately supported by the use of rational and empirical methods is sound, there is no need to turn to pure faith for such support. True, democracy is not likely to survive unless its supporters have strong emotional commitments to its principles—unless, indeed, they have faith in its ideals. But that faith, to endure, must be grounded, more or less consciously, upon some rational and empirical foundation. In fact, those who argue that the values upon which democracy rests are beyond rational criticism or evaluation by reference to empirical evidence jeopardize the very values they are defending.[35] Their opponents can and do assert *their* values as equally self-evident truths.

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[34] It must be remembered that we are not concerned with mere individual instances in which action in accordance with democratic principles cannot be shown to be to a person's interest in that instance *taken by itself*. All that is required is that *on the whole* democratic institutions tend to maximize the individual's satisfaction. He cannot expect to be permitted to enjoy such institutions if he insists on abiding by them only in those instances in which they benefit him.

In other words, we must not fly from skepticism to the opposite extreme. Those of us who are committed to scholarship and the light of reason should not give up the effort to find a rational basis for whatever doctrines we espouse. If we find in man a universal tendency to justify his actions in terms of social well-being, the cornerstone of our structure has been laid. And if we discover that man has an inherent proclivity to strive for an all-inclusive harmony, or that so to strive is a necessary condition of self-realization, or of realization of the Good, or of complete satisfaction, then we have our structure well on the road to completion. The finishing touch is added when it is stated that human beings can approach this all-inclusive harmony only on the basis of a recognition of a certain ultimate human equality, such as is involved in treating every man as an end-in-himself. This completes the theory—the ethical foundation of democracy as the ideal form of government; and, it is submitted, except for theories which rely upon intuition, it constitutes the irreducible minimum for such a theory.

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[35] For a strong statement of the position that democracy must be based upon "transcendental" values, which are "not susceptible to empirical proof" and "must be accepted upon faith," see John H. Hallowell, "The Decline of Liberalism," *loc. cit.* (note 1 at p. 342). Note also Willmoore Kendall's assertion that the principle of majority rule is "self-evident" and incapable of proof or disproof. Willmoore Kendall, "The Majority Principle and the Scientific Élite," *Southern Review*, Vol. 4 (1938–39), pp. 463–473, at p. 465. An elaboration of the dangers involved in the refusal to analyze the basis for democratic beliefs may be found in an article by Sidney Hook on "The Philosophical Presuppositions of Democracy," in *Ethics*, Vol. 52 (1941–42), pp. 275–296, at pp. 275–276.

LEGAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY, II

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III. CONDITIONS FORESHADOWING THE SOVIET-NAZI PACT AND WORLD WAR II

There are abundant controversial treatises bearing on Soviet-Nazi relationships, with their consequent effect on world power politics.[28] The observations summarized herewith may shed light on recent developments, suggesting the cataclysm that today shakes the world.

(1) Mutual distrust on the part of the British and French governments on the one hand and the Soviet régime on the other, dating back to the Revolution of October 7, 1917. In a large measure, this is due to the fact that there have been, and there are now, active Communists and sympathizers in England and in the United States to propagandize the Soviets' point of view and to apologize for the faults of the Stalin régime. Conversely, there have never been, and there are not now, democratic agents and sympathizers at large in Soviet Russia to represent and interpret Western ideas of democracy either to the Russian people or to the Soviet leaders. There is a school of thought represented by distinguished scholars in America and England which contends that the Soviet overtures at Geneva looking toward disarmament were naively insincere. Ambassador Litvinôv's personal motives were, however, beyond reproach. The argument advanced is that

> "in the light of Soviet revolutionary expediency, Litvinov's program of disarmament was another illustration of the Kremlin's deceit in its international bargaining. . . . As such, the Soviet policy of championing world disarmament, though outwardly inconsistent with the revolutionary need of an army, was not in discord with the Marxian credo that the end justifies the means. . . . To the Soviets, international war and peace are not two diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive phenomena, but two equally important means, supplementing each other in the communists' advance towards their final revolutionary goal."[29]

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[28] Frederick L. Schuman, *Night Over Europe; The Diplomacy of Nemesis, 1939–40* (New York, 1941); Vera Micheles Dean, "Russia's Rôle in European Conflict," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XV, No. 24, Mar., 1, 1940; E. Straus, *Soviet Russia* (London, 1941).

[29] T. A. Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy* (New York, 1940), pp. 275 and 295. This scholarly treatise was published under the auspices of the Bureau of International Research, Harvard University and Radcliffe College.

Recent military developments seem to point in the opposite direction; the Soviets have been motivated, not by conquest, but by sheer self-preservation. The Soviets' foresight and military preparedness have been the outstanding single determining factor in the ultimate defeat of Nazi Germany.

(2) Germany and Turkey were among the first countries in Europe to establish relations with Soviet Russia after 1917. This fact is important to an understanding of Russia's later relations with Nazi Germany. Since the days of Bismarck, German policy toward Russia has been guided by two major considerations: (1) the Germans have regarded Russia as an essential source of food and raw materials, as well as a market for their manufactured goods and their technical exports; (2) they have feared the possibility of war on two fronts, and have again and again sought to insure the Reich against war in the East.

The Kremlin suspected that both Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay remained inimical to the Soviet Union, and might attempt to divert Germany from the West by creating a new theatre of war in the Balkans and the Near East, where they would attempt to draw Russia into war against the Reich. This suspicion, latent in the Soviet Union for many years, was sharply increased in July, 1940, when the German Foreign Office, following the occupation of Paris, issued a White Book alleging that France and Britain had planned to attack Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus with the aid of Turkey and Iran. As far as the limited available data indicate, these allegations have not been denied.[30]

(3) The subterranean interplay of alliances effected by the British and French governments, with the tacit consent of the government of the United States, prompted the Soviet government to seek and to maintain its own equipoise of political power by *means other than war*. Consequently there has always been an undercurrent of anxiety, and the Soviet Union has always been poised for an emergency. Soviet economists and political scientists are aware of this phenomenon and are frank in voicing their observations:

"We entertain no illusions in regard to the burgeois democracies. We know they are nothing but one of the expressions of the bourgeois dictatorship. Yet, in comparison with absolute lawlessness, oppression, enslavement, and the hell which is suffered by the proletariat under Fascism, the bourgeois democracy has not a few advantages. Marxists have always considered the bourgeois democracy as a great advance as compared with feudalism and absolutism."[31]

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[30] See editorial, "Razablachennye Planny Organizatorov Voiny ("Revealed Plans of Organizers of War"), *Izvestya*, July 5, 1940. In this connection, see also the statement made by Vyacheslav M. Molotov at the Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on August 31, 1939, and published in *International Literature*, Nos. 8–9 (Moscow, 1939).

In an address delivered at the Eighteenth All-Union Communist Party Congress on March 11, 1939, Dmitri Z. Manuilsky, member of the executive committee of the Communist International, poured scorn on the policy of Britain and France in capitulating to fascism:

> "The plan of the English reactionary bourgeoisie is this:—sacrificing of the small states of Southeastern Europe to Fascist Germany and to direct Germany eastward, namely, against the U.S.S.R., to attempt by such a counter-revolutionary war to retard the further successes of socialism and the victory of communism in the U.S.S.R.; to bribe Germany from her imperialistic designs on English colonies."[32]

He further charged that British reactionaries planned to divide Spain with Italy at the expense of France, woo Italy from the Axis and Germany, and participate in the partition of China after Japan and China had both become weakened.

Curiously enough, the Soviets' charges against the men and forces responsible for the present débâcle have also recently been echoed by the former Foreign Minister of Italy, who stated:

> "The Italian people would have overthrown Fascism at the start of the Ethiopian adventure if the honest backing of the League had been given them. The responsibility for their failure to do so rests with the "Official" foreign foes of Mussolini, who were in reality his secret supporters. This strange phenomenon has not quite disappeared. For that reason the United Nations may, with regard to Italy, face new disillusionment, further loss of prestige and precious time."[33]

Soviet leaders have spoken and written with equal vehemence and in similar vein. In this connection, a statement made by one of Stalin's key "yes-men" merits quoting:

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[31] Eugene Varga, "25-Letie Imperialisticheskoi Voiny ("25 Years of the Imperialistic War"), in *Mirovoye Khoziaistvo i Mirovaya Politika* ("World Economics and World Politics"), Nos. 7–8, pp. 9–10 (1939).

[32] *Pravda*, Mar. 12, 1939. Excerpts from Manuilsky's address analyzing other phases of the Party's activities, particularly those dealing with the growth of membership in foreign countries, were published in the *New York Times*, Mar. 13, 1939.

[33] Count Carlo Sforza, "Thoughts on World War III", *The Nation*, Vol. 155, No. 1, July 4, 1942.

"The British and French Governments have no wish for an equal treaty with the U.S.S.R., that is, for the only kind of treaty to which a self-respecting state can agree. They desire a treaty in which the U.S.S.R. would play the hard laborer shouldering the entire burden of obligations. They talk about a treaty with us only to speculate before public opinion in their countries on the imaginary unyielding attitude of the U.S.S.R., and thus make easier for themselves the road to deal with the aggressors."[34]

This official warning was evidently issued with a view to calling the attention of public opinion in Britain and in France to the fact that those governments should be headed by men who would evince confidence in Soviet leaders, and not by the leaders who betrayed Czechoslovakia at the ill-fated Munich Conference. The Soviets thus embarked upon a preventive encirclement strategy; the fear of aggression gradually moved them to counter-aggression.

Soviet legal writers spared no effort in insisting that the main purpose of the proffered rapprochement of London and Paris with Moscow was to use the Soviets merely as tools for their own interests. Proudly crediting themselves with loyalty to Stalin's precept that Soviet policy should always be oriented toward the U.S.S.R. only, it was not the intention of the Soviet Government to be provoked into conflicts by the instigators of war. The vital interests of the Soviets dictated rapprochement with Germany; and the pact of August 23, 1939, was the way to safeguard those interests.[35] As evidenced by subsequent events, the "Pact" was an honest one, since neither party expected to keep it in force.

(4) Maxim Litvinov's failure to establish an effective system of collective security, i.e., to check aggression before it occurred, and the subsequent withering away of the League of Nations, again convinced the Soviets that they would have to rely on their own efforts in warding off or resisting attacks by Germany and/or Japan. Consequently, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was shaped in terms of *Realpolitik*, as reflected in the fluctuating trends of international relations during the last decade.

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[34] Andrey Zhdanov, in *Pravda*, June 29, 1939. At the time this article was published, Andrey Zhdanov was chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union.

[35] Josif M. Lemin, "Sovetsko-Germanskiia Otnosheniia" ("Soviet-German Relationship"), in *Mirovoye Khoziastvo i Mirovaya Politika*, No. 10 (1939) pp. 38 ff.; "Torzhestvo Stalinskoi Politika Mira" ("Triumph of Stalin's Peace Policy"), *ibid.*, No. 11 (1939), pp. 82 ff.

Contending that the British and French governments sabotaged all efforts in behalf of "collective security," the Soviet government was very reluctant later to participate actively in "collective action" against aggressors, because such action might involve it in war with Germany and Japan simultaneously. This it sought to avoid at all costs. Subsequent events have demonstrated the farsightedness and wisdom of Litvinov's judgment in his advocacy of effective "collective security" and "durable peace." Litvinov failed in his mission with honor and sincerity.

(5) The Nazi-Soviet Pact was consummated, so it seems, in the belief that the Nazis would conquer their imperialist rivals. Hence Stalin undertook to present Hitler with the domination of Western Europe. However, the Soviet régime realized too well that a victorious Nazism was bound to be, soon or late, the mortal enemy of the Soviet Union. This observation may be substantiated by the fact that three days after this Pact was announced the Soviet government instituted universal compulsory military service, and that it later reduced the initial military age from twenty to eighteen and one-half years.[36]

Subsequent events proved, however, that the benevolent neutrality of the Soviet government toward Nazism greatly increased the latter's chances of success. Moreover, the grave mistake by the Soviets lay in their miscalculations, and in not realizing that by signing the Pact they helped the Nazis to become so strong militarily and politically as to seem to warrant their unprovoked onslaught on the Soviet Union itself.

As indicated earlier, it seems that imperialist ambition of the Soviet government was and is a secondary factor, if a factor at all, in its foreign policy. One of the primary considerations of the Soviet régime in concluding the non-aggression pact with Hitler was a desire to avoid war with its most dangerous potential enemy, even at the price of abetting fascism in its policy of aggression. Parenthetically, it may be observed that the ferocious attacks by the Nazis around Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalingrad have demonstrated Russia's formidable resistance, and have contributed immeasurably to national cohesion, discipline, and collective morale within the Soviet Union. Russian patriotism and Russian nationalism were the moving cores in Russia's reconquest of its territory.

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[36] *Vedomostii Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Organ of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.), No. 32 (Sept. 23, 1939), pp. 1–2.

(6) On his return trip from Russia and his visit from Joseph V. Stalin in the Kremlin, Prime Minister Churchill did not minimize the barrier that still stood in the way of better coöperation between the British and Soviet governments. The meeting between these two leaders took place, it will be remembered, at the time when the savage battle between the Axis and the United Nations was *in medias res*. The Prime Minister reported that

> "The Russians did not think that we or America had done enough to take the weight off them, and this is not at all surprising in view of the terrific onslaughts which they have withstood with marvelous tenacity.
>
> "It was difficult to make the Russians comprehend the difficulties of ocean transport, as Russia is essentially a continent while we are an island. It was difficult to explain fully the different characteristics of the war effort of the various countries, but I am sure we made their leaders feel confidence in our loyal and sincere resolve to come to their aid as quickly as possible, without regard to sacrifices and losses involved so long as the contribution is toward victory."[37]

The implication is thus quite clear. While Stalin and Churchill left each other with an understanding, there were vital points of disagreement between them which have not yet been clarified, the Anglo-Soviet Agreement of May 26, 1942, notwithstanding. The fact that neither Stalin nor the other members of the *Politbureau* ever had contacts with the outside world, especially with the Western democracies, made confusion and misunderstanding the more confounded. This situation became all the more obvious when President Roosevelt's three personal envoys, Harry L. Hopkins, W. Averell Harriman, and Wendell L. Willkie, failed to effect the coveted *rapport* between contemporary Soviet and British leaders.

(7) As generally observed, the Soviets argue that their treaties of neutrality and non-aggression are different from those effected by other great powers, being designed specifically against aggressive wars. They also argue that this was the primary motive for their championing the Pact of Paris. The Soviets further contend that their treaties of non-aggression make no distinction between war and intervention, but apply to any form of action by arms. Their outstanding spokesman has expounded this thesis on several occasions when he stated that "a particular characteristic of neutrality, in the contemporary imperialist system, is the fact that neu-

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[37] Statement made by Winston Churchill in the House of Commons, Sept. 8, 1942; dispatched by Reuter and published in *New York Times*, Sept. 9, 1942, p. 4.

trality is subjected to the ends pursued by the aggressor. As a rule, a treaty of neutrality is only one of the elements in preparing for war, one of the elements in making an aggression harmless."[38]

The treaties with Italy, France, Finland, and Poland signed in 1932 and 1933 all carried the "escape clause." If one party attacked a third country, the other could denounce the treaty without notice. In fact, the Soviet government threatened to do this in case Poland attempted to invade Czechoslovakia in September, 1938; and it held that its participation in sanctions against Italy in the Abyssinian war was not in contravention of its non-aggression treaty with Italy.

In a speech delivered April 4, 1934, on the occasion of the signing of the protocols for the promulgation of the pacts of non-aggression between the U.S.S.R. and the Baltic countries, Litvinov emphasized that "it should be clear to the whole world that our proposal is not of a temporary nature and is not inspired by a casual conjunction of circumstances, but is an expression of our constant and permanent policy of peace, an essential element of which is the provision for the independence of the young states you represent."[39]

One of the last published addresses delivered by Litvinov was that of September 21, 1938, at the Seventh Plenary Meeting of the Nineteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations. In this speech, the then People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs outlined the attitude of the Soviet Union on the acts of aggression in Europe. He contended that its position was based on the general and unalterable principles of its foreign policy. He reiterated that the Soviet government had always striven to strengthen its relations with other countries by the conclusion of pacts of non-aggression and of neutrality treaties for the settlement of conflicts by conciliation. Referring to the treaty of mutual assistance between the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia, Litvinov made a very clear and unambiguous statement:

> "We intend to fulfill our obligations under the pact and, together with France, to afford assistance to Czechoslovakia by the ways open to us. Our War Department is ready immediately to participate in a conference with representatives of the French and Czechoslovakian War Departments, in order to discuss the measure appropriate to the moment."[40]

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[38] Maxim M. Litvinov, *Vneshniaya Politika SSSR; Rechii Zaiavlenii* ("Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.; Speeches and Statements"), 1927–1935 (Moscow, 1935), p. 136.

[39] Maxim Litvinov, *Against Aggression* (New York, 1939), p. 16.

[40] *Op. cit.*, p. 129.

Litvinov's plea went unheeded. Instead, the British and French governments ignored the Soviet government and effected the ill-fated Munich Pact on September 29, 1938.

In the light of such official assertions and pledges, it is difficult to reconcile the Soviet's treaty obligations with subsequent events.[41] Suffice it to mention the Treaty of Non-Aggression with Poland, signed in Moscow on July 25, 1932, and the Treaty of Friendship and Boundaries between the Third Reich and the U.S.S.R. as a result of which Poland ceased to exist.[42]

(8) Five months before the Nazi-Soviet Pact became effective, Communist propaganda launched a campaign for a Russian-German rapprochement on the ground that there was no real reason for war between these two countries. Again the signal was given by Stalin himself, when he called attention to the lack of any real reason for war between Germany and the Soviets and accused enemies of the Communist régime of provoking a war between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Contending that in practice non-intervention had never been regarded as a principle of international law, Stalin made the pronouncement that

> "One of the principles upon which the foreign policy rested was the proletarian support of nations who have fallen victims of aggression and are fighting for their independence.
>
> "Politics is politics, as the old case-hardened bourgeois diplomats say. It must be remarked, however, that the big and dangerous political game started by the supporters of the policy of non-intervention may end in a serious fiasco for them.
>
> "The aim of the Communist party itself must be the promotion of peace and extreme vigilance that the Soviet Union be not drawn into armed conflicts by instigators of war who are accustomed to have some one else pull their chestnuts out of the fire."[43]

Five days later, on March 15, 1939, German troops marched into

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[41] For a documented résumé of events preceding the fateful Munich Pact, see Frederick L. Schuman, *Europe on the Eve; The Crises of Diplomacy, 1933–1939* (New York, 1940).

[42] For a list of bilateral treaties, agreements, pacts, and protocols regarding peace, establishment of relations, and other political questions, to which the U.S.S.R. is a signatory, see T. A. Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy*, Appendix, pp. 315 ff. A more comprehensive résumé of those treaties is contained in *Sbornik Deistvuiushchikh Dogovorov* ("A Collection of Treaties, Agreements, and Conventions in Force with Foreign States"), No. 249, Vol. VII (1933).

[43] Joseph V. Stalin, Speech at the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party, Mar. 10, 1939, in *Izvestya*, Mar. 11, 1939, No. 57.

Prague. As is known, the Soviet government's reaction was to do nothing.

The Second World War formally began on September 1, 1939. Eight months later, when it became clear beyond any doubt that the French army was defeated, Fascist Italy joined the Axis Powers on June 10, 1940. The Axis Powers and Japan pledged themselves to respect and support each others' efforts "to establish and maintain a new order of things" in Europe and Greater East Asia. The tripartite alliance[44] concluded by Germany, Italy, and Japan on September 27, 1940, evoked official Soviet reaction to the effect that it had been prompted by an extension of military collaboration between England and the United States and presaged an expansion of the war. Furthermore, the Berlin pact did not represent anything particularly unexpected for the Soviet Union, which had been informed of its terms in advance by the German government.[45] Soviet Russia was still pledged to a policy of peace and neutrality; and this policy was recognized by the Axis Powers and Japan, which had stated in Article V of their alliance that their relations with the Soviet Union remained unchanged.

In the light of the foregoing, one is prone to doubt that Soviet diplomacy was primarily a reflection of an inner degeneration of Soviet society.[46] Rather it is submitted that Stalin and his associates at the Kremlin have been the master players of *Realpolitik*, with a flexibility and ruthlessness typical of totalitarian dictatorships. Also, the supremacy of politics over economics was both a teleological concept and a logical sequence of events in which the Soviet régime participated in a full measure. Hence, leaders of the *Narkomindel* (Soviet Foreign Office) felt free to practice such opportunism in foreign policy as expediency might dictate.

(9) Former Ambassador Davies has been both lauded and derided for his naïve report of the three political "trials" and the subsequent "purges" of the Founding Fathers of the Bolshevik Revolution. Execution of dissident leading Army generals had its corresponding damaging effect on the striking power and morale of the Red Army. But Mr. Davies chose to overlook the political implications of these trials and the consequent repercussions on foreign policy. He shares the official Soviet view that the "liquida-

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[44] *New York Times*, Sept. 28, 1940.

[45] *Pravda*, Sept. 30, 1940.

[46] Louis Fisher, "Stalin and Hitler," *The Nation* (New York, 1940).

tions" were primarily a means to weed out fifth columnists from the Soviet Union.

In reply thereto, we have the testimony of a distinguished American scholar:

> "I do not know whether or not there were fifth columnists in Russia. I do not know whether there were fifth columnists among the accused in the Moscow trials. But I do know, after careful study of the trial records, that it is impossible to seine any credible evidence of fifth-column activity out of all the contradictions, confusion, and patent lying on the part of the accused, the self-inculpating witnesses, and the prosecutor. I can say this without taking into account such egregious and promptly exposed lies as the famous testimony about the non-existent "Hotel Bristol," or that about Pyatakov's alleged secret midwinter flight to Oslo. I know also that any disinterested peron who will take the trouble really to study the records—which are available in official English translations published by the Soviet Government—must inevitably reach the same conclusion."[47]

In fairness to Mr. Davies, it should be stated that he did make a significant observation, viz., "The Stalin régime, politically and internally, is probably stronger than heretofore. All potential opposition has been killed off."[48]

There had taken place in Russia equally harsh and brutal purges, trials, and intrigues prior to the Nazis' coming into complete power in Germany. It would therefore be a deliberate misreading of events to minimize the desire to "liquidate" the remaining adherents of Leon Trotsky and other potential rivals in the Party leadership. Another plausible explanation of the trials is furnished by the international situation. The late Leon Trotsky's suggestion is of singular pertinence:

> "Many symptoms indicate that Stalin has to fight a certain part of the bureaucracy which will assure its position at any price, even at the price of an alliance of friendship with Hitler. Stalin is, I suppose, not inclined now to go along in this way, but will expose this tendency by the spectre of Trotskyism."[49]

Fear of war has always been a paramount factor in the Soviets' foreign policy. Hence Russia had to be prepared for war. Obviously, a nationalist Russia could be better directed toward that end than an internationalist Soviet Union. It followed, therefore, that the outstanding leaders of the Bolshevik Revolution who still clung to their revolutionary ideas had to be removed. As a prelude, these leaders had to be shown up as traitors to the Socialist Fatherland before their liquidation would be accepted by the rank and file of the Party and by the mass of the Russian people.

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[47] John Dewey, in *New York Times*, Jan. 11, 1942. Professor Dewey was chairman of the International Commission of Inquiry into the Moscow Trials of 1937–38.

[48] Joseph E. Davies, *Mission to Moscow* (New York, 1940), p. 202.

[49] Preliminary Commission of Inquiry, *The Case of Leon Trotsky* (London, 1937), p. 383.

The deleterious effects of the "purges" both at home and abroad caused Stalin to admit that the "trials" and subsequent "mass purges" were carried out with indiscriminate ruthlessness. "It cannot be said that the purge was conducted without serious mistakes. Undoubtedly we have no more need for the method of mass purging."[50] Naturally, the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939, and the German assault on Russia of June 22, 1941, temporarily obviated the necessity of further "purges." For all dissident elements have been mobilized in the "Patriotic War," in the defense of the "Soviet Fatherland" and "Russian Motherland."

(10) The *Comintern* (Third or Communist International) was founded in Moscow in March, 1919, by a small group of international revolutionists who envisaged it as the successor to the First International Workingmen's Association founded by Karl Marx and dissolved in 1878. The Second International of Social Democrats was dissolved in 1914 into warring national sections. At the conclusion of the First Congress, the *Comintern* issued a manifesto on March 10, 1919, addressed to the proletariat of all countries. Their platform outlined assaults against capitalism and capitalist governments, and against socialists who believed in political democracy. The *Comintern* demanded that all Western revolutionists accept the Bolshevik organizational system and the disciplinary leadership of the Russian Bolshevik party. World revolution was its *Weltanschauung*. It sought to promote class war everywhere outside of Russia. An American observer at the First Congress says: "I do not think the Russianness of the idea, or even the control from Moscow, was the essence of the trouble. The essence was that people who believed in democracy, and wanted to make it more perfect, undertook to do so by destroying what democracy

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[50] Stalin, *op. cit.*, *Pravda*, Mar. 11, 1939. Excerpts from this speech were also published in the *New York Times*, Mar. 12, 1939.

there was and denying every democratic instinct in themselves."[51] The avowed revolutionary conspiracy to conquer the world was a source of perpetual frustration to its founders and followers.

Just before he died, Lenin himself was aware of the fatuous impracticality of this state of affairs. On numerous occasions, he expressed apprehension concerning the lack of cosmopolitanism within the leadership of the *Comintern.* In his last speech before the organization, he warned: "The trouble with this organization is that it is too Russian. For one thing, its reports and manifestoes are so long that nobody but a Russian would read them."[52]

The Soviets and Nazis were fighting each other with propaganda in all parts of the world, each using the other as a bogey with which to win over or consolidate public opinion. At the same time, the Red Army and the *Wehrmacht* maintained friendly relations established in 1924. In fact, until August, 1939, many segments of the Red Army were manned by German militarists.

As far as the record indicates, the Soviet régime has not disavowed its interest in international proletarian revolutions.[53] From September, 1938, to May, 1943, none of the Soviet leaders has made any reference to the *Comintern* or to collective security. In fact, *Pravda* still hauls up the Marxian banner: "Workers of the World, Unite." This phenomenon contributed little toward an effective Anglo-Soviet-American conciliation. However, the dissolution of the *Comintern*[54] on May 15, 1943, if carried out in good faith, should remove many of the suspicions that have disturbed the unity of the United Nations.

(11) The Spanish civil strife sharpened the cleavage between the Soviet government and British-French governments and precipitated the ill-fated Munich Pact. As is known, the Soviet leaders were excluded from the negotiations and from the conference at Munich in September, 1938. The Non-Intervention Com-

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[51] Max Eastman, *Stalin's Russia and the Crisis in Socialism* (New York, 1940), p. 118.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 99.

[53] I. S. Yuzefovich, *Osnovanie Kommunisticheskoyo Internationala* ("Founding of the Third International") (Moscow, 1941); *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional* (Communist International), *7 Vsemirnyi Kongress; Itogi* ("7th World Congress; Results"), edited by Dmitri Z. Manuilsky (Moscow, 1935).

[54] The resolution of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the (Third) Communist International (*Comintern*) proposing self-dissolution was adopted on May 15, 1943. The full text of the statement was published in *Pravda* on May 22, 1943, and released to the world on the following day.

mittee was brought into being on September 9, 1936, in London in an effort to coördinate the efforts of the Powers concerned to stop foreign intervention and to facilitate international accord concerning the Spanish civil strife. The Soviet Union was represented on this Committee.[55] Soon thereafter, as a result of the bombing of British, German, and Italian naval patrol vessels anchored in Spanish waters, the four European Powers (Britain, France, Italy, and Germany) signed two agreements on June 12, 1937, with a view to safeguarding their warships and to consulting jointly in the event of further attacks.[56] Among other things, this agreement provided that the Powers which patrolled the waters off Spain should request from both the rebels and the loyalists guarantees of safety for their naval patrol vessels.

The Soviet government protested against this Four Power Agreement, maintaining that all questions connected with the "Patrol Scheme" should be handled by the Non-Intervention Committee. It also opposed the addressing of any note by the Committee to the insurgents for humanizing the war.[57] The whole episode of the Non-Intervention Committee was characterized by no less a personage than David Lloyd George as "the greatest and basest fraud and deception ever perpetrated by great nations upon a weak people."[58] This, however, is quite contrary to the conclusion drawn by an American scholar, who states: "It is significant that the European states were able at such a time as the present to develop an international machinery and organization for the observance and enforcement of such an accord by their subjects."[59]

In this connection, it should be pointed out that in its declaration of August 23, 1936, adhering to the Agreement Regarding Non-Intervention in Spain, the Soviet government made it very clear that it would put this declaration into effect as soon as the Italian, German, and Portuguese governments shall likewise have adhered to the declaration.[60]

The Soviet leaders had no illusions about the entire conflict; nor were they unaware of the attitude of the United States government, particularly the friendly overtures which the Department of State had made to Franco. As usual, the Soviets made their position quite clear:

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[55] *L'Europe Nouvelle*, Mar. 13, 1937, Supp. p. vi.

[56] *London Times*, June 13, 1937.

[57] *Le Temps*, June 12, 1937, and *The Times* (London), June 19, 1937.

[58] Norman J. Padelford, *International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife* (New York, 1939), p. 119.

[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 201–202.

[60] Padelford, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

> "The proletarian struggle in Spain brought about the admiration of millions of workers and revengeful hatred in the capitalist world. . . . By this example the Spanish people invited all other people to struggle against the fascist instigators of war and incited the solidification of forces for peace and freedom in all capitalist countries. Around Republican Spain was created a sentiment of wide mass solidarity. . . . It takes various forms, ranging from collections of money to mass meetings and demonstrations, and from the formation of committees of Spanish defense to political walk-outs and the formation of volunteer units."[61]

The bitter controversy that ensued evoked accusations and counter-accusations on the part of the British, French, Italian, and Soviet governments. The United States was by no means neutral. Finally, the Non-Intervention Committee weighed evidence presented to it concerning violations and charges of violations of the Accord. At its meeting on November 12, 1936, the Committee decided that the charges brought by the Italian representatives against the intervention by the Soviets were not supported by the evidence produced. Hence the Soviet government could not be held responsible for any violation of the Agreement.[62]

(12) Soviet writers are equally vociferous in their attitude toward the present government of China. They have continually reiterated charges that the Japanese are using "appeasers" who hold high posts in Chungking in an effort to split the Kuomintang (the Government party) and the Communist party. Both through diplomatic channels and in official publications, the Soviets have warned Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that China faces serious difficulties, civil war, and possibly military defeat unless he eliminates the elements—the appeasers—who are undermining China's war effort. Moreover, "these gentlemen for a long time past have been pressing the Chinese government to liquidate the Eighth and Fourth Armies (the former Chinese Communist Army), which comprise the most advanced, firmest, and most self-sacrificing people of China."[63]

[61] Dmitri Z. Manuilsky, in *Mirovoye Khoziaistvo i Mirovaya Politika* ("World Economics and World Politics"), No. 4 (1939), p. 57.

[62] *New York Times*, Nov. 13, 1936.

[63] Vladimir Rogov, "*Polozhenije v. Kitaje*" ("The Situation in China"), in *Vojna i Rabocij Klass* ("War and the Working Class), No. 5 (Aug. 1, 1943), pp. 17–23. This semi-monthly journal began to be published in June, 1943, and has since come into prominence as a mouthpiece of Soviet foreign policy.

(13) None of the weaknesses still existing in 1939 in the economic system of the Soviet Union could have been remedied by annexations and exploitations of other peoples. Hence it is doubtful whether the Soviet-Nazi Pact, with its concomitant annexation of Eastern Poland, was an expression of imperialistic ambition. It is even submitted that the annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and the unprovoked attack on Finland were not necessarily imperialistic; and this observation is borne out by the fact that the economic values of the invaded territories were meager. Then, too, the Soviet leaders would have liked to avoid the bitter resentment that these annexations aroused the world over. At that juncture of world power politics, the Soviets could ill afford to arouse the enmity of the United States and other governments. The Soviet régime was also fully aware of the consequent growing discontent among its people. And, since war could not be averted by the Munich Pact, they sought to divert the imminent onslaughts of the mechanized German forces and the striking Japanese naval power to territories and possessions of the British and French empires.

Moreover, try as they would to adhere to generally accepted principles of international law, strategic geographic factors had to be given primary consideration in Russia's estimates of international relations, violations of previous agreements, protocols, conventions, pacts, and treaties notwithstanding. It is also common knowledge now that the vociferous cry for *lebensraum* has too often been the disguise for other sinister intentions. The Soviet régime, being aware of this, acted accordingly. Hence it is now abundantly clear that the motivating force of recent Soviet moves was strategical necessities from the point of view of Red Army, Navy, and Air Force staffs.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

Our analysis may be summarized as follows:

(1) Soviet concepts of civil law have not been subjected to extreme fundamental revisions. Soviet jurists speak of law as a socialist law which has always been an instrument of socialist reconstruction of society. Every problem of Soviet civil law has been treated from the point of view of the interest of the ruling class, from the point of view of the policy of the Communist party, which, in turn, dominates the government. Dictatorship of the

proletariat has always been and still is the supreme law which determines the concrete contents of all Soviet laws.

The theory concerning the withering away of the state, as originally formulated by Karl Marx, promulgated by Friedrich Engels, and later expounded by Nikolai Lenin, found a new expression in Soviet *Realpolitik.* The *Politbureau* contends that the state must be maintained, including the Red Army, Navy, and political police.

Moved by constantly changing political expediencies, Soviet concepts of international law have shifted accordingly. These shifting concepts have reflected the economic, social, political, and revolutionary exigencies of Soviet foreign policy during given periods. Thus, during the period 1933–38, when Litvinov expounded his thesis of "collective security" and "durable peace," the Soviet government deemed it advantageous to conform to generally postulated principles of international law. Later, during the period 1939–40, when the government was making moves in utter disregard of existing treaties and in flagrant violation of international law, Soviet theorists were summoned to justify those actions on legal grounds and to reconcile obvious contradictions.

(2) The terrific tempo in building the "Socialist Fatherland" during the past fifteen years has been but an integral part and a continuation of the Soviet government's total scheme of things. One of the basic trends in Russia's foreign policy during the past fifty years—under the Tsars as well as under the Soviets—has been the prodigious effort to avoid a war on two fronts—with Germany in the west and with Japan in the east. Moreover, problems affecting the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. have been further complicated by the fact that its economic importance, both as an undeveloped market for manufactured goods and as a source of foodstuffs and raw materials, has been a constant temptation for advanced industrial countries which hoped to find in Russia, especially the Ukraine and the Caucasus, the *Lebensraum* formerly open in Africa, Asia, and the Americas.

(3) Although Russian intellectuals and dissident Army generals were purged, the Soviet régime has not yet been fully able to consolidate and integrate the vast territories that are already under its control. Furthermore, its class structure and its economy did not require foreign conquests as a prerequisite of domestic stability. This accounts also for the fact that the functions of the *Gosplan* are closely interwoven with the *Politbureau,* which determines its

policies. This interlocking control of the entire national economy has given the government its extraordinary power and its exceptional stability; and it paved the way for Russia's powerful military machine and its formidable resistance.

(4) The Spanish civil strife and the fiasco of the Non-Intervention Accord widened the gap between the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R. Similarly, the ill-fated Munich Pact and its counterpart, the Nazi-Soviet Agreement, cancelled each other out in terms of violations of existing treaty agreements and utter disregard of generally accepted principles of international law.

(5) A series of extenuating circumstances resulted in deeply embedded anxieties which still prevail in the Kremlin and in Downing Street. There have also been profound psychological factors, as well as economic and military factors, in the political situation. It is submitted that the psychological factors have been among the significant imponderables that shaped the course of recent history. Accordingly, shifts in Soviet foreign policy and concurrent international relations have been determined by internal problems (industrialization, socialization, deification of Stalin,[64] periodic purges, etc.); by shifting pressures in the constellation of hostile foreign Powers; by the persecution complex of the Soviet régime; and by the ebb and flow of the revolutionary tide throughout the world.

(6) Ernest Renan's keen observation that a common enemy unites men more than a common joy is of particular significance in the present political scheme of things. To be sure, there are certain organic defects in the coveted strong Anglo-Soviet-American coalition: military, psychological, and political. These divergencies could become, as they have been in the past, serious limitations, capable of weakening and disintegrating the coalition. One argument frequently advanced is that the coalition consists of heterogeneous elements with different ideologies, and that this will prevent their really organizing joint action against the common enemy. Undoubtedly these subterranean psychological factors account, in large measure, for the lack of a genuine supreme Allied war council, for the absence to date of a global military strategy, and for the disintegrated global political war.

The Soviet leaders are cognizant of this situation. Yet they contend that the barriers are surmountable, provided sincere efforts are made by the respective leaders of the governments comprising the coalition to achieve the desired aims, namely, the destruction of the Hitlerite state. The official Soviet point of view has again been formulated on the eve of the formal opening of the second front:

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[64] Charles Prince, "A Psychological Study of Stalin," *Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 22 (1945).

> "It would be ridiculous to deny the difference in ideologies and social systems of the countries composing the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. But does this preclude the possibility and expediency of joint action on the part of members of this coalition against the common enemy who holds out the threat of enslavement for them? It certainly does not. . . . We have facts and events pointing to a progressive rapprochement between the members of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition and their uniting into a single fighting alliance against the Italo-German coalition."[65]

Here is Russia's bid for a common understanding, mutual trust, broad collaboration, and, above all, for an effective and lasting Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. The official Soviet point of view bearing on post-war problems has recently been expounded in no uncertain terms. The contention is that the Soviet Union occupies one-sixth of the world's territory and has proved itself the most powerful continental nation; hence it should have one of the most decisive voices in post-war reconstruction. The Soviet Union has withstood the brunt of Hitler's hordes and consequently suffered more than any other of the United Nations.[66] This trend of thought appears in print over the signatures of the leading Soviet spokesmen. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union will need a firm peace in order to restore its wrecked economy.

(7) Responsible British spokesmen have recently voiced semi-official opinion that security in Western Europe depends upon security in Eastern Europe, which only Russia can guarantee; hence European peace will depend upon the "continuous vigilance" of Britain and Russia in collaboration. This was the basic principle of the Anglo-Soviet Agreement of May 26, 1942, pledging coöperation for twenty years.[67] Similarly, on the basis of numerous declarations

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[65] From Joseph V. Stalin's speech to the Moscow Soviet on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the October Revolution in Russia, Nov. 6, 1942. Associated Press dispatch in *New York Times*, Nov. 7, 1942.

[66] Nikolai Malinin, *O C'eliakh Vojne* ("Concerning Aims of War"), *Vojnari Rabocij Klass* ("War and the Working Class"), No. 3 (July 1, 1943), pp. 11–15.

[67] See editorial in *The Times* (London), Mar. 10, 1943.

from the Kremlin and relevant theses analyzed in Soviet journals during the past three years, it is reasonable to assume that Soviet Russia will not be interested in a Bolshevization of Europe after the present conflict, preferring political stability to social revolution in the region west of her historical frontiers.

However, it is unlikely that the Soviet government will be willing to effect a firm alliance with the Western Powers affecting the European scene to the exclusion of the Pacific area, especially the Far East. For, relationships between the Kuomintang under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists have been, and still are, very precarious. But the present governments of both Russia and China are resolved to defeat their formidable common enemy, i.e., Japan, the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941, notwithstanding. Therein lies the hope of an effective alliance of the United Nations.

It is, therefore, submitted that a genuine understanding between Soviet Russia, the United States, China, and Great Britain is indispensable for the future peace of the world. But such an understanding will remain less than effective as long as the deeply embedded prejudices and suspicions continue in Moscow, London, Chungking, and Washington. Moreover, an effective understanding and subsequent coalition are both feasible and probable, provided the respective foreign-policy-makers transcend all other predilections and approach the problems and dangers facing the world from the point of view of an international spirit of coöperation, and make a gradual, universal application of the doctrines of economic security, social justice, and political liberty.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

WOMEN AND NATIONAL PARTY ORGANIZATION

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For the first time in American history, the majority of the voters in the presidential election of 1944 will be women. That party managers have realized this fact has been evidenced by their special appeals to the feminine vote in campaign literature, public statements, and management techniques. Furthermore, in a growing number of cases, women have been entrusted with responsible functions in party organization which up to now have been reserved for men. To cite but one example in national party structure, there is the appointment for the first time of a woman to serve as secretary of the Democratic national committee.

The unusual political responsibilities and opportunities which war conditions have made available to women bring up the question of the progress they have been able to achieve in national party organization during the years since the adoption of the suffrage amendment in 1920. In 1933, an analysis of the formal status of women in the national party organizations was made by Miss Sophonisba Breckinridge, and included in her volume, *Women in the Twentieth Century*,[1] published as one of a series of monographs on "Recent Social Trends in the United States," under the direction of President Hoover's Research Committee on Social Trends. As a formal measure of women's status in national party organization, Miss Breckinridge examined their participation in the national conventions and their position on the national committees of both parties from 1892, when they were first represented in a convention, through 1932.

The present study carries Miss Breckinridge's investigation through the 1936, 1940, and 1944 nominating conventions. The data used in both studies were obtained from the official convention records and from replies of national committeewomen to questionnaires.

Although they made their first appearance at the Republican convention in 1892, when three were seated as alternates, Miss Breckinridge found that few women attended national conventions until 1920, shortly before the ratification of the suffrage amendment. In 1900, women were represented by one official delegate in each of the two major party conventions; in 1908 and 1912, by two; and in 1916 the number rose to five in the Republican and eleven in the Democratic convention.[2]

With suffrage for women practically assured, the Democratic conven-

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[1] Sophonisba P. Breckinridge, *Women in the Twentieth Century* (New York 1933). [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 275–278.

TABLE I

WOMEN DELEGATES AND ALTERNATES IN REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTIONS

1892–1944

Convention	*Republicans*		*Democrats*	
	Delegates	*Alternates*	*Delegates*	*Alternates*
1892	0	3	0	0
1896	0	0	0	0
1900	1	0	1	0
1904	0	4	0	0
1908	2	0	2	3
1912	2	0	2	1
1916	5	9	11	11
1920	27	129	93	206
1924	120	277	199	310
1928	70	264	152	263
1932	87	307	208	270
1936	61	222	252	333
1940	78	231	208	347
1944	99	264	174	332

TABLE II

WOMEN ON MAJOR NATIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTEES

Committee	*Convention*											
	1924		*1928*		*1932*		*1936*		*1940*		*1944*	
	R.	*D.*	*R.*	*D.*	*R.*	*D.*	*R.*	*D.*	*R.*	*D.*	*R.*	*D.*
Permanent Organization	14	7	1	6	9	3	5	9	7	0	4	5
Credentials	2	12	2	3	5	2	2	3	0	8	3	5
Rules and Order of Business	9	1	5	3	2	2	4	4	4	0	6	6
Platform and Resolutions	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	30	42
Totals	25	20	8	12	17	8	12	17	11	9	43	58

tion of 1920 seated 93 women as delegates and 206 as alternates. In addition, women were given generous representation on committees. Feminine participation was further increased in the Democratic convention of 1924, which included 199 women delegates and 310 alternates. Further evidence of the increasing rôle assigned to women was found in the fact that three of the four major convention committees, i.e., Permanent Organization, Credentials, and Rules and Order of Business, included 20 women as members. These three committees, plus the Committee on Platform and Resolutions, play a major part in convention activities, and the number of women included in their membership is a significant indication of the status accorded to women delegates.

In 1928, however, feminine participation in the Democratic convention declined. There were 152 women delegates and 263 alternates, and only 12 served as committee members. In 1932, the final year of Miss Breckinridge's study, the number of women delegates increased over 1928, but their participation did not equal the high point of 1924. There were 208 delegates and 270 alternates in the 1932 Democratic convention, but only eight women served on the four major committees.[3]

In continuing Miss Breckinridge's study into later years, it was found that the peak representation for Democratic women occurred in 1936, when 252, or 14 per cent of the delegates to the convention, were women, while 333 served as alternates. A total of 17 women were members of the four major committees of the convention, nine on the Committee on Permanent Organization, three on Credentials, four on Rules and Order of Business, and one on Platform and Resolutions. In addition, women were named to the following honorary positions: committee for notification of presidential nominee, 13; committee for notification of vice-presidential nominee, 19; honorary vice-presidents, five; honorary secretaries, 20; assistant secretaries, 16; assistant parliamentarian, one; and assistant tally clerk, one. Participation of women in convention proceedings included 13 seconds to nominations made by men, and the offering of six resolutions—five of courtesy, extending thanks and appreciation to various people concerned with the convention, and one on routine organization.

A down curve began in 1940, when 208 delegates and 347 alternates at the Democratic convention were women, the women delegates representing 12 per cent of the official convention membership. Only nine of the delegates were placed on the major convention committees—eight on Credentials and one on Platform and Resolutions. This was less than half the committee representation of women in 1924. In the less important positions, eight women served on the presidential notification committee, ten on the vice-presidential; thirty-nine served as assistant secretaries, and one as assistant tally clerk. The 1940 Democratic platform included, however, the following plank: "We will continue our efforts to achieve equality of opportunity for men and women without impairing the social legislation which promotes true equality by safeguarding the health and safety, and economic welfare, of women workers. The right to work for

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 277–278.

compensation in both public and private employment is an inalienable privilege of women as well as men, without distinction as to marital status."

The 1944 Democratic convention, which might have been expected to show an increased percentage of women delegates, instead revealed a continuing downward trend. There were 174 women delegates and 332 alternates, the number of delegates being smaller than at any convention since 1928. In the organization and conduct of the convention, however, women were accorded more recognition than at any previous time. There were more women on the four major committees: 42 on Platform and Resolutions (half the membership of the committee); six on Rules and Order of Business; five on Credentials; and five on Permanent Organization. For the first time in the history of the Democratic party, or of any major party, women were selected as co-chairmen of all the major convention committees. Another important gain was the fact that women served for the first time as major officers of a national convention, one as permanent assistant chairman, and one as permanent secretary. For the first time, also, two women delivered major addresses on matters of party policy at evening sessions of the convention.

The history of women in the Republican national convention parallels to some extent the Democratic record, if we bear in mind the larger size of the Democratic conventions. In 1920, the Republicans seated 27 women delegates and 129 alternates; in 1924, 120 delegates and 277 alternates. In the 1924 convention, 25 women served on three of the four major committees: Permanent Organization, Credentials, and Rules and Order of Business. In 1928, only 70 women delegates and 264 alternates attended the convention, with eight serving on committees. In 1932, the curve turned upward, with 87 delegates and 307 alternates. Seventeen were included in the four major convention committees.[4]

Continuing Miss Breckinridge's study to 1936, the trend again turned downward, reaching the lowest point since women gained the vote, with only 61 women delegates (six per cent of the convention) and 222 alternates. Of the delegates, five served on the Committee on Permanent Organization, two on Credentials, four on Rules and Order of Business, and one on Platform and Resolutions. In honorary positions, six women were on the presidential notification committee, twelve on the vice-presidential; there were seven women honorary vice-presidents, and one tally clerk. Three women seconded nominations and two offered resolutions, one on committee organization, the other to dispense with the reading of committee names.

The Republican convention of 1940 seated 78 women delegates (eight per cent of the convention) and 231 alternates. This represents a slight rise over 1936, but does not regain the status of 1932, and is a long way from the high point of 1924. Eleven women served on major committees—seven on Permanent Organization and four on Rules and Order of Business. This is less than fifty per cent of the committee participation of women in 1924. Among the less important committee assignments, one woman was a member of the presidential notification committee, two of the vice-presidential. Eight served as honorary vice-presidents; one as tally clerk; two as assistant secretaries; and one as assistant reporter. One nominating speech, five seconding speeches, and five resolutions (two on committee organization and three of courtesy) were made by women. Thus the following statement, made by Miss Breckinridge in 1933, seems to apply as well to later years: "There is no protest from the men when the women softly or vehemently offer resolutions, and second nominations with deferential grace. The decorative aspects of women delegates are appreciated. If, however, the appointment of women to positions of potential responsibility is a guide, they have not gained in influence during the brief time during which it is possible to compare their opportunities."[5]

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[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 276–287.

The number of women delegates at the 1944 Republican convention was the largest at any convention since 1924. However, the 99 delegates and 264 alternates did not equal the peak reached in that earlier year. As was true of the Democratic party, women were granted greater recognition on the four major committees than at any previous convention, with 30 on Platform and Resolutions, six on Rules and Order of Business, four on Permanent Organization, and three on Credentials. For the first time in the history of the party, women were given equal representation with men on the important Committee on Platform and Resolutions. It was also the first time that a woman delivered one of the major addresses at the convention.

In both the Republican and Democratic conventions since 1920, women have appeared in larger numbers as alternates than as delegates. In answer to a questionnaire sent by the authors, a Republican national committeewomen points out that "women are generally afraid to file as delegates. When we approach them on the subject, they reply that men don't want women delegates. So—the women file as alternates." Women cannot play an important part in the national conventions, however, unless they are seated as delegates, and they cannot become delegates unless they are willing to compete with men for the positions.

Reflecting the importance accorded the women's vote in the presidential election of 1944, both parties incorporated in their platforms a plank favoring a constitutional amendment providing for equal rights. In both platforms the support of the equal rights amendment is coupled with the principle of equal pay for equal work. The Democratic plank reads as follows: "We favor Federal legislation assuring equal pay for equal work regardless of sex. We recommend to Congress the submission of a Congressional Amendment for equal rights for women."

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[5] *Ibid.*, p. 290.

Turning from the presidential nominating conventions to the Democratic and Republican national committees, we find that women were granted equality in formal representation soon after the suffrage amendment was adopted—in 1920 in the case of the Democrats, and in 1924 in that of the Republicans. Thus in these bodies women have equal representation, in name at least, with each state and territory represented by one woman and one man. To what extent are women participating significantly on these committees of which they are members? What kind of women are they? And how important is their influence?

Again following Miss Breckinridge's procedure, a questionnaire was sent to all national committeewomen requesting information pertinent to these questions. Eighteen of the 45 Democratic committeewomen and 23 of the 53 Republican committeewomen responded;[6] and from the replies it has been possible to extract the following data bearing on the rôle of women as members of the national committees.

Of the 18 Democratic women responding, the great majority have worked up to their present positions through other party offices. Only three have held no other office in the party, and many have been precinct, ward, city, county, and state committee members and officers. Many also have been officers in Democratic women's clubs. Two have served as presidential electors, and three as convention delegates. In addition to these party positions, 11 of the 18 have held public office, including a variety of local, county, state, and national positions. These range from clerk in town court to United States minister to Norway, and include an executive secretary to a governor, three memberships in state legislatures, four memberships in local boards of education, and one membership in a county board of supervisors. The average for the group of 11 is two public offices. These women have spent from six to 32 years in politics, with an average of 19 years.

Each Democratic committeewoman belongs to at least one women's organization aside from party clubs, and the average number of memberships is four. Those most often mentioned are: the General Federation of Women's Clubs, nine; the League of Women Voters, eight; and the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, seven. In all, 23 organizations of more than local scope are listed.

Most of these Democratic national committeewomen state that they have worked for a number of civic issues during their political careers. Predominant on their lists of special fields of interest are the following, in order: child welfare, education, women in industry, consumer problems, juvenile delinquency, and foreign affairs. There is a marked similarity between the special fields of interest listed by the committeewomen of 1944 and those mentioned by the committeewomen canvassed by Miss Breckinridge in 1933.

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[6] This is a larger coverage than that obtained by Miss Breckinridge, who received replies from 11 Democratic and 12 Republican committeewomen.

The 23 Republican committeewomen returning questionnaires indicated a similar pattern of activities, interests, and opinions. The majority have worked up from less important party offices; only four are holding their first party office at this time. In addition to service in precinct, city, county, and state committees, they have been active in Republican women's clubs, and nine have served as convention delegates, seven as alternates. Turning to the field of public service, we find that 12 of these Republican committeewomen have held public office in their city, county, or state. Three have been elected to state legislatures and four to school boards. The group includes a former state treasurer, a city prosecutor, a police magistrate, and a state's attorney. The average number of public offices held by these 12 women is one and one half. The group of committeewomen responding have spent from nine to 25 years in politics, averaging 19 years.

Each of these Republican women belongs to at least one women's organization outside the party, and the average woman belongs to three. Fourteen indicate membership in the General Federation of Women's Clubs, while three list each of the following affiliations: Daughters of the American Revolution, League of Women Voters, Parent-Teachers Association, and the Young Women's Christian Association. Republican committeewomen, like their Democratic sisters, are interested in civic issues centering around child welfare, women in industry, education, and war activities such as the American Red Cross.

Both Republican and Democratic national committeewomen were asked to express their opinions regarding the influence of women on the national committees, and the lines along which such influence is felt. Two-thirds of the 41 women answering the questionnaire believed that they had a genuine influence on national committee policies and procedures, but about one-third stated in rather strong terms that the influence of the women members was negligible. Among the opinions expressed by Republican committeewomen in the latter group were the following: "We are known mostly for our nuisance value"; "Of less value today than twenty years ago"; "There are some women who have influence, but they have to be pretty big women"; "There are many women on the committee who have nothing but a feminine viewpoint, and those women have influence only when matters concerning women are being considered"; "Women are not as important as they should be, due to two reasons: first, many men do not want women to participate, except to do the chore-boy type of politics, and second, some women feel rather inferior and reluctant to take their rightful place, or else they are too aggressive"; "A woman's influence on the national committee is frequently a direct reflection of her power in her own state. Much depends upon the attitude of the male member from her state also, for in many instances there is jealousy for the limelight. Only a few women members have real influence, largely because in many instances their selection is dictated by logrolling rather than fitness or ability. Personal wealth gives them influence in some instances, but frequently this merely means that they seek publicity and are not necessarily competent."

About a third of the Democratic committeewomen shared the same point of view. To quote them in their own words: "Unfortunately, women have little or no influence on the national committee. In most instances, women are never consulted concerning patronage"; "The majority of women have little influence, unless they have a strong personality. During the past ten years the Democratic committee has given women more recognition, having included them on important committees. As they participate on these committees, they should be helpful in assisting to formulate the policies of the party"; "I do not consider the influence of the women important, and see no immediate prospect of it becoming anything more than personal and indirect"; "I do not consider that women on the national committee have any influence, important or otherwise. In my state, the national committeeman got used to politics without women and, consciously or unconsciously, he has never recognized the fact that they vote, let alone that they are capable of functioning politically. Women are still on the outside looking in."

Several women in both parties stressed the point that the influence of the national committeewoman is in proportion to her political influence in the community or district from which she comes. It was thought by others that as women become more experienced organization workers, they achieve more power on the national committees. An appreciable number of committeewomen agreed that their influence was primarily in the details and mechanics of procedure rather than in basic policy-making. 7 Several women expressed the opinion that their influence had been largely concerned with questions of social welfare, since, to quote one statement, "women are consulted oftener on such subjects because they are supposed to know more about child welfare, old age pensions, and such social problems."

The committeewomen were asked to suggest ways of improving the position of women in party organization. There was general agreement on four points: (1) Women must be better informed on current affairs, and thus more adequately equipped to make their opinions heard. (2) Women must support party organization and activities with greater energy and loyalty. In the words of one committeewoman, "too many women work at politics only when the bands are playing and the flags are waving." (3) The masses of women must be aroused from their political apathy, and as this is accomplished it will raise the status of women political leaders. (4) Strong women candidates must be supported, to enhance the prestige of women generally. As one Republican committeewoman stated, "too many times in the past we have supported women just because they were women rather than because they had the background and training for the job they sought. When such women are elected and fail to do a good job, it is a reflection on all of us."

Other suggestions offered by one or more committeewomen included the following: "Women should be less personal and more objective"; "they should take greater part in the money-raising activities of the parties"; "women should not try to impress the men that they know more than the men do"; "women should be more practical and less idealistic—they must learn when it is necessary to compromise"; "too many women feel that they are superior to political bosses. This gives party leaders the conviction that women are political trouble-makers and do not belong in strictly party positions."

There was, however, a distinct split of opinion on the means of reaching these and other ends. One side believed that women should organize, work, and vote as a group; the other believed that they should work, not as women, but as individuals, shoulder to shoulder with men, gaining positions, not through pressure on the part of their sex, but through their ability.

If it can be assumed that these 41 committeewomen are representative of their feminine colleagues on each national committee, the findings of this study would seem to agree in general with those arrived at by Miss Breckinridge in 1933. As the earlier study concluded: "The committeewoman is often a mere shadow of the committeeman, but she is a woman. The door has opened a little."[7] Comparing the opinions of the committeewomen of 1944 with those expressed in 1933, it is obvious that the door has opened farther during the last ten years. On the other hand, the door is still not wide open. Too large a proportion of the national committeewomen still feel strongly that their influence is negligible in basic policy determination.

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[7] *Ibid.*, p. 288.

MEETING THE NEEDS FOR STATE AND LOCAL REVENUES IN THE POSTWAR ERA

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"The financing of government in the South presents an important field of study. The needs in relation to sources of revenue are greater in the South than in other parts of the nation. The South has relied heavily on the property tax to meet these needs, but it has also experimented widely with other forms of taxation. It has depended on federal grants to a great extent, though it has had difficulty in meeting certain conditions set up for some of these grants. The whole subject of government finance needs to be further studied and the experiences of the various states in the area need to be compared and contrasted. Materials will be found in state reports, in the reports of federal agencies which distribute grants-in-aid, and in the findings of various groups which have studied the general problem, as, for example, the Advisory Committee on Education which reported to the President in 1939, and the Committee on Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations set up by the Department of the Treasury."[2]

Much of the foregoing comment by a group of Southern political scientists with special reference to the Southern region is equally applicable to states in other sections of the country. It has often been alleged that the American tax system, in so far as it may be called a system at all, is a survival of the horse-and-buggy age. The thousands of small local taxing jurisdictions existing throughout the country—some 165,000 of them—are striking evidence of our antiquated methods of levying and collecting taxes. In Pennsylvania alone—and many other states are in a worse condition—there are approximately 5,200 local units of government, half of them school districts, and all of them with the power to tax and to incur debt.

I. THE PLIGHT OF THE LOCAL UNITS

Limitations on Local Taxing Powers. In the face of the multiplicity of taxing jurisdictions, the base on which these agencies may levy taxes has become increasingly narrow. Local communities in Pennsylvania are not permitted to tax sources of tax revenue preëmpted by the state. Moreover, the state constitution prohibits levying any taxes which are not uniform on a given class of subjects. A progressive tax on net personal incomes based on ability to pay, recognized by tax authorities as an equitable tax, cannot be levied even by the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, let alone by local communities within the state.

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[2] From *Governmental Problems of the Post-War Period; Research Suggestions for Southern Political Scientists* (University of Alabama, 1943), pp. 8–9.

Results of Inability to Raise Adequate Local Revenues. Parallel with the increase in the number of units of local government, there has been a tremendous increase in the number and scope of the functions of government performed, with a corresponding increase in the total expenditures incurred. Because of the narrow tax base available to meet these expanding local needs for public expenditures, local communities have been hard pressed to find sources of revenue adequate to meet the financial burden imposed on them. They have increased the tax on real estate values, often beyond the point of fairness and equitability. They have tried, within the constitutional limits imposed upon them, to devise new tax forms. They have made extensive use of their constitutional or statutory borrowing power, many of them rushing headlong into debt. Not least important of the methods which they have tried has been the appeal to the larger units of government for financial assistance; and thus have grown up the extensive systems of federal and state grants-in-aid. In view of the perplexing problems which face the local communities in the post-war era, it becomes important that we analyze now the effects of the grant-in-aid system, and that we consider ways and means of meeting the state and local needs for revenue.

II. FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS

Any proposal for meeting the financial needs of the state and local units after the war must of necessity be based on certain assumptions, of which three are here important.

Trend toward Centralization. We may as well accept the fact that the development of modern science has made it not only possible but necessary for government to function in larger units than heretofore. Machinery and new methods of transportation and communication have changed our way of life. The diminishing importance of space has made government at long range possible; the increasing significance of the time factor has stimulated the demand for speed in governmental activity. Power has passed from one unit to the next successively higher, in one jurisdiction after another, both here and abroad. Counties, cities, and towns have lost to the states, the states to the nation; and now it seems likely that the nation will likewise shift some power to some international organization designed to maintain peace and order in the family of nations. Politicians have denounced this trend, while scholars have expressed apprehension about the speed with which centralization has advanced, if not about centralization as such. Whether we like it or not, it is here, and as far as can be seen, it is likely to be more rather than less in evidence in the immediate future.

It is not meant to imply either that this trend toward centralization will go on forever or that it cannot be reversed. Certainly there is a point beyond which it cannot go, although no mortal may be wise enough to tell us precisely where it is. It may not be so far ahead as some are inclined to believe. Neither is it to be concluded that centralization has been an unmixed blessing; the verdict of the future may be that, in some of its forms, it has already gone too far. Since, however, the end is not yet in sight, we may well, for the present purpose, concern ourselves less about the fact of centralization and more about making adjustments essential to the operation of free institutions within the new and somewhat different framework which results from centralization.

Expanding Scope of Governmental Activity. In the second place, we may as well accept the idea that government will undertake more activities and assume more functions designed to promote the general welfare, and that it will enlarge many of the programs that are already under way. One may call it bureaucracy, if he chooses, but that does not in any way diminish the significance of the fact that the people are constantly demanding—and getting—more and better service from government at all levels—national, state, and local. While this trend, also, may not go on forever, no one knows where it will stop. If there is to be left a sizable sphere within which the individual is free to do as he likes, the trend should stop—one may even say, it must stop—somewhere well on this side of the assumption by government of control over all forms of human activity. Perhaps, even here, we may be nearer than we realize to the outermost boundaries of that expansion.

Nor should one forget that many of the supposed losses of power occurring through centralization have been offset, in whole or in part, by the development of new activities and the expansion of older functions already being performed by the very units which centralization is supposed to be destroying. New standards of administrative management demand not only that governments do more things, but that they do them better; and governments are meeting that challenge.

Continuance of Federal Financial Assistance to State and Local Governments. Finally, we must assume that, by some device or other, the amount of financial assistance given to the states by the federal government will continue to be very large and that it may even increase. Grants-in-aid for established state activities have grown from the small beginnings made in the Morrell land grant act of 1863 to very considerable proportions. The number of purposes to which the subsidy system has been applied has steadily increased, along with the amounts appropriated. When periods of emergency have arisen, enormous additional grants have been made, regardless of the party in power. The Republicans established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation; the Democrats continued this agency and added many others—the Civilian Conservation Corps, the National Youth Administration, the Works Progress Administration, the Public Works Administration, etc. It seems reasonable to assume that, in the critical post-war period, old established grants will be continued as in the past, and that new ones will be made in large amounts, the purposes and conditions of which will be dependent upon the nature and proportions of the emergency.[3] It behooves us now, therefore, to take thought for the morrow, before the pressure for immediate action in a critical situation precludes the possibility of careful analysis.

III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Continuance of the Grant-in-Aid System. Grants-in-aid by both the federal and state governments for specific purposes have become an important source of "public funds" in states and local communities during recent years. In the present discussion, consideration will be confined chiefly to federal aid payments to the state and local governments which, during the fiscal year 1938, for only three forms of public assistance, amounted to over a quarter of a billion dollars. Just before the outbreak of the war in 1939, federal aid to states and local communities, in the form of regular, permanent grants, reached approximately one-half billion dollars. Substantial increases in these grants may be expected in the years to come, particularly for public assistance grants under the Social Security Act, for public health, and for public housing.

In the light of this expansion in the use of so-called "federal funds" to help meet local needs, it would appear advisable to examine into possible alternatives, perhaps resulting in a radical change in the past and present policy of granting federal aid. The states and local communities, being either unable or unwilling to pay for new programs of governmental activity, have appealed to the federal government for more and more aid for more and more purposes. While the amount appropriated for such aid has been increased from year to year, this has not been done in accordance with any plan. The amount of increase has depended upon the resourcefulness of lobbyists and on the success with which their techniques have been applied in the sponsoring of new programs or of increases in existing programs. No attempt has been made, either to determine how much federal aid should be given to the states and local communities, in relation to their over-all needs or to the total national income, or to allocate in some equitable and systematic manner the total federal funds to be apportioned among the various governmental purposes for which subsidies are desired.

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[3] One observer takes exception to this assertion. His views are best stated in his own words: "In the first place, the federal government will have financial difficulties of its own; and, in the second place, unless the law of the pendulum has been repealed, there will be a political reaction to the recent policy of increasing federal financial aid to the states. In short, I am not at all sure that the trend as here stated will inevitably continue; but even if I were, and I believed it boded ill, I would resist it rather than hasten it. I recall the famous retort of the late Senator Penrose to a committee of suffragettes who asked his espousal of their cause on the ground that woman suffrage was inevitable. He replied, 'So is death, but I don't see anyone hastening to meet it.' Lest I be misunderstood, let me hasten to remark that I never shared the late Senator's distaste for woman suffrage."

Federally-collected, State-shared Taxes. A system of federally-collected, state-shared taxes might be used to supplement, or at least in part as a substitute for, the existing grant-in-aid system; the means test, which is widely applied in the allocation of such aid, might be in part dispensed with, so that the amount of funds agreed upon would be made available to the states as a matter of legal right. Where the grant-in-aid system was continued, some means test of eligibility for such grants should be required, with a view to maximizing the community benefits derived from funds made available by the federal government for state and local purposes. The term "federal funds" is an unfortunate misnomer, for in the last analysis, these funds are collected by the federal government in the form of taxes levied against the income of the people. Because federal taxes, under present laws, can be more equitably apportioned than locally levied taxes, the possibilities of extending the principle of centrally-collected, locally-shared taxes should be carefully explored.

Under this proposal, the federal government would serve as the collecting agency for a portion of the local taxes, which would be refunded in accordance with an acceptable formula, considering population, federal taxes paid, or other similar criteria to be agreed upon in advance. In highway appropriations, for instance, the old formula allotted equal weight to population, area, and post-road mileage. Extensive controversy has developed out of the current proposal to allot such funds by a formula in which one-half of the funds appropriated are allocated on the basis of population, one-fourth on area, and one-fourth on post-road mileage.

If the federal government were, at the close of the war, to refund annually to the state and local governments for some years to come ten dollars of taxes per capita, paid by the people in the form of federal income taxes, this would represent, in the case of the city of Philadelphia, a fund of $20,000,000. A similar refund of ten dollars per capita throughout the country would mean $1,300,000,000 annually, or less than one week's cost of financing our war effort. But if $20,000,000 additional tax revenue had to be raised locally by increasing the levy on real estate values in Philadelphia, it would necessitate increasing the city tax-rate, which many regard as too high already, by practically 50 per cent.

The differences between obtaining grants-in-aid and obtaining federal tax refunds by the states or local governments are rather obvious. So-called "federal funds" would come to the states and their subdivisions without strings attached, and without wirepulling and political maneuvering to get them. A broad provision that these funds should be used for local capital expenditures, as planned and recommended by the local planning commission, might be considered, but it is believed that control over the allocation of the refunds should be under local authority and not centered in the federal government. Funds collected by the federal government would be refunded as a matter of legal right, and not by requiring definite proof of need, as is the case with many of the current federal grants-in-aid.

Modernizing the State Tax System. It has been argued that it would be sounder procedure to aim at state and local tax reform, through constitutional amendments if necessary, in the interest of efficiency, economy, and equity in levying state and local taxes, rather than to centralize the taxing power in the hands of the federal government. Certainly the effort to achieve such reform should not be diminished; on the other hand, the solution of immediate postwar financial problems cannot be suspended while further efforts at reform are carried on. Constitutional revision in the states proceeds at a snail's pace. Few movements for revision ever get to the convention stage, and of those that do, very few indeed actually result in the adoption of revised constitutions. The prescribed processes for piecemeal amendment are so difficult to operate that, in most states, progress by this method is almost equally difficult. The proposal for change, by whatever method, arouses such determined resistance on the part of entrenched groups that the prospect of solution of the tax problem by the time-honored processes of state and local action seems extremely remote.

Our inquiries into overlapping taxes and possible ways of allocating sources of revenue to the three levels of government should go on, and undoubtedly will result ultimately in a more orderly and equitable revenue system than we now have. Once we have arrived at some degree of agreement on the broad outlines of such a system, there is likely to be more rapid progress toward state and local revision than we have had in the past.

IV. WHAT COURSE SHALL WE FOLLOW?

An effort has been made to indicate the framework within which a choice of method or methods in the handling of the postwar needs of state and local governments for funds will have to be made. Many of the states have not, in recent years, been able to provide the revenues they need, under the shackles of outworn constitutional provisions affecting their taxing powers. As a substitute for making the necessary changes in their constitutions, they have sought federal aid. Former Governor Pinchot of Pennsylvania, for instance, was among the first—if not the first—of the governors of the states to appeal for federal assistance in the relief crisis of 1932, and Pennsylvania, a populous and wealthy state, might, if it had had a modern tax system, have met its own needs fairly easily. By seeking aid from afar, the states have to a large extent forfeited their control over their own affairs. Their citizens pay the tax bill anyway, in the form of federal taxes, if not in that of state taxes, and in so doing, they have surrendered to senators and representatives from other states the determination of the kinds and amount of taxes to be raised from their citizens, and the disposition which shall be made of the funds so obtained.

It seems reasonable to expect that in the postwar era, the need for public funds will be great. Governor Dewey has recently said that the state and local units will be relatively free from debt after the war, and therefore in a stronger position financially than the federal government. Even so, they will still expect federal assistance if the going gets tough, as very likely it will. The habit of expecting such assistance is well established, and it is not likely now to be reversed, no matter how strongly some may believe that the states should avail themselves of this favorable opportuity for reversing it.

There are, as has been shown, three ways of meeting the financial problem which will confront the states and many local communities after the war. Which one shall they adopt? The course that they ought to follow is perfectly clear—they ought to put their financial houses in order. This they have made no serious effort to do in the past; if they should do it now, they could, in all probability, get along reasonably well without wholesale financial assistance from the federal government. Perhaps one way of accelerating tax revision at the lower levels of government would be to remove Santa Claus from the upper level. A strong case might be made for a federal policy that would force state and local governments to bestir themselves in the matter of revenues rather than for pursuing, as in the past, or as seems likely in the future—a policy that would lull them to sleep. From that sleep there might be a dreadful awakening!

It is probably merely wishful thinking, however, to expect either that the states will themselves reform their financial policies and procedures in time to meet the postwar needs, or that the federal government will compel them to do so. We are confronted, then, with an unwelcome choice between a continuance of the haphazard grant-in-aid system and the adoption of a federally-collected, state-shared tax program. The subsidy system is, in a sense, a bribe to the states to increase their spending. It may, in some cases, be wasteful. It has been systematic and consistent only in its adherence to the principle of raiding the federal treasury. But it is not likely soon to be abandoned. The politics of the situation points clearly to its continuance. The senators and representatives from the many states that have the votes and that need the money are not likely to settle for less than they have been getting. But always the amount of federal aid should be kept at the minimum necessary to aid states with limited resources to maintain essential services at a minimum acceptable standard, and the states and local communities should be required to carry as much of the burden themselves as they can. Locally raised money is less likely to be spent lavishly than money received as a "gift" from the federal government.

There are many objections, also, to federally-collected, state-shared taxes, one of the most important of which is the possibility that the plan might lead to further centralization of the taxing power in the hands of the federal government. As Chief Justice Marshall said in quite a different connection, "the power to tax is the power to destroy"; increasing concentration of the taxing power in the federal government might lead ultimately to the complete destruction of the state and local tax autonomy. Moreover, to accept the principle of centrally-collected and locally-shared taxes as a matter of legal right is an implied admission of failure to achieve state and local tax reforms, designed to make possible levying equitable taxes by the state and local governments.

It has been argued also that, unsatisfactory as the subsidy system is, to go from it to federally-collected, state-shared taxes is to jump from the frying pan into the fire. Under a system of federal grants for specific purposes, the amount of federal aid has to bear some reasonable relationship to specific purposes and specific needs, while under the latter, the grants would be for general purposes of the states only, and the sky might be the limit. Much larger sums might come back to the states under this plan than under the grant-in-aid system, and, it is argued, the evils inherent in having "gift" money to spend would be correspondingly magnified.

Another possible objection arises from the difficulties likely to be encountered in devising an acceptable formula for the distribution of the shared taxes. It will prove immeasurably more difficult, says one writer, to devise an appropriate formula than to say that there should be one. If such a formula were devised by Congress, it might be written by a pen guided by sectional interests rather than by considerations of justice, and it might change with the changing political complexion of Congress, thus introducing a high degree of instability into state finances. While every proposed change of major policy should be examined with a view to foreseeing the worst possible outcome of its adoption, this dire prediction exaggerates the instability of Congress and suggests a too ready willingness to expect the worst.

Not all taxes, of course, can be centrally collected to advantage. Careful selection must be made of the taxes to be so handled. Obviously, a tax on real estate values should not be centrally collected, nor should a mercantile license or other tax on the privilege of doing business. On the other hand, a sales tax—either general or specialized—should, if it is to be effective, be so collected. Central collection of such a tax insures lower costs and a minimum of evasion due to the making of purchases in areas not included within the area in which the tax applies. Similarly, an income or wage tax can be best collected centrally.

In spite of the many objections to and limitations upon the centrally-collected, locally-shared principle, it seems definitely preferable to the subsidy system—the alternative that seems most likely to prevail. It is more economical in collection costs than duplicate collection systems in the individual states. The federal collecting machinery is more efficient than that in most states; hence there is less opportunity for tax evasion. The use of the graduated income tax principle assures fairness and equitability in the distribution of the tax burden. Most important of all, it makes possible the exercise of some control over the amount of federal aid given to state and local governments, and restores to them the opportunity to determine the uses that shall be made of the money. As such, it constitutes a move in the direction of the restoration of the vitality of the state and local governments in the management of their own affairs.

If such a plan is adopted, care must be taken to establish a situation in which the federal government will not take advantage of its position as collecting agency to force conditions upon the states, as has been done on many occasions in the past. The Hayden-Cartwright Act of 1934 well illustrates this practice. Here, funds appropriated to the states for highway purposes were made available only to those states which refrained from an "excessive" diversion of the funds raised by gasoline and motor vehicle taxes. While an amendment to the federal Constitution would give greater assurance of continued freedom from federal interference in the use of the funds, it will be necessary, in the absence of such an amendment, to rely upon the integrity of Congress.

V. A FEDERAL-STATE FISCAL AUTHORITY

A few months ago, the United States Treasury's Committee on Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations reported, recommending again the establishment of a Federal-State Fiscal Authority. Regardless of what the decision shall ultimately be as among the three alternative methods of meeting the financial needs of the state and local governments in the postwar era, the need for coördination in the field of intergovernmental fiscal relations will still be acute. The problem is a continuing one, and could best be dealt with by such a Federal-State Fiscal Authority as the Committee proposes. Whatever is done to meet the immediate need will, of necessity, be a more or less temporary means of handling an urgent current situation. The establishment of such an Authority would provide the machinery for developing a long-range fiscal policy on a relatively permanent basis.

EMERGING PROBLEMS IN THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

I. ORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN WORLD AFFAIRS

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I. INTRODUCTION

Looking at the post-war period, it seems obvious that the government of the United States will give more attention to foreign affairs than it has in any comparable period of American history. How can the machinery for conducting foreign relations best be organized to meet these increasing responsibilities?

The conduct of foreign relations in the modern world is no simple matter. Technical experts, intelligence systems, ability to negotiate, national political stability, a large and loyal staff of public servants—these are but some of the national requisites for effective participation in world affairs. The mobilization and organization of the best staff resources in the country, the negotiation of national policies, and then of international agreements, constitute a formidable task under any system of government.

The conduct of foreign relations is, of course, easiest in a completely authoritarian state. It is made immeasurably more difficult by any division of authority. In most non-authoritarian governments, some division of authority has been found desirable, even at the expense of occasional awkwardness of procedure, because thereby the dangers of usurpation of power are minimized. The United States has gone farther than any democratic country in dividing responsibility in foreign affairs. Not only is there the usual distinction between legislative and executive authority, but the independence of the two branches has been so far underlined that the achievement of over-all *government* policies (as distinct from *legislative* and *executive* policies) is extremely difficult unless the party relationships are just right between the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. More than this, we have not yet successfully organized even the executive branch for the formulation and execution of foreign policy. Finally, our federal system has made well nigh impossible in the past the acceptance of international responsibility in many important areas like education and labor relations which were not considered within the jurisdiction of the national government.

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* Now on military leave, serving as Lieutenant (j.g.) in the U. S. Naval Reserve. Opinions expressed in this article are not to be construed as reflecting the views of the Navy Department.

Other contributions to this symposium deal with the first and last of these special problems of division of authority. The present article deals with some of the administrative problems arising in the executive branch in connection with the conduct of foreign relations.

II. TRADITIONAL RÔLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

It has been the practice of the United States to insist that all contacts with foreign states should take place through the Department of State. During the early decades, when our international relations consisted mainly of negotiating treaties, maintaining our neutral rights, and protecting our citizens abroad, this proved a logical arrangement. It was a relatively easy matter to channel all communications and all activities relating to foreign affairs through the State Department—the agency charged with the responsibility of conducting, on behalf of the President, the nation's foreign policy.

However, the widening scope of our foreign relations, increasingly touching upon subjects far removed from the background and fields of training of State Department personnel, led gradually to the establishment of direct contacts between other United States agencies and foreign governments. Thus the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, as well as the Army and Navy, sent attachés to diplomatic missions abroad. These attachés consulted directly with departments of foreign governments, although they did so always under the supervision of the chief of the diplomatic mission. During World War I, widespread technical contacts were established between the Allied and Associated Governments on shipping, food, and production questions. An extensive hierarchy of inter-allied committees emerged in which technicians of the various governments worked side by side. In the course of this experience, there developed the prototype of the present Combined Boards. The consulting officials were able automatically to implement their international decisions through administrative regulation of the national agencies to which they were attached. During the period following the first World War, the system of attachés continued, and direct foreign contacts of agencies other than the State Department was stimulated further through the needs of League of Nations technical committees. It is interesting that in spite of non-membership by the United States in the League, the machinery of United States foreign relations was thus influenced along the lines intended by some League proponents, viz., to increase contacts among technical governmental agencies and with the technical committees of the League without the interposition of foreign offices. In 1939, because of confusion in foreign countries due to competition among the field representatives of various agencies, the agricultural and commercial attachés were brought under the direction of the Department of State by Reorganization Plan No. II. This amalgamation had barely been effected when we entered World War II.

III. WARTIME EXPERIENCES IN CONDUCTING FOREIGN RELATIONS

World War II ushered in a new period of divided responsibility not unlike that of World War I. By its very nature, this war, fought on the military, economic, psychological, and diplomatic fronts, has required a tremendous broadening of government activity in foreign relations. The net effect has been to reduce the exclusive control of the State Department and to increase the responsibility of other agencies. Inevitably there have arisen a host of serious problems in inter-agency relations and in the coördination of foreign policy, in both its military and civilian aspects.

(*1*) *Military Aspects of Wartime Foreign Relations.* The military side of our foreign relations has involved the coördination of United Nations' strategy and operations, and the disposition of men and materials according to master plans. The combined planning of Roosevelt and Churchill, each with his technical military staff, has provided the broad framework of these plans. In carrying on discussions in behalf of the United States, the President has merely continued his traditional and constitutional rôle of conductor of American foreign relations. To provide the foundation for these discussions, however, and to implement the decisions arrived at, a vast expansion of United States relations with allied governments has come about through the medium of the War and Navy Departments. Elaborate consultative and planning agencies have been created, generally under the aegis of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The subject-matter of these combined agencies, although generally classed as military, ranges, in fact, over a wide variety of matters cutting deeply into foreign policy and other civilian activities. No decisions can be taken on the military front without considering the potential effects upon our relations with allied and neutral countries. Involved are problems of the highest political importance. For example, how should United Nations forces be deployed near countries not members of the United Nations? What policy shall be followed by the armed forces toward the governments-in-exile, and more particularly toward democratic and fascist groups, toward labor, industry, and the churches, when territories are liberated from the enemy? What policy limitations shall be placed upon the AMG forces following the periods of active military operations? These are but illustrations of the many questions with which the military become centrally and vitally concerned and on which, for strategic reasons, they must have or provide decisive answers. Yet each decision made has far-reaching consequences for the long-term foreign relations of the United States, and consequently is of vital concern to the State Department.

It is not enough to say simply that when peace gives way to war international relations become primarily military relations. The war is but a passing phase in the continuing relations between nations, and wartime relations must therefore be coupled at the beginning and close of war to the pre- and post-war policies of the nations involved. While, therefore, the armed forces take over many important aspects of international relations, they must have continuing collaboration and direction from the foreign offices concerned.

Because the military represent established departments with contacts abroad and at home, because the area of their official concern is well marked out in practice, because the President is commander-in-chief as well as chief of state in relations with foreign governments, and because in war military considerations so clearly take precedence over civilian, it has been relatively simple to devise machinery for tying the State Department and other civilian agencies into discussions with the military. It is to be presumed that differences of opinion have frequently appeared and that smoothly functioning machinery for coördination of policies and operations has not always been present. Yet the inexorable drive of events and the wartime balance of power among the various agencies have encouraged decisiveness and discouraged prolonged jurisdictional disputes.

(2) Civilian Aspects of Conducting Foreign Relations. The difficulties in coördinating *civilian* activities in foreign affairs have been far greater. The creation of a number of emergency agencies which carry on programs in the field of foreign relations inevitably led to numerous jurisdictional conflicts. The Secretary of State, it was assumed, and explicitly stated on several occasions, continued to be responsible for the formulation of foreign policies and for the conduct of normal diplomatic relations. How was this responsibility to be carried out, and how did it impinge on the functions of other agencies? A glance at the executive orders and the presidential letters bearing on the functions of the more important civilian agencies in this area will show something of the character and magnitude of the problem.

(a) Definition of Inter-agency Relationships. The Executive Order of July 30, 1941, setting up the Office of the Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs indicated that his office was to act as the coördinator for all inter-American activities, but that it was to work very closely with the Department of State. The pertinent parts of the order provided that the CIAA should do the following: (a) "serve as the center for the coördination of cultural and commercial relations of the Nation affecting Hemisphere defense; (b) formulate and execute programs, in coöperation with the Department of State, which, by effective use of governmental and private facilities in

such fields as the arts and sciences, education and travel, the radio, the press, and the cinema, will further the national defense and strengthen the bonds between the nations of the Western Hemisphere; (c) formulate, recommend, and execute programs in the commercial and economic fields which, by the effective use of governmental and private facilities, will further the commercial well-being of the Western Hemisphere."

The Executive Order of July 30, 1941, directed that the Economic Defense Board (later called Board of Economic Warfare, and now a part of the Foreign Economic Administration) be set up for the purpose of "developing and coördinating policies, plans, and programs designed to protect and strengthen the international economic relations of the United States in the interest of national defense." The order also stated that economic defense meant the conduct of international economic activities relating to exports, imports, the acquisition and disposition of materials and commodities from foreign countries, including preclusive buying, transactions in foreign exchange and foreign-owned or controlled property, etc.

The Executive Order of October 28, 1941, establishing the Office of Lend-Lease Administration laid the basis for the working relationship between the State Department and OLLA. It provided that "the master agreement with each nation receiving lend-lease-aid, setting forth the general terms and conditions under which such nation is receiving such aid, shall continue to be negotiated by the State Department, with the advice of the Economic Defense Board and the Lend-Lease Administration."

The Executive Order of February 7, 1942, establishing the War Shipping Administration, outlined the functions of WSA, but said nothing about the rôle of the State Department. Among other things, WSA was to "represent the United States Government in dealing with the British Ministry of War Transport and with similar shipping agencies of nations allied with the United States in the prosecution of the war, in matters related to the use of shipping."

The Executive Order of April 30, 1942, defining certain functions and duties of the Board of Economic Warfare, provided that the BEW should "represent the United States Government in dealing with the economic warfare agencies of the United Nations for the purpose of relating the Government's economic warfare program and facilities to those of such nations." It also provided that for the purpose of carrying out its responsibilities, "the BEW may arrange through the Department of State to send abroad such technical, engineering, and economic representatives responsible to the Board as the Board may deem necessary."

The Executive Order of June 13, 1942, providing for the Office of War Information, stipulated that the Director should perform certain functions and duties "consistent with the war information policies of the President and with the foreign policy of the United States and after consultation with the Committee on War Information Policy."

The President's letter of March 19, 1943, to Governor Lehman, defining the functions of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operation authorized him "to plan, coördinate, and arrange for the administration of this Government's activities for the relief of victims of war in areas liberated from Axis control through the provision of food, fuel, clothing, and other basic necessities," etc. It also provided that OFRRO's "operations in any specific area abroad will, of course, be subject to the approval of the U. S. military commander in that area so long as military occupation continues, and in matters of general foreign policy you will be guided by the directives of the Secretary of State."

In his letter of June 3, 1943, outlining the plan for coördinating the activities of civilian agencies in liberated areas under the Office of Foreign Economic Coördination, the President insisted that there had to be one central point in Washington for the coördination of such activities and said that he looked to the State Department to assume the necessary leadership. "I shall rely on you," he wrote Secretary Hull, "to unify our foreign economic activities to the end that coherent and consistent policies and programs result."

In a further attempt to coördinate our international economic activities, the President, on July 15, 1943, announced that "the Director of the Office of War Mobilization is given the responsibility of unifying and coördinating the policies and programs of the agencies engaged in foreign economic matters in conformity with [the] foreign policy of the United States as determined by the State Department."

On September 25, 1943, the President issued an executive order consolidating OLLA, OFRRO, OEW, and parts of OFEC, into the Foreign Economic Administration so as to "unify and consolidate governmental activities relating to foreign economic affairs." The order provided that "the powers and functions of the Administration shall be exercised in conformity with the foreign policy of the United States as defined by the Secretary of State."

All of the executive orders cited placed duties involving foreign relations upon agencies other than the State Department. Most of them specified that the powers granted should be exercised in conformity with the foreign policies of the United States as formulated by the Secretary of State. However, this reiteration of the rôle of the Secretary of State was not enough, in practice, to insure a smoothly working system of multiple-agency conduct of foreign relations. Given the large number of agencies involved, how was the State Department to exercise its control of foreign *policy*?

When all foreign activities are carried on by Foreign Service officers or by attachés under its control, the Department is in a position to maintain daily supervision, if it wants to, and it can allow freedom of action to individual officers at its own discretion and in accordance with current experience. When, however, employees of other agencies are making important decisions affecting relations with foreign countries, and receiving their orders from the heads of those agencies, the exercise of policy control is removed from a daily or routine administrative basis. The Department of State, therefore, sought to establish controls at strategic points in the process by which the agencies carried out their functions. The new agencies, on the other hand, sought to get areas of activity marked out for them, within which they would be allowed full discretion and freedom of action.

The real problem was an administrative one: how could separately identifiable parts of a total operation be geared so that they might function efficiently toward the achievement of a single objective? Preclusive buying, developing resources abroad, purchasing essential war materials, distributing information about the United Nations by radio, press, or motion pictures, are distinct activities calling for technical skills. Each is of such magnitude as to require specialized technicians and large supporting staffs. Yet, in the interest of consistent national policy, none could be carried on except in the framework of foreign policy.

The administrative problem thus faced has been of very special concern because of its relation to the prosecution of the war. However, it will continue into the post-war period and must be approached as a long term problem of governmental organization. A satisfactory plan for the administration of our foreign relations did not exist before the war; for even then we were not organized for the job of a great twentieth-century world power. Through the war, our responsibilities have become greater and the scope of our foreign relations permanently more complex. The urgency for finding a pattern that will efficiently organize the government of the United States for foreign-relations purposes is therefore born of pre-war-neglect, of wartime experience, and of the need for foresight for the post-war period.

Wartime practices in multiple-administration of foreign relations have shown clearly the focal points at which the State Department and other agencies come into conflict. It will be useful to look more closely at the issues raised since their solution will provide the key to effective post-war administration of foreign relations.

(*b*) *Policy Determination.* Upon the creation of each of the agencies mentioned above, an effort was made to define precisely what the foreign policy supervision of the Secretary of State meant. In the course of time, several kinds of relationships or definitions of authority were tried out. Some agencies attempted to organize their work on a *project* basis. In brief, the Department approved the agency's programs in broad outline and then permitted it to carry them out with general supervision, but without a great deal of interference. If CIAA's motion picture division, for example, desired to produce a series of films for distribution in Latin America, it outlined its plans in the form of a project which was submitted to the State Department for approval. Once the official approval of the Department had been obtained, CIAA carried through by letting the necessary contracts, supervising the production of the films, etc. Following a final review by the Department—which was usually provided for in the project—CIAA proceeded with the actual distribution. Permission for distribution could be withheld, of course, if it was thought that the films might prove detrimental to the development of the Good Neighbor Policy.

A number of agencies tried to distinguish *policy-making* (a State Department function) from *operations* (an agency function).[1] A completely satisfactory working arrangement based on this approach was never developed. It was extremely difficult to get agreement on the extent of control that the State Department needs to exercise to insure conformance to foreign policy. Clearly, a program likely to jeopardize our relations with other countries should not be approved. But on what grounds should the Department be able to declare a program contrary to our foreign policies? For example, if it is found necessary for the government to acquire wheat abroad, should the Department be permitted to hold up the proposed program on grounds of (a) the country from which it is proposed to buy, (b) the grade of wheat, (c) the price, (d) the company or agency through which the purchase is being arranged, (e) the personnel to be sent by the other agency to the foreign country to effect the purchase, (f) the fact that the purchase is to be made by our government direct or through a private trader? It became very evident that the line between policy and operations was almost impossible to find because from the beginning to the end questions of policy were always closely interwoven with operations.

Another formula was tried in order to distinguish the special areas of the BEW and the Department of State. The Board was to recognize the primary responsibility of the Secretary of State in the formulation and conduct of our foreign policy, but in "matters of business judgment" concerned with providing for the production and procurement of strategic materials, the Department was to recognize the primary responsibility of the Board. If, however, the State Department believed a proposal of the Board to be at variance with our foreign policy, the chairman of the Board and the Secretary of State were to discuss the problem and reach a joint decision, calling upon the President for direction in matters of sufficient importance. This line between business judgments and foreign policy judgments was frequently just as hard to define as the line between operations and policy, because, in specific cases, the agencies found it difficult to agree whether foreign policy considerations were involved in business judgments.

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[1] Cf. the statement of Leo Crowley, shortly after his appointment as Administrator of FEA: "I will not attempt to have a foreign policy of my own. My end is operating and administering, while policy-making is for the President and Secretary Hull to determine." *Washington Post*, Sept. 30, 1943.

An effort was made also to distinguish *economic policy* from *political policy*. Such a line was even more difficult to draw than that between policy and operations or between business judgments and foreign policy. For example, is a decision of our government to engage in the development of rubber plantations in Brazil a matter of economic policy or of political policy? What foreign economic policy is there that does not have political implications? A distinction may be made between economic facts and political facts as bases for policy judgments. But economic and political *policies* are parts of the same thing.

These approaches had in common an effort to define the point at which the Department of State should give its approval, in terms of foreign policy, to a proposed course of action. In particular, an attempt was made to define a point beyond which the other agencies would be free to act if they stayed within the terms of a stated area of policy. None of the foregoing efforts was found entirely satisfactory. There was a consistent belief on the part of the State Department that it had to exercise extensive supervision, and a corresponding belief on the part of the agencies that they were left insufficient freedom of action. All parts of foreign relations are so interrelated that it is virtually impossible to assign different parts to wholly independent agencies.

(c) *Personnel Selection.* The head of every agency of government appoints whatever personnel is needed to help him carry out his duties, subject, of course, to civil service regulations. The agencies engaged in foreign activities assumed that they were free to send abroad personnel they believed to be competent, although they realized that every person had to be cleared by the State Department in issuing passports. At this point, the Department of State felt itself justified in examining the qualifications of proposed field staffs in terms of their acceptability to foreign governments and their conformance to departmental standards for service abroad. The situation was productive of conflict and misunderstanding whenever clearance of personnel was delayed or denied. What was actually involved here was another phase of the policy control problem. Through such control over personnel, the Department could make sure that persons selected to carry out agency programs agreed with its foreign policies as interpreted by the Secretary of State. It could at the same time make a last minute check on projects which had previously been approved.

(*d*) *Communications.* The large field staffs of most of the war agencies made the communication system between Washington and the field an extremely important factor in carrying out agency functions. Every agency had to be in almost continual touch with its field personnel. This communication took place through normal mail channels, diplomatic pouch, cable, radiogram, and telephone. Cables and radiograms of most agencies go through the facilities of the Department of State, and since these messages involve instructions to, and information or reports from, the field, the Department has maintained that they should be scrutinized in terms of foreign policy before dispatch or delivery. The need for scrutiny was especially great in the early stages of the war when the personnel of the war agencies was new to the job and unschooled in the ways of diplomacy. The executive orders made no reference to this kind of surveillance by the Department of State, and bitter conflicts arose over the propriety of the control and over the manner of administering it which sometimes resulted in delays in delivery. Obviously, if the State Department were to raise policy questions, the messages could not be cleared by clerks, but had to run the gamut of professional staff members attached to various country desks. With an almost unbelievable increase in the number of communications,[2] both justifiable and unjustifiable delays no doubt occurred.

Although a satisfactory agreement was never reached among all agencies concerned regarding the kinds of questions the Department ought to raise in the course of clearance, a *modus operandi* was found sooner or later for each of the agencies involved. As the State Department and the other agencies coöperated more closely in planning programs and in formulating cables of instruction, the occasions for further interference were reduced. It gradually became possible to agree upon certain types of messages which the sending agencies could mark "no clearance necessary." These were to be dispatched by the Department without delay, with carbon copies distributed to persons concerned. At the same time, a necessary reorganization of State Department communication facilities permitted setting maximum time limits beyond which the Department was not to delay the transmission of messages.

At the center of the communications controversy was always the issue of the extent of policy control to be exercised by the Department after the broad lines of specific programs had been agreed upon. What seemed to the Department a necessary policing function was looked upon by the other agencies as interference in their internal operations.

(*e*) *Field Relationships.* There are two primary points of contact with foreign governments. The one is in Washington, with the representatives of the governments with whom we are carrying on relations. The other is in the various foreign countries through our own representatives located abroad.

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[2] In October, 1943, some 800 cables a day were sent or received through the facilities of the Department, more than tripling the pre-war figure of 1939.

From an administrative point of view, unity of policy formulation in Washington has its counterpart in unity of policy execution in the field. Just as there is only one Secretary of State representing the President in the broad conduct of foreign relations in Washington, there can be only one chief of mission, again representing the President, and directing United States field activities within each country. Here, then, is the final point at which control of policy may be exercised by the State Department, which is charged with the conduct of the President's foreign policy.

The executive orders setting up the various war agencies did not clarify inter-agency field relationships. Each agency sent its field staff abroad, after proper clearance through the State Department, and began issuing instructions to carry out the agency's job.[3] To the extent to which the agencies in the early stages were not in agreement with the State Department on programs, it was possible for conflicting instructions to be sent by the agency and the Department to United States personnel in country A. But more was involved than consistency of instructions; the application of any foreign policy at a foreign post must always be guided by more than daily instructions from Washington. The exact temper of the foreign government and the status of other negotiations with it contribute to the judgment of the chief diplomatic officer in timing his negotiations. To a large extent, therefore, he must have freedom. It is at this point that the relationship between field representatives of other agencies and the chief of diplomatic missions becomes important. Consequently, the State Department has insisted that, whatever the agreements between the Department and the war agencies in Washington regarding policies and programs, the chief of the diplomatic mission, as representative of the President, must give general supervision to the work of all other agency representatives. Some of the agencies have been more reluctant than others to acquiesce. They have sometimes argued that the job they were set up to do required the kind of technical or business judgments which many chiefs of mission and foreign service officers lacked and did not understand. Moreover, they have claimed that frequently differences in wholly technical judgments between the Department's and other agency field representatives have been decided arbitrarily by chiefs of diplomatic missions allegedly on diplomatic grounds. In some instances, the agencies have asserted that Foreign Service officers lacked the vision necessary to understand the real nature of their programs.

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[3] In October, 1943, more than 30 agencies and departments of the government had representatives abroad.

IV. BASIC ISSUES IN POST-WAR ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

Looked at on a day-to-day basis, the wartime troubles which arose in administering foreign policy were inter-agency struggles over jurisdiction. Each agency could and did raise honest questions about the intended division of responsibilities. How, the agencies asked, could they be responsible to the President if their programs, personnel, communications, and actual field operations were under the direct control of the Secretary of State? Apart from jurisdictional problems, political considerations, personal attitudes, and perhaps "ideologies," were contributing factors to inter-agency disputes.

However, this wartime search for definitions was but a phase in a longer-range, and more fundamental, search for an administrative pattern which will permit the United States government to participate effectively in modern world affairs. As previously indicated, this government had not even before World War II arrived at a satisfactory organizational scheme. While many parts of the domestic governmental machinery were reorganized during the 1930's, the agencies concerned with foreign relations have never been properly geared.

The end of the war will automatically raise the question of the future of the emergency agencies (including their various corporations) in the foreign relations field. It should also bring a reconsideration of the international functions of the old line agencies like Commerce and Agriculture (and of the independent regulatory boards like the Civil Aëronautics Board) that have had a less active rôle during the war. The central issue will be the rôle of the State Department in a world in which the activities of so-called domestic agencies (Labor, Agriculture, Interior, etc.) impinge upon international relations and in which every international event affects domestic affairs for which some agency other than the State Department is responsible.

In seeking a definition of the rôle of the Department of State, four possible patterns of organizing our foreign activities have been suggested. A review of the proposals will indicate the broad issues involved.

(*1*) *All foreign activities should be centralized in the State Department and the functions of other agencies in this field eliminated.* This plan would require the Department to expand its activities in keeping with the ever-widening scope of foreign relations. It would mean a very substantial increase in Departmental personnel and in the regular Foreign Service to insure adequate technical reporting and competent negotiating with representatives of other countries. It also would probably mean full control by the Department over all representatives of the government abroad, and therefore would go considerably beyond the Reorganization Plan No. II of 1939 regarding agricultural and commercial attachés.

Proponents of this plan not only would give to the State Department the functions of FEA, CIAA, OWI, and OSS, but would also turn over those branches of the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture and other agencies engaged in foreign activities. (None has suggested that corresponding parts of Army and Navy be likewise absorbed.) Such a move, it is argued, would wipe out at a single stroke duplication, overlapping, and interagency bickering, and would assure a unified foreign policy under the control of the President and the Secretary of State. Organizationally, the result would be a greatly expanded Department, with vast responsibilities in the political, informational, cultural, and economic fields.

While possibly doing away with duplication in one respect, such a solution would force the State Department to develop extensive technical operating staffs in areas like trade, finance, labor, agriculture, etc., where the individual agencies with their vast technical resources must continue to operate to carry out domestic responsibilities. In an interdependent world, the line between domestic and foreign aspects of these subjects is so hazy that great duplication would be inevitable. While such a plan would, therefore, do away with inter-agency conflicts within the area of foreign relations, it would lead to other conflicts in drawing the line between "foreign" and "domestic" activities and policies. Moreover, it is likely that the policy-making function would be in danger of being smothered both by the sheer size of the Department and by the lack of competition from other agencies. An incidental drawback to such a concentration of responsibility in the State Department would be the inability to divorce negotiations of high political character from intelligence activities and technical negotiations, including trade promotion, financial transactions, industrial development abroad, health and sanitation, and cultural programs.

(2) The State Department should be limited in functions mainly to high policy planning and negotiations. This concept obviously involves decentralization in as extreme a form as plan (1) suggests centralization. It would leave most day-to-day foreign relations to the technical departments of the government, dealing directly with their opposites abroad. The competence of the Department of State would be limited here mainly to the art of diplomacy and would not extend to technical subjects. Every other department would select its own staff for service abroad as well as its representatives to international functional organizations.

It is recognized by proponents of this approach that there must be coordination in foreign affairs to the extent of insuring consistency. It is believed, however, that such consistency can be assured by occasional definitions of broad policy by the State Department, leaving their specific application to competent technicians. Moreover, it is argued, this plan would serve to remove the important substance of international affairs—

things like commerce, investments, health, traffic in drugs, etc.—from the power politics manipulations of foreign offices bent merely on advancing the national state. Technical experts of all countries would meet as technical experts, and not as representatives of national states, to devise means of meeting world-wide technical problems.

Moreover, some people, in arguing for this division of labor, insist that it is undesirable for high political reasons for the State Department to become actively involved in such technical operations as the dissemination of propaganda abroad, the purchase of strategic materials, etc. Whether or not this premise would hold in peace-time, it has no doubt been true during the present war. As one war agency official declared in a public meeting, "Our operations are often nothing more or less than bloody higgling in the market place, and the State Department cannot afford to jeopardize its good relations with the diplomatic authorities of other countries by quarreling about the price of certain commodities." It is convenient, at times, to be able to lay the blame for such activities at the door of another agency!

While maximizing the importance of technical competence, such an approach fails to take real account of the national organization of the world. The national basis for organizing public services will remain in the years immediately ahead, and negotiations for their improvement through international organizations will continue on a national basis. *Inter-national* organizations will be only what their name implies. There will remain, therefore, need for the closest possible coördination and national planning in the realm of foreign affairs in the interests of the United States.

(*3*) *The division of responsibility prevailing before the war should be continued.* Under this proposal, the State Department would be responsible for the formulation and administration of foreign relations, but, when appropriate, would consult with other agencies through various liaison arrangements including interdepartmental committees. The primacy of the Department in foreign relations would be here unquestioned. It would formulate foreign policies and administer them through the Foreign Service. Interdepartmental policy determination would be the exception, and would take place ordinarily at the wish of the Department or when required by legislation. The present administrative arrangements regarding the Foreign Service under the Reorganization of 1939 would remain.

(*4*) *The formulation and administration of foreign policy should be recognized as government-wide responsibilities.* The special rôle of the State Department under this plan would be to see that there are foreign policies for the United States, that these policies are consistent and coherent, and that they are properly applied. The Department would also have the special task of administering the foreign service of the United States and of gearing special field missions into regular missions abroad.

This alternative would present many of the problems of coördinating responsibility which were unsuccessfully faced both before and during the war in the multiple-agency conduct of foreign relations. If this approach were deliberately chosen, it would be based on the assumption that foreign policy, much more in the future than in the past, is to be the product of interdepartmental consultation. Because it involves the most practical alternative to the pre-war pattern, it is examined here with greater care than the other proposals previously mentioned.

In the past, the President, as chief of state in the conduct of foreign relations, has relied principally on the Secretary of State for the formulation and execution of foreign policies. An interdepartmental approach would involve reliance upon the composite judgments of the heads of several agencies under the active leadership of the State Department. It would mean a recognition of the government-wide incidence of foreign affairs. This would mean a change of thinking regarding the nature of the primacy of the Department of State in matters of foreign relations. While the Secretary of State would direct foreign policy formulation, and would supervise our foreign activities in order to assure unity in both policy and action, the other agencies concerned would have to be geared much more closely into the entire foreign relations process. To effect this greater coördination would entail the highest administrative skills.

It has been suggested that the needed coördination can best be achieved through the cabinet, sitting as policy adviser to the President. However, there is nothing in the history of the cabinet to suggest that foreign policies could be satisfactorily formulated in this body, given the manner of selecting cabinets and the relations between cabinet members and the President. Under our constitution, they are not collectively responsible to anyone or for anything in particular.

Even were there collegial responsibility at the top, interdepartmental collaboration in foreign policy formulation would require a network of cross channels to insure a free flow of intelligence materials and the results of research between the various departments concerned, and to make possible technical interdepartmental collaboration in the formulation of policies. In part for want of adequate planning agencies in the government, and in part because of the way in which government operates in this country, foreign policies, like any other policies, are not made at the top. They are an institutional product rather than orders issued from above. They are submitted in a hundred different ways through staff decisions and recommendations, to be tacitly or explicitly approved or disapproved. Many policies become accepted in practice merely through failure of so-called "top-side policy officials" to object to a given course of action. Of course, the broadest policy lines are frequently laid down by directive, or, more often, by implication, or by the known preferences of responsible officials; but most of the alternative applications of policy (which therefore give meaning to policy) are made from the bottom up. If there is to be interdepartmental participation in foreign affairs, it must come at working levels below the cabinet.

The Committee on Trade Agreements, under the chairmanship of the Department of State, for example, brought together representatives of all interested agencies and produced for the President the substance for the agreements Congress had authorized him to conclude. Similarly, the Executive Committee for Economic Foreign Policy promises to be an exceptionally successful interdepartmental device, at a working level, for the formulation of economic foreign policies for the approval of the Secretary of State and the President.

Government-wide participation in the conduct of foreign relations would raise certain questions regarding their administration. The Foreign Service under the direction of ministers and ambassadors appointed by the President would much more generally be recognized as the foreign field service of the entire United States government. It would certainly become the object of much greater concern by many more agencies. While the State Department would continue to provide central direction for the Service as now, many agencies would be concerned that sound methods were used in finding, selecting, directing, and promoting the personnel and in making transfers between the field and Washington.

The regular activities of the Foreign Service, such as looking after the interests of American citizens, representing the United States in general negotiations and discussions with foreign governments, and regular reporting of economic, political, and cultural affairs, would need to be supplemented by the activities of special technical missions. The latter presumably would be under more direct instructions of the technical departments than are the commercial and agricultural attachés. They would be selected by the departments, subject, of course, to clearance by the State Department. While these technicians would be under the general supervision of the chief of diplomatic missions, they would be granted wide latitude in collaborating with members of technical departments in other governments.

Necessarily, under such a plan, the Department of State would have central responsibility for the international conferences which are a device for carrying on multilateral negotiations. The special function of the Department would be to decide, in consultation with other agencies, when conferences were to be held, to make certain that United States policy had been determined in advance of the conference, to see that appropriate generalists and technicians were represented on the United States delegation, and, in most instances, to provide the chairmen for such delegations.

Such a plan for organizing our foreign relations would tremendously increase in quality the responsibilities and functions vested in the Department of State. It would call for leadership of a very high order and for a staff competent both in international and domestic political relations. To lead, to guide, to assist—all this tactfully but firmly—requires exceptional qualities, including that rare quality of being able to resist the temptation of doing for others jobs they can do better themselves. The proper performance of this task requires also an appreciation of the different kinds of advice that should appropriately be given at different administrative levels. For example, the broadest type of policy supervision should not be attempted at low levels where clearances of a minor and routine character are involved. Finally, it would permit the Department to use much more fully the special competence for which its staff is selected: understanding of the broad principles of international relations and diplomacy. The other agencies are primarily concerned with, and exposed to, the domestic front. In the State Department, with its special knowledge of international affairs, must reside the task of watching the international implications of both our foreign and our domestic policies.

The rôle of the State Department, implicit under this alternative, as coördinator of policies and administrator of the foreign service would probably call for some radical changes in departmental activities. Without detailed operating responsibility, the Department could and would have to devote more of its time to the research and planning essential for providing leadership to the entire government on the objectives and long-range policy of our foreign relations. Information now almost exclusively reserved to the staff of the State Department on grounds of secrecy would need to be disseminated among many agencies. Administrative procedures, geared for the use of one department and of persons accustomed to working together within it, would need to be streamlined to insure service to others outside the Department now equally interested and responsibly concerned. Above all, greater interdepartmental formulation and administration of foreign policy would call for a high degree of team-work among the agencies and much greater recognition that all personnel works for the government of the United States and not merely for specific departments or persons.

The foregoing are but the broadest implications of the main alternatives which seem to lie before us. As already indicated, the choice probably will be made between plans 3 and 4. Even between these two alternatives, it is unlikely that either, in the simple form in which it is outlined, will be adopted. The choice is between directions of administrative organization rather than between blueprints or patterns. Inevitable adjustments have to be made in any organization to allow for traditions, personalities, leadership and, in broader terms, for politics. But it is important that the ultimate direction be kept in mind, since the premises underlying each are administratively quite different.[4]

V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The extent to which any of these alternatives will be selected for determining the rôle of the State Department will depend also upon the character of world relations in the post-war period. If the world of tomorrow is a world of pure power politics, with sovereign states bargaining and maneuvering for power in a dog-eat-dog fashion, then a highly centralized administration for the conduct of our foreign affairs might meet the needs of the hour. If, on the other hand, the community of nations is able to attain a modicum of security and stability, peaceful relations among nations would probably be furthered more if technical matters were handled by the agencies directly concerned, under the coördinating leadership of foreign offices. For the more the settlement of such problems falls to the immediate jurisdiction of political foreign offices, the more they tend to become involved in considerations of national honor and prestige and are used to further the over-all bargaining power of the state. When that happens, human advancement may be sacrificed at the altar of power politics.

The problem of streamlining the national government for effective action in world affairs is the direct result of the revolutionary changes that have been taking place in international relations. It is by no means, therefore, peculiar to the United States. In Russia, the Supreme Soviet recently granted the sixteen republics of the U.S.S.R. the right to deal directly with other countries. In Great Britain, too, numerous proposals to reshape the Foreign Office have been advanced from both governmental and private sources. And in other countries the issue is becoming equally clear; foreign offices highly specialized in the diplomatic techniques of a by-gone era must be fitted with new methods and new men in order to meet the new problems that confront them. The success of the peace we establish after the war will depend in large measure upon how well the various states are organized to carry on the complicated relations of the international community.

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[4] Any plan which contemplates the exercise of leadership by the State Department assumes, of course, that the Department is organized to play the rôle effectively. Cf. W. H. C. Laves and F. O. Wilcox, "The Reorganization of the Department of State," in this REVIEW, XXXVIII, 289–301 (Apr., 1944).

II. AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS WITHIN AN ORGANIZED WORLD FRAMEWORK

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I. THE NEW CONTEXT OF POLICY

Absorbed for three years in the grim business of global war, the American people only dimly understand what is involved in their apparent willingness to participate in the equally exacting business of organizing the world for enduring peace. If this participation is to be sustained and effective instead of short-lived or sporadic, the scope and forms of the future foreign policy of the United States cannot help being profoundly affected. Its context will be radically different from that of prewar times.

This observation does not imply any sharp departure from the fundamental postulates of policy enunciated year in and year out by Secretary Hull since 1933. The foreign policy of every great power is always more or less a continuum, compounded of old and new elements. Between wars we at least paid lip service to the ideal of a world organized for peace and security, though we persistently declined to assume the obligations of full membership in the League of Nations. We have for decades sponsored the development of a loose collaborative system designed to further Pan-American solidarity. At the world level, moreover, we have been an active participant in international agencies concerned with technical, scientific, social, and humanitarian matters, including, since 1934, the International Labor Organization. And in 1928 we joined with sixty-two other signatories of the Pact of Paris in renouncing "war as an instrument of national policy."

Yet none of these engagements committed us in advance to employ our economic or military resources for the prevention of aggression. We refused to adhere to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, even minus the so-called "optional" clause. Still less was this country prepared to subject its trade, currency, investment, or agricultural policies to criticism, or advice, or recommendation, let alone regulation, by international institutions which it might have sponsored for these purposes. Such policies fell within the domain of "domestic questions." Contrast, for example, the narrowly conceived economic provisions of Wilson's Fourteen Points with the far-reaching social objectives of the Atlantic Charter. "Freedom from want" and "full employment," which today are recognized to be of international as well as national concern, reflect the impact of prolonged world depression and total war upon the shifting line dividing domestic and international responsibility. To quote from President Roosevelt's address to the delegates in the 1941 International Labor Conference: "We have learned too well that social problems and economic problems are not separate water-tight compartments in the international any more than in the national sphere. In international affairs, economic policy can no longer be an end in itself. It is merely a means for achieving social objectives."

If the United States boldly accepts the responsibilities of great-power leadership for the advancement of these new objectives, the context of international action will, for this country perhaps more than for any other, widen and deepen, while the area within which it will be free to act alone will be correspondingly circumscribed. We may not in a legal sense delegate coercive powers to any supra-national authority, but we shall none the less be obliged, morally and politically, to give heed to the repercussions of our national policy upon other peoples. We shall be forced to adopt the habit of consulting *regularly* with the family of nations on many problems formerly left to the precarious treatment of ordinary diplomacy, when indeed they were not handled exclusively on our own account. Certain practices, hitherto regarded as part and parcel of the prerogatives of statehood, may not be indulged in short of violating our national good faith, or of risking to undermine the very foundations of the new peace structure. Our national pride, if nothing else, should impel us to contrive methods whereby our contribution to the work of the new international machinery may be commensurate with our unmatched human and material resources.

II. THE AMBIT OF A COÖPERATIVE WORLD POLICY

(*1*) *Organized Security in Lieu of War and Neutrality.* If, in agreement with the other United Nations, we succeed in establishing the type of general international organization envisaged by the Moscow Declaration and the Connally Resolution, what traditional practices shall we have to modify or abandon in order to play our proper part in making such an organization work? Secondly, what new responsibilities will devolve upon the United States?

While the precise contours of the projected security system had not been revealed at the time these lines were written, shortly after the opening of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, it is obvious that every member of the security organization must surrender the legal right to declare and wage war unilaterally. No member state may with impunity resort to force or the threat of force in its relations with other states *except* when it is so authorized by and on behalf of the organized international community. As a matter of broad principle, the United States has been committed to this proposition ever since it ratified the Pact of Paris. But the proposition, tragically enough, lacked any workable means of enforcement. When we become a party to an instrument which creates a general security system based upon the coöperative use of force, we shall in effect be announcing to the world that the constitutional power of the American Congress to declare war has been superseded by the security provisions of this instrument. Measures taken in our own defense, against unauthorized attack, will of course still be permissible, but we shall have to refrain from acting as exclusive judge of the conditions under which we may use armed force in any other circumstances or for any other object.

A logical and necessary corollary of this will be the abandonment of the dogma of neutrality. Any threat to peace, no matter in what part of the world it may occur, will be the concern of the entire community of states. Contrary to popular impression, this does not mean that the United States will be called upon to contribute to the international force required to prevent armed conflict every time and every place it may be threatened. In the case of disturbances involving minor powers located outside our primary strategic orbit (i.e., the Western Hemisphere and its oceanic outposts), the responsibility for initiating police measures will presumably be assigned by the security organization to one or more of the other principal military (and possibly lesser) powers—unless, as now seems unlikely, a permanent internationalized force for police duty should be created as part of the apparatus of world security. In any event, we shall not in the future be able to indulge in the kind of "legislative neutrality" that marked our futile course from 1935 to 1940. Unilaterally imposed "arms embargoes" will make no sense in a universal peace enforcement system.

On the other hand, we cannot refuse to comply with such recommendations for the concerted application of economic pressure against an aggressor as may be decided upon in given situations. Whether this method of dealing with aggression, taken alone, can ever be efficacious has been the subject of debate ever since the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. Experience to date with economic sanctions would appear to be inconclusive. It may well be that such action, when directed against a state of secondary industrial strength and supported by all of its suppliers of war materials, will prove a sufficient deterrent. The point is that the United States, as the world's most important producer of industrial goods, must go along with the rest of the international community whenever the latter decides to impose economic penalties in order to compel compliance with the law of peace—notwithstanding pressures to continue profitable trade relations, or to import essential raw materials, which may be exerted by organized economic groups or sectional interests within this country. There must be no repetition of the equivocal policy we pursued during the Ethiopian business. Accordingly, the authority of Congress "to regulate commerce with foreign nations" will in effect be measurably curtailed by reason of our world security commitments.

Thus far we have been considering the *negative* phases of the problem of peace enforcement. On the *positive* side, our new commitments will entail a number of new obligations. It may be taken for granted that the general international organization will include, in President Roosevelt's words, "an international court of justice to deal primarily with justifiable disputes." Whether this will be the existing World Court or some newly created tribunal is immaterial. This country can no longer consistently refuse to accept the jurisdiction of any court eventually agreed upon by the United Nations. It may be presumed that the statute of such a court will pledge the member states to allow it to adjudicate all disputes of a *legal* character which, by joint consent of the parties concerned, are not adjusted through other means. The court's jurisdiction must not be "optional," but compulsory for all, and the United States must be bound thereby in the same manner and degree as the other members of the family of nations. Nor can this country again insist upon the right to veto requests for advisory opinions from the court which may be made by the political organs of the new world system.

The logic of the new situation will also require us, in principle at least, to recognize the right of the world organization to take cognizance of *any* international dispute in which we may be directly or indirectly involved. It may be that the world organization will devolve upon an appropriate inter-American body the authority to deal with *political* controversies arising exclusively out of the relations of the American republics. But if the efforts of the inter-American system should fail to effect a peaceful settlement, the world organization must possess residual authority to intervene, whether we like it or not. To deny this right would be to encourage the recurrence of the kind of situation that developed during the Chaco affair, when the parties in conflict managed for years to play off League and Pan American agencies one against the other. The jurisdiction of the over-all security organization must, in the event of any major danger to the security of any nation, be able to override that of any subsidiary regional system.

In his statement of June 15 last, President Roosevelt said: "We are seeking effective agreement and arrangements through which the nations would maintain, according to their capacities, adequate forces to meet the needs of preventing war and of making impossible deliberate preparation for war, and to have such forces available for joint action when necessary." It is not clear from the President's declaration whether he had in mind a multilateral agreement binding the signatory powers to maintain armaments within prescribed *minimum* as well as *maximum* limits. It may not be possible, or for that matter desirable, to negotiate any such agreement until the postwar world has recovered political stability. There should be no difficulty, when the time comes, in winning the support of the American people for an arms regulation convention, provided its emphasis is on the maintenance of a naval and air force which will enable us not only to defend our own shores, but to carry our proportionate share of the burden of world policing. Such technical obstacles as may prove troublesome can be overcome if the three principal victor powers remain united in their determination to prevent another major war. Here again, the obligation of Congress "to raise and support armies" and "to provide and maintain a navy," while remaining constitutionally unaltered, will have to be exercised within the substantive limitations imposed by the international arms control agreement.

If international inspection is provided for by this instrument, the United States obviously cannot ask for exemption from its application to our own arms plants and military installations. There will probably be an intermediate period, between the end of the war and world political reconstruction, when inspection will be applied only to the ex-enemy countries. During this period, the victor powers will have learned much as to methods of discovering evidence of industrial activity susceptible of conversion to munitions of war. When the time comes to generalize inspection the world over, this country must expect to be treated like any other military power. We cannot have our cake and eat it too.

In the new international code there will be another principle, still more novel for us when not at war, which we shall have to observe. From time to time, a portion of our national forces may be subject to disposition and control by some sort of continuing international "combined chiefs of staff" machinery. The degree of such control will vary with the gravity of any given threat to world peace. Contrary to what is implied by the 1944 Republican platform, our military commitments can no longer be "determined by Congress" alone. If we enter a world-wide "coöperative organization . . . to prevent military aggression," the President must be authorized to place at its disposal such naval and/or air strength as may be necessary to ensure the safety of the law-abiding members of the world community against any danger serious enough to require our aid, be it in Europe, the Near or Middle East, or Asia. Unless we are prepared to act with dispatch in time of crisis, our contribution to the enforcement of peace will be worth little and the associated powers will soon lose confidence in the sincerity of our intentions. Fortunately, the present conflict has accustomed us to having American forces under theatre commanders, some of them non-Americans, selected by inter-governmental agreement. This inter-Allied machinery has functioned so smoothly that it is not likely that the American public, or Congress, will hesitate to accept such joint staff-planning and command arrangements as the new security organization may evolve to meet specific situations. American staff officers and technicians will obviously play a decisive part in determining the strategy to be followed, in apportioning national quotas, and in assigning field commanders.

The solution of the complicated question of security bases is closely related to the larger question whether any permanent police force, supranational in composition, can be created. Should such a force come into being, the internationalization of certain strategic air and/or naval bases would logically follow. But if policing arrangements are to depend upon the coöperative employment of national contingents, to be provided chiefly by the principal powers, they will no doubt retain control of their own bases. Accordingly, the United States, while administering and garrisoning all bases within its territorial jurisdiction, may be expected to make them available to other national forces acting for the security organization. A precedent for such an arrangement already exists in respect of the bases leased from Great Britain in 1940, which were then declared to be open to use by all other states in this hemisphere.

The foregoing analysis assumes that the creation of a fully internationalized police force, while theoretically desirable, is now outside the range of political practicability. The control, supply, financing, and operation of any such force strong enough to check the aggressive designs of a major state would call for an international authority with far greater powers than this country, or Britain, or Russia, is likely to stand for. Indeed, the organization would then assume the complexion of a super-state. The most we are likely to get in this regard will be a small force, consisting chiefly of air units, to engage in warning demonstrations or holding operations until national contingents can, if necessary, be brought into action. If this type of internationalized force were to be established, our participation would probably be confined to air squadrons recruited on a volunteer basis for short terms of service. Out of the millions who will have served in our Army and Navy air corps during this war, there may be a considerable nucleus of trained men so wedded to aviation that they will be eager, for a time at least, to offer themselves for international air police work. American military contingents may, of course, be detailed to exercise surveillance over Germany and Japan by special agreement of the victor powers or, later on, under the control of the general security organization. It would be surprising indeed if the American people were to object to this type of assignment.

As one of the powers permanently represented on the executive council of the security organization, the United States will be in a position to veto decisions to use force in restraint of aggression. It is unthinkable that, so long as military strength is so overwhelmingly concentrated in the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and ourselves, we would consent to any arrangement to be bound by a recommendation of the council when our representative, on instructions from the Executive, found it necessary to dissent therefrom. No collective security system can hope to work during the years that lie immediately ahead unless the Big Three act in unison on all *major* threats to world peace. If they split apart, the whole system will break down. At best, the world will then revert to a new balance of power situation, with the maintenance of peace a precarious thing indeed; at worst, another conflict on an inter-continental scale may be anticipated. However, there may occasionally be *minor* disturbances, not involving any direct American interest and geographically remote from this hemisphere, when our representative on the world council will prefer to refrain from voting, thus allowing the other powers to take the onus for whatever is done. Even so, our government will be bound to do nothing calculated to impede the execution of such military or economic measures as the council might set in motion.

(*2*) *Economic and Financial Institutions.* The impact upon American foreign policy of postwar international institutions in the economic and financial field is less easy to predict than are the effects of world security organization. Such institutions will presumably be multiple in character, with varying forms and objectives. Some of them cannot be worked out until the tasks of immediate rehabilitation and reconstruction are well along toward completion. These tasks, moreover, will proceed at different tempos in different parts of the world, dependent upon the rate of liberation from enemy occupation. Improvised arrangements, more or less temporary in nature, will be necessary. Other undertakings based upon formalized international agreement, like the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, are likely to give way, bit by bit, to such permanent institutions as the projected Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development planned at Bretton Woods.

The United States will have a direct and special responsibility for seeing to it that the new economic machinery produces tangible results. In large part, the initiative for the creation of this machinery is coming from Washington. In large part, also, the pattern it eventually assumes will have been due to our decisive position in the give-and-take of negotiation. Declarations of United Nations policy inspired mainly by us, e.g., the Atlantic Charter and the Philadelphia Declaration of the International Labor Organization, have already set the broad objectives of postwar economic and social welfare collaboration. These objectives may be summarized as (1) the world-wide prevention of unemployment and (2) the progressive improvement of standards of living for the world's peoples.

Clearly, our own rôle in these undertakings will not be productive unless, in shaping *national* policies, we pay far more regard to their international consequences than was the case before the war. This point is most strikingly illustrated by reference to the tariff. The establishment of an "international trade commission," along the lines recently advocated by Professor Percy W. Bidwell,[1] would put to the test our professed desire for a world-wide reduction of tariff rates. While it would be too much to expect this country to confer upon such an agency the power to control our national tariff legislation, it might be authorized to examine pending changes in rates with a view to determining their probable effect upon world trade, each member nation undertaking not to enact the new rates until after full and careful consideration of the findings of the international body. By way of implementing this procedure, Congress, the State Department, and the Tariff Commission might arrange for direct consultation by American tariff experts with the staff of the international agency prior to final congressional action. With proper publicity and time for reflection, it is possible that the effect upon the behavior of our national legislature would be salutary. At first, the powers of the international commission would probably be technical and advisory only, but in the course of time it might acquire additional functions, such as the administration of multilateral trade agreements and the supervision of international cartels and commodity control arrangements.

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[1] See his closely reasoned article, "A Postwar Commercial Policy for the United States," *American Economic Review*, Mar., 1944.

International plans for currency stabilization and the gradual abolition of exchange restrictions are further advanced than plans for the direct stimulation of world trade. As the largest contributor to the proposed International Monetary Fund, this country will hold the key to its success or failure. Irrespective of whether the Fund is eventually given *direct* control over exchange rates and foreign exchange transactions, American monetary policy can no longer be exclusively determined by national fiat. Future "devaluations" of the dollar, for example, will henceforth be a matter for agreement after consultation with other states.

Similarly, if an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is established, the flow of American capital abroad will be subject to conditions fixed by international agreement. While the primary purpose of such a Bank will be to facilitate loans for developmental projects in devastated and backward areas, it cannot help influencing the whole trend of international investment, private as well as governmental. Accordingly, American investment policy, provided our government strongly lends its support to the Bank's operations, can no longer be guided, as it was in the wild 1920's, either by the lure of speculative profit or by special diplomatic *desiderata*, but with a view to the maximum utilization of the world's resources for the widest possible good.

Space permits only passing reference to other forms of international regulatory machinery which will probably become operative after the war. Informal discussions have long been under way in Washington looking toward an agreement with other countries concerned as to suitable postwar controls over oceanic shipping, international commercial aviation, international cartels, and the development and utilization of the world's oil supply. In all these undertakings, the legitimate national interest of the United States must be reconciled with the principle of fair treatment and equal opportunity for all if we are to contribute effectively to the building of a stable world economy.

(3) *Organization for Social Welfare.* No sharp line can be drawn between the institutions referred to above and such agencies as the I.L.O., the projected Food and Agriculture Organization, and an international health organization. The difference is one of emphasis and technique rather than of fundamental objective. The welfare of the individual is stressed more directly in the welfare type of agency than in the former. Also, the range of welfare functions extends to matters with which the constituent states of our federal system are directly concerned—labor legislation, social insurance, public health, housing, nutritional standards, rural education, and the like. This being so, the practical effect of recommendations for national action flowing from such international welfare agencies will depend, in our case, not only on steps the federal government may take, but also on its success in stimulating legislative and financial support for its program in the several states. The New Deal era has gone far toward the removal of constitutional and administrative obstacles to federal guidance in the social welfare field. However, should there be a sharp reaction toward "states' rights" after the war, conflicts of jurisdiction may again plague us.

As a matter of fact, the primary rôle of the United States in world collaboration for human betterment has always been, and will no doubt continue to be, that of a catalytic and subsidizing influence. This country may not be in the vanguard of social progress on all counts, but its vast physical resources, its technical skills, and its humanitarian idealism should enable it after the war to exert progressive leadership toward the realization of the new "social mandate" of the I.L.O. Without strong leadership from us, this mandate may amount to but little more than a pious hope. It would be a token of the sincerity of our national purpose if we should proceed to ratify a substantial number of international labor conventions—after ten years in the I.L.O.!

Similarly, the development of the new Food and Agriculture Organization will depend in no small measure on the stimulus it receives from this country. Lacking such stimulus, the inspiring recommendations of the Hot Springs Conference may eventuate merely in another international bureau for *better* agricultural research and the compilation of *improved* statistical data on world crop production, food consumption, and the standards of rural life. It will be largely up to us to provide the technical assistance and financial resources necessary to enable the more backward countries to modernize their techniques of food production and distribution. The F.A.O. can serve as an effective mechanism through which to channel this activity—or not, largely as we choose. Under its proposed constitution, it may go further and offer to member governments on its own initiative advice bearing upon a wide variety of matters within the range of its competence. With the U.N.F.A.O. obviously in mind, a distinguished New Zealand publicist recently observed: "In the performance of its advisory functions an international organization need [not] differentiate between large and powerful states, and those who are small or undeveloped. In the nature of things, weak states will be more in need of assistance, but strong states may be more in need of admonition."[2] Even the rich and proud United States can profitably take to heart this bit of wisdom from a citizen of a small but progressive country.

Equally wide opportunities will challenge us when the war-torn world starts rebuilding its cultural life. The United Nations Education Office, now apparently in process of establishment, can do much to aid this rebuilding—by facilitating student and teacher exchanges, disseminating new knowledge, and furthering international understanding, provided we fulfill our new responsibility as the chief repository of the world's science and technology. Without attempting to be Santa Claus to the entire globe, the American people can "help other peoples to help themselves." This they will continue to do, for it is in line with their national traditions. The real test will come over means and methods.

III. THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Important steps are now being taken by the Administration to equip our State Department and Foreign Service so as to meet the expanding demands that our position in the postwar world will impose upon them. Not less attention will need to be given to the machinery, procedures, and personnel essential to the effective exercise of our obligations as an active participant in the work of international organization. Reference here is not merely to the desirability of abolishing the two-thirds rule on treaties or to the acute need of some continuing device to bridge the gap between the Executive and Congress in the formulation of basic policy commitments, whether by the creation of a joint Congressional-Administration advisory committee or by other means. Over and beyond such steps as these, Congress should overhaul its own slow-moving and creaking procedures as they will impinge upon the handling of our relations with world organization. Seven long months passed before Congress appropriated a cent to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Meanwhile, U.N.R.R.A. was obliged to live off funds advanced by member governments far less rich than ours and responsible for a much smaller portion of its budget. If large parts of Europe had been liberated last spring, the new relief organization would have found itself woefully short of funds. As it was, the failure of the United States to make available promptly a substantial part of its quota handicapped U.N.R.R.A. in arranging for the early procurement of certain types of relief supplies and equipment. Such behavior on the part of a government which had been the prime sponsor of the U.N.R.R.A. agreement is almost enough to make one despair of the democratic conduct of foreign affairs. Although in this case the blame should probably be shared by Congress and the Administration, one important reason for delay was the two-stage procedure which calls for the adoption of an "authorizing" resolution prior to any appropriation of funds. As a result of this procedure, the U.N.R.R.A. question was threshed over in four different committee hearings and debated four times on the floor of Congress.

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[2] Allan G. B. Fisher, "International Institutions in a World of Sovereign States," *Political Science Quarterly*, Mar., 1944.

Such an episode as this suggests a number of procedural improvements. If, during the years ahead, our financial support of international institutions is to be prompt and adequate, steps should be taken to consolidate their annual budgetary requests. This combined international budget, moreover, might well be submitted to Congress separately from that of the State Department with a special White House endorsement, particularly since the activities of many of the new international agencies will be of interest not only to the State Department, but to the Treasury, the War and Navy Departments, and numerous federal bureaus dealing with commercial, agricultural, labor, public health, and educational policies. In the second place, Congress should set up a joint committee of the two houses to consider our international budget. In addition, the President ought to be provided with a substantial revolving fund from which he could advance to international organizations in financial straits "payments on account," the fund to be replenished from subsequent congressional appropriations.

Our permanent participation in the representative organisms of international agencies will call also for the development of more satisfactory methods of selecting and instructing American delegates. Any one who has been privileged to view the operation of an important international conference from the vantage point of the secretariat cannot help sensing the vital importance of this. All too frequently the composition of our delegation to international conferences is not determined until a few days before the opening of the conference in question. Certain of the delegates, even some of their technical advisers, have little or no time to study the essential documentation or to receive adequate instructions. From personal observation, the writer knows of one situation in which an American delegate to an important United Nations conference took a particular position on a major policy question before a certain committee while another member of the delegation was vigorously supporting the opposite view in a second committee. If one may judge from reliable testimony, this is not an isolated instance.

Desirable as may be the representation of various political and economic interest groups at such conferences, those high officials responsible for the choice of individual delegates might well give more careful attention to their caliber than now appears to be the practice. The reservoir of American talent for international negotiation is surely large enough to provide us with representatives that compare favorably in ability and knowledge with those of other great powers.

As we participate increasingly in the policy-making organs of international bodies over the years, the advantage of preserving as much continuity of representation as is consistent with the progression of American policy will become more and more important. This will be particularly true of those agencies concerned with technical and welfare functions. Shifts in party control of the Administration or Congress should not be accompanied by wholesale changes in the make-up of our delegations to the periodic meetings of the councils, boards, and commissions that control the functional machinery of the postwar international community. Adoption of this principle of "non-partisanism" will, however, require a good deal of education on the part of the managers of our national party system. It assumes the development of a steadily wider area of agreement as to the conduct of our relations with international agencies.

The United States will be expected, and must be prepared, to contribute generously, not only to the executive leadership of many of the new international institutions, but also to their administrative and technical staffs. Men of the caliber of a Winant, a Willkie, a Wallace, or a Welles will be in demand for the exercise of constructive statemanship in the emergent realm of world governance. It is to be hoped that such men will respond to the challenge and that the time will not be far off when the prestige value of directing an important international agency will, for American leaders, be at least equal to that of managing a great federal department.

Into the international civil service of tomorrow Americans will be in a position to inject certain techniques of public administrative management which this country has notably developed during the last two decades. Among such techniques are program-planning through the budget, the conditional grant-in-aid, in-service training procedures, and various types of testing for administrative talent. Even so, our influence for what we regard as "modernized" administration may be nullified if we assume that American practices are *ipso facto* more efficient than those of the British or Russian or French or other national groups. International administration calls for arrangements and procedures peculiar to its own special *milieu*. The Washington observer may already detect a tendency on the part of some of our self-styled professional experts to regard any good national administrator as suitable material for the United Nations agencies that now have their headquarters in our national capital. In numerous instances, such administrators have been misfits without themselves realizing it. A sympathetic understanding and a wide knowledge of the national backgrounds of their foreign colleagues are often just as important as the mastery of administrative technique.

Fortunately, a small but growing group of enlightened officials in Washington are beginning to explore experimental devices which, when effectively implemented, may make the United States one of the principal training centers for the new international civil service. We shall have a large nucleus of experience in wartime international work to draw upon at the outset—thousands of men and women from the overseas staffs of the Office of Strategic Services, the Office of War Information, the Foreign Economic Administration, and the planning and field units of military government. The establishment of intensive training courses, after the war, for some of these "international war veterans" would aid in moulding them into excellent material for the staffs of civil international organizations. The federal government, private foundations, and leading American universities might well collaborate in providing facilities for a continuing training program, including field fellowships, designed to attract a constant flow of top-flight young men and women into international governmental service. Our revamped and expanded Foreign Service will constitute another source of supply for such work.

While the number of available posts is not likely to be large at any given time, such career opportunities as emerge—and they will increase with the years—should have a strong appeal for postwar youth seeking "new worlds to conquer." The expanding frontiers of world organization may kindle a new pioneering spirit in true American style. Not only will this new international service require high intelligence, integrity of character, technical and linguistic competence, and administrative drive, but it will also call for a genuinely international outlook. This has been aptly defined by a distinguished international civil servant as "an awareness made instinctive by habit of the needs, emotions, and prejudices of the peoples of differently circumstanced countries, as they are felt and expressed by the peoples concerned, accompanied by a capacity for weighing these frequently imponderable elements in a judicial manner before reaching any decision to which they are relevant."[3] Quality, and not quantity, must be the watchword of any training program that attempts to meet this bill of particulars.

There are two other respects in which our government can contribute to the progress of the new international administration. In order to smooth the way for federal employees to accept limited-term appointments with international agencies, our civil service regulations should be amended so that such employees may suffer no loss of seniority or retirement rights. Although most of the staff officials of any public international agency should and will be on permanent tenure, some interflow of technical personnel between national and international service is eminently desirable.

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[3] C. Wilfred Jenks, "Some Problems of an International Civil Service," *Public Administration Review*, Spring, 1943.

In the second place, it is high time that our government took cognizance of the special obligations which devolve upon any country acting as "host" to international institutions. The administrative offices of some of the postwar agencies, particularly those handling economic and financial functions, will doubtless be located in the United States. As host to such bodies, we should be prepared to grant them inviolability of premises and archives, immunity from suit, and exemption from taxation, as well as appropriate diplomatic privileges and facilities for their professional staffs. Our record to date in this matter is nothing to be proud of. The Pan-American Union has for fifty years had its seat in Washington, but the United States government has thus far refused to grant diplomatic privileges and immunities to the officials of the Union. Unless Congress consents to amend our tax laws so as to place the staff personnel of American-based international agencies in the same category as the members of foreign diplomatic missions, practical difficulties will arise in connection with the adjustment of compensation rates for such personnel. One of the new United Nations organizations with headquarters in Washington has already run into serious complications as a result of an iron-clad, retroactive ruling by the Bureau of Internal Revenue relative to the income tax liability of the non-American staff of the organization. Exemption from customs and immigration restrictions will be equally necessary for international officials of alien nationality. If we are to serve as one of the "international capitals" of the postwar world, we shall be honor-bound to go at least as far as the Swiss and Canadian governments have gone in according facilities and immunities to the Secretariat of the League and the International Labor Office, respectively. Congress must be made to understand that the purpose of such immunities is not to create a privileged caste, but to facilitate the effective performance of international work. National participation in the organization of the world community calls for the observance of certain minimum international amenities.

IV. THE RÔLE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION

In the long run, we shall measure up to our grave responsibilities as a member of the organized world community only in so far as American public opinion comes to realize their full meaning and insists upon their sustained fulfilment. Formal commitments by the President and Congress will amount to little unless the people back up their elected representatives.

III. POSTWAR SECURITY FOR THE UNITED STATES

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I

Postwar American security planning will be realistic and adequate only to the extent that it is based upon a careful evaluation of the present and prospective relationship of the power position of the United States to that of the remainder of the world. In the past, it has been fashionable in this country to condemn power politics as something immoral, associated with the sinister contrivings of European diplomatists and not with the honest and above-board conduct of foreign relations by a democratic and peace-loving people. The term "power politics" has come to mean the cynical and ruthless use of power to advance national interests at the expense of others. But even though such a use—or abuse—of power is to be condemned, it does not follow that the power factor in international relations can be disregarded or even minimized. In practice, it will always be uppermost in the minds of statesmen, however much they say about the legal equality of all states, and the peoples of democratic countries need to be as fully aware of the constructive uses to which power may be put as to the misuse of which it is so freely susceptible.

While condemnation of power as a basis of policy has by no means disappeared from American thinking, there is a growing realization that we were able with impunity to minimize its importance in the past because of the existence of a particular set of circumstances which combined to provide us with adequate national security and which required little positive effort on our part. In other words, there is a new awareness of the fact that our favorable position with respect to security, which existed during the latter part of the nineteenth century and up to 1914, arose, not from moral superiority on our part or from the inherent excellence of our governmental system, but from other factors which had little or no relationship to these political or moral qualities.

Our favorable international position in the pre-1914 world does not require extended discussion or analysis. It was a time when the only important power centers of the globe were located in Western Europe. British naval predominance, based on an undisputed primacy in all European waters from Scandinavia to the Levant, was such that we were secure against any European attack unless Britain joined in a combination against us. It is not accurate to say that we enjoyed the consistent, if tacit, support of Britain *vis-à-vis* Europe during this entire period, but it is true that the preservation of Britain's balance-of-power policy with respect to the Continent would have been jeopardized by any important extension of Continental power to this hemisphere. Moreover, the Continental powers were absorbed in domestic and European problems to such an extent that their overseas expansionist activities, postponed until the latter part of the century, were of necessity directed toward areas, such as Africa and the Far East, where substantial gains could be envisaged without the employment of a major national effort. Consequently, even though under appropriate circumstances Britain might have refrained from interfering actively on our behalf, there were other factors which were not at all the result of a carefully planned American policy, but which operated to prevent any of the great powers other than Britain from considering an aggressive policy against us. Seldom has any great or near-great power enjoyed so fortunate a situation. On both of our long sea frontiers we were virtually free from danger, and our hemispheric neighbors were far too weak to challenge us even had they wished to do so.

Under these circumstances, it was not necessary for the United States to have a positive security policy based on any likelihood of attack by a great power; and accordingly we were free to denounce alliances, the maintenance of great military establishments, and all the other methods by which less fortunate states had to try to reënforce their national security. We could safely maintain only a second or third-rate navy, virtually no standing army, and the purely negative security policy of isolation and neutrality. Content to concentrate our energies upon the task of developing our great store-house of natural wealth at home, we paid little attention to the forces of change which were about to drive us out of our pleasant seclusion into the turmoil of every-day international life.

Our involvement in two major wars within a quarter-century is a striking evidence that our world of the past has disappeared and that disaster may attend any effort on our part to insist that it still exists. Obviously, the progress of technology is to blame. It has greatly weakened the effectiveness of sea power in its traditional form, because surface craft are now subjected to new dangers from the air and from submarines and mines. Also, states are less vulnerable to a sea blockade than in the days when science could not provide substitutes for so many imported raw materials essential to a war effort. Moreover, modern communications have given greater mobility to land transport—a factor of considerable military importance—and the airplane has caused geographic barriers and ocean distances to lose much of their traditional protective value.

Thus, effective power does not rest today upon a single specialized arm, as in the days of British sea supremacy, or upon geographic barriers, but upon the totality of power components—population, raw materials, an efficient industrial system, and the ability effectively to combine these factors for the support of national policy. Fortunately for the United States, it has these power elements in overwhelming abundance, and it has been able to make use of them in a war effort of incredible magnitude to meet a threat which an inadequate security policy failed to envisage or evaluate. This, however, is the sheerest kind of improvisation. It is appalingly expensive and wasteful, and it is unreliable, because it may not always insure a final victory. It is the negation of policy to rely fully upon this great power potential and to assume that it can be counted upon to provide all necessary protection in the event of a national emergency.

If the alternative is a carefully constructed security policy, an examination of this policy must begin with an analysis of power distribution in the post-Hitlerian world.[1] In prospect, the picture appears far different from that of 1919 when the last attempt at security planning was made. First of all, the position of Continental Europe will be radically different. It can be assumed that Germany will become militarily impotent, probably for a longer time than after 1919. For some time to come, both France and Italy will be in a lesser power status than that of the truly great powers. It is probable that Italy will never again be regarded as a great power, and it is possible that France will fail to regain front-rank stature. This doubt is warranted primarily because the tremendous industrial development of the United States and the Soviet Union has raised the level of full great-power status to a point which neither France nor Italy, with limited resources, can hope to equal. On the other hand, France, in particular, does possess certain strategic assets in her geographic position in Western Europe and in her overseas possessions; and these may to some extent offset her lack of industrial power.

If the foregoing assumptions are warranted, then Continental Europe, long the great-power center, will become a "low pressure" area between the great peripheral states of Britain and the Soviet Union. If these two states can maintain a policy of reasonable collaboration, and can avoid rivalry over the issue of Continental influence, the situation should favor the development of postwar security organized on an international basis. Anglo-Soviet competition for the extension of national influence over this weakened region would be a source of great danger, not only to general security but to the future security of the United States as well.

The defeat of Japan will mean that the United States, for a time at least, will be the only other state to share front-rank world power with Britain and the Soviet Union. While China has been included for special reasons as an equal with the "Big Three" in current negotiations, it is idle to anticipate that she will become a truly great power at any time in the near future. Industrial development, and probably potential, is lacking, and there is little prospect for the early development of the social unity and political stability necessary for the effective integration of such power elements as China does possess.

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[1] The following section of this paper is adapted from a memorandum of mine entitled, "International Politics and International Policing," which was given restricted circulation by the Yale Institute of International Studies.

Thus, the postwar world will have but three first-rank powers. This is a greater concentration of power than has existed at any time since the rise of the modern state system. Moreover, these three states will have a near-monopoly of heavy armaments, and they alone will have the gigantic industrial machine capable of producing mechanized war implements and equipment on a scale of unprecedented magnitude. Technology also enables these states to apply impressive force speedily and over great distances—a fact amply demonstrated by the present war effort. This is relatively more true of the United States and Great Britain, with their emphasis upon sea and air power, than of the Soviet Union, whose military development necessarily has been focused upon the strategic problems of land warfare.

Furthermore, the United States and Great Britain will have at the end of the war two other assets of tangible security value to each. First, they will have a large number of naval and air bases scattered throughout the world. If these were maintained on any kind of collaborative basis, they would enable the two states to mobilize and apply concentrated force at distant points with a minimum of delay. Second, high military, naval, and air officers of the two countries will have had the valuable experience of working together in a single unified organization; and this will provide a backlog of experience which would enable these states, with a minimum of delay and friction, to organize and to use their forces concertedly in the future.

The same considerations which point to the unparalleled position of the greatest powers emphasize the declining military importance of the smaller and non-industrialized states. Since effective military power now rests to such an unprecedented degree upon the possession of vast supplies of an almost bewildering variety of heavy arms and equipment, it follows that the small state can no longer enjoy its former importance as a buffer, capable of holding off a more powerful opponent until the allies of the smaller state can come to its assistance. It cannot cope with the swift attack of fast mechanized equipment. The difference in the effectiveness of Belgian resistance to the German armies in 1914 and in 1940 provides a striking illustration of the fundamental change in the rôle of the smaller states. Now, more than ever before, they are at the mercy of their larger neighbors.

In addition to this general power-distribution framework for future American security planning, attention must be given to popular attitudes, because they have a determining influence on what is politically possible in any democratic state. For one thing, there seems to be a greater acceptance than at any previous time of the view that peace can be assured only if it is backed by impressive force. In 1919, American thinking was still under the influence of the "free ride" which we had so long enjoyed in security matters. Consequently, there was a disposition to emphasize the influence of world opinion as a deterrent to aggression, and a tendency, shown by our attitude toward the League of Nations and by our army and navy policy, to deny the existence of any inherent relationship between the existence of force and the preservation of peace. Today, with the object lesson of our recent experiences in mind, it is scarcely surprising that there has been so little significant opposition to the Fulbright or Connally Resolutions, or to the Moscow Declaration, all of which emphasize the need to keep the peace through the establishment of some form of effective force. While the end of the war may bring about a recession from this view, the reversal is not likely to be as cataclysmic as in 1920. At the moment, at least, the principle of security through force seems firmly established.

A corollary is the new view that the greatest powers must assume security responsibilities which go some distance beyond a narrow conception of the limits of national interest. This, too, may not persist in the postwar period, particularly if great-power differences develop over the war settlements. But at the present time it seems clear that American opinion has moved significantly away from its prewar position. How far it has moved, and in what direction, are matters for conjecture, but as of the moment it appears that American opinion is remarkably sensitive to the responsibilities which flow from the new power position of the United States, provided security is to be organized on any international basis.

Another corollary is the current lack of interest in disarmament as a principal means of securing peace. The tendency to place emphasis upon some form of force has cast into temporary oblivion those who have argued so stoutly in the past that arms were in themselves a potent cause of international conflict. While there is little contention even today against the view that unrestricted competition in arms is prejudicial to the interests of peace, the speed of our own war effort has demonstrated that the acceptance of an arms-limitation agreement by a great industrialized state is not in itself a potent guarantee of future peace. Also, there is a realization of the fact that emphasis upon disarmament in the inter-war period helped to place the peacefully inclined states in a condition of apparent impotence which encouraged the Axis states to undertake their policies of aggression. It seems to be agreed, in other words, that armament competition is not so much a cause of war as a symptom of conditions which threaten to eventuate in war.

II

Given some of these considerations which seem to form a framework for policy, what is the trend of the prospective American security planning?

The commitments up to the present time have been given wide public discussion. In sum, they indicate that the United States believes that security, while safeguarded by appropriate national measures, must be reënforced through the creation of a new world organization which must succeed where the League of Nations failed. Open to initial or early membership by all peace-loving states, this organization is to be an agency for the collaboration of its members on a basis of "sovereign equality"—whatever that may mean. The new organization is not to be a superstate in the sense that its creation involves any serious or fundamental impairment of the sovereignty of its members. As envisaged in recent statements by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, it is to have a structure much like that of the League, namely, a general assembly, a small council, and an international court for the settlement of justiciable questions.

Understandably, security plans are still in a formative stage which must precede widespread public discussion. However, President Roosevelt has indicated that he does not favor the establishment of an international police force, by which, apparently, he means a truly internationalized force, permanently assembled, and subject only to the command of the international organization. Assistant Secretary Long, speaking before an American Federation of Labor forum, April 12, 1944, said specifically that "each of the major nations, and any other nations to be agreed upon, should accept special responsibility for maintaining adequate forces and for using such forces, on the basis of arrangements made in connection with the international organization, to prevent or suppress all disturbances of the peace."

This statement indicates that the favored principle is that of the joint use of contingents of national forces, to be made available for police service on the basis of a multilateral agreement. Whether these units would be detached temporarily from their parent forces on the basis of a decision taken at the time of crisis by the collaborating nations, or whether they would be earmarked in advance, is a technical matter which would not invalidate the general quota principle whatever the decision concerning it might be. The point is that units of national forces, collaborating under the general direction of the international organization, would be relied upon as the major device tor the protection of peace.

Is such an arrangement practicable? Would it provide that sense of security which is so indispensable? Would it be acceptable to the American people?

Practicability is a political rather than a technical issue. If the major powers maintain their political solidarity at a satisfactory level, they will control all the necessary military force, no matter how they determine the particular allocation of their responsibilities, to deal with any security threat which arises from a controversy among any of the lesser states. It is clear, however, that the international organization will not in itself dispose of sufficient power to cope effectively with any controversy among these major states. Nothing short of far-reaching national disarmament down to the level of internal policing needs, and the creation of a supranational force of considerable size, would suffice for this great task. In view of the speed with which a disarmed industrial power can prepare itself for conflict, it is doubtful even if such a drastic solution could be relied upon. An international security organization, built upon the existing power distribution, can provide full security for smaller states, but only a very limited and qualified security for the major states themselves. To be sure, it would be of some benefit to a great power because of the aid which the organization could provide in case that power were attacked by another one of its giant colleagues; but the outcome still would be a major war. Hence, the conclusion that the practicability of any security arrangement based on the collaboration of units of great-power forces, assisted by those from some of the lesser states, is to be determined far more by the political factors conditioning that collaboration than by the technical devices adopted for its implementation.

The basic validity of this conclusion is not lessened by the fact that technical arrangements will have some influence upon the political aspects of a particular security problem. If these are such as to provide for the speedy and virtually automatic assemblage of forces, once the organization has reached its decision to take military action, there would be a greater likelihood of success than if the advance arrangements were imprecise, leaving loopholes by which a state could manage to avoid the assumption of an inconvenient security responsibility.

This raises an auxiliary question certain to be a focal point of discussion in the United States. If it be granted that security demands the speedy assemblage and use of forces designated for use in behalf of the international organization, then the setting in motion of these forces must be as nearly automatic as possible. In the United States, however, this would mean that the President must be able to dispatch the demanded units immediately upon receipt of the decision taken by the Council. Could this be done by the President, acting on the basis of his authority as commander-in-chief and chief executive, or would it be necessary in each case to withhold compliance until Congressional approval had been obtained? Would Congress be willing to waive any possible rights by a resolution authorizing the President to take the necessary steps without reference to the legislative arm of the government? This is a question of the utmost importance, because if governments are impotent to act, when called upon, until a legislative battle has been fought on the home front, it is doubtful whether a security arrangement based on a national contingent principle would be an effective instrument for the preservation of international peace.

The regionalization of enforcement responsibility is another aspect of the problem which may provoke some controversy, especially in the United States. If a contingent system is to be assumed, it is probable that a relatively greater burden of enforcement responsibility would be assumed by the great power nearest the scene of operations, or which had special national interests involved. Thus, the United States would naturally assume the primary burden as an agency of international organization in dealing with most controversies arising in this hemisphere, and it is possible that we might not look with favor upon Russian or British participation in the settlement of a controversy in a region of such special strategic interest. A comparable situation might exist with respect to Russian policy toward American and British participation in the settlement of a controversy arising on her Eastern European borderlands.

For purposes of analysis, this problem can be reduced to fairly simple terms. Each of these three superpowers has a special interest in situations arising in those regions considered particularly important to its own national security. Each power can be expected to contribute more extensively to a solution of problems in these areas than in others which have a more remote relationship to national interests. Moreover, such a division of labor would be in the interest of speed and efficiency. It would be unreasonable, for example, to move men and planes from the United States to deal with a situation arising as a result of controversy between Romania and Bulgaria, when the Soviet Union had an ample supply of forces and equipment near the scene.

On the other hand, any attempt to formalize such an allocation of primary responsibility along lines coinciding closely with the paramount national interests of the great powers would encounter much popular criticism. It would be said that the international organization was in substance little more than a façade behind which, and by means of which, a large part of the world had been divided conveniently into great-power spheres of interest and influence; and such a view, if widely held, might gravely prejudice the future of the whole security arrangement. It is arguable whether the self-denying provisions of the Moscow Declaration would suffice to dispel fears aroused by too much regionalization of responsibility.

Then there is the question of the rôle of the smaller states. American support for, and confidence in, the international organization undoubtedly would be increased if it appeared that the smaller states were to have an active part in enforcement activity. As a political ideal, it is praiseworthy to say that all states, great and small, should join their strength, each providing whatever was within its capacity, in dealing with any would-be breaker of the peace. Actually, however, a moment's reflection indicates how difficult it would be to work out such an arrangement in practice. An agglomeration of minute quotas of troops from dozens of states would constitute the most inefficient type of fighting mechanism imaginable, and few military men would want the task of commanding such a motley force. The supply problem, too, would be well-nigh insuperable.

There are other ways, however, in which a smaller state could assist in a security enforcement action. It could provide communication and transit facilities, foodstuffs, needed raw materials, and the like. Thus, the general principle of mutuality of effort could be satisfied by a carefully planned application of the principle of the division of labor. The essential thing is that though the great powers must collaborate closely enough to ensure efficiency of action, their policies must be so closely integrated with that of the international organization as to prevent undue alarm about great-power domination of the world. This is not a counsel of perfection; it is a basic necessity for general security.

III

Assuming that membership in such an organization will be a fundamental feature of American policy after the war, what will be the other aspects of our security planning?

First, the United States will undoubtedly need to maintain much greater military power in all categories—land, sea, and air—than in any previous peace-time period of its history. In the light of the preceding discussion, the reasons are obvious. The old conditions external to the United States which once had a protective value have now disappeared, or have been diminished to relative insignificance. Also, since we are now open to serious attack from a distant source, the consequence is that we shall have need for forces of our own to deal with any such threat as far from our shores as possible. Moreover, we shall have need of considerable forces to support our part in the security work of the international organization; for the surest way to deter aggression is to have available for immediate use a military force of impressive size and striking power.

At the end of the war, there will be strong sentiment in the United States in favor of maintaining a large navy and air force. The maximum size will apparently be determined by international agreement, and it is probable that we shall keep much closer to this agreed ceiling than we did with respect to the naval limitations set in the Washington Conference. The major problem for decision will be that of the size and structure of the Army. In particular, should we provide a huge backlog of trained soldiers by adopting the familiar European policy of universal military training? This was discussed at the end of the last war, but Congress turned a deaf ear to the wishes of the Army and Navy and decided in favor of a small professional army which should be capable of expansion in short order in case of need. This time, there will be greater pressure in favor of universal training, and the matter must be decided on the basis of anticipated needs rather than economy or sentiment.

Obviously, there will be no need for universal training in order to provide our necessary contingents for the police operations which the new international organization is to be prepared to conduct. A small professional army, created on the basis of voluntary enlistment, would suffice for this purpose. But it has been pointed out that the organization would not in itself be capable of preventing or repressing an attack by one of the great powers upon another. Consequently, the decision on universal training will necessarily be a reflection of our judgment concerning the possibility of becoming involved in this fashion. We shall have to decide whether the added sense of security which we would have by creating such a force would be offset by the additional insecurity which might result from what would be, in effect, a public profession of our fears of a great-power conflict. Conversely, would a decision not to adopt universal training be regarded generally as an earnest of our intentions to maintain political solidarity with our great neighbors, come what may? One thing is clear. Inter-great-power relations, while better than at any previous time, are not yet wholly on the basis of full confidence, and our adoption of a military policy which would only be interpreted as arising from a fear of great power conflict should be weighed with great care lest it have an adverse effect upon this one primal necessity for future peace.

Closely associated with this is the question of outlying bases. These have the dual purpose of protecting the approaches to the United States and of facilitating the application of American military power in policing operations abroad. In the Pacific, it appears to be taken for granted that the United States will retain some form of control over the former Japanese mandated islands. Official pronouncements also seem to anticipate the development, within the framework of the international organization, of some collaborative arrangements for the use of naval stations and air fields, to be concluded by the powers of that area under the leadership of the United States.

In the Atlantic, maximum security, viewed narrowly and nationally, would require control of both the north and south approaches to this hemisphere from Europe, as well as bases on or near the coast of that Continent. For obvious reasons, such a program would be hopelessly impracticable, and attempts in that direction would create doubts in other countries as to American motives *vis-à-vis* Europe. Consequently, American interests in European happenings could best be protected by a dual policy of close collaboration with Britain, viewed as a great strategic outpost, and of equally full collaboration in the work of the general international organization. Unwillingness on our part to accept any responsibilities in Europe would be a betrayal of our own best interests, because such a policy would encourage precisely the kind of excessive regionalization which, by dividing the world into spheres of interest, would pave the way for the only kind of conflict that could really be a major threat to our security.

In the long run, the United States cannot remain indifferent to political developments on the rimlands of Europe and Asia. While we have a general stake, as one of the "Big Three," in preventing the peace from being broken anywhere, we have a particular stake in keeping the coastal lands across the Atlantic and Pacific from falling into the hands of any single power. Only a bankrupt security policy would be satisfied with the building of great military power in this hemisphere while maintaining complete indifference to developments on the continents of Europe and Asia. The lessons of our involvement in two world wars cannot be so overlooked —at least not with impunity. Our interest in Europe and Asia, however, can be safeguarded and made to serve the highest considerations of national policy only if it is expressed through the instrumentality of the international organization, and if it is couched in general terms. Otherwise, the formation of other state *blocs* to counterweight the position of the United States would be invited.

These elements of policy—military strength, full participation in the work of the international organization, careful observation of political developments in Europe and Asia—can be blended into a unified security system only if there is a careful and constant attempt to study all of them in their relationship to each other. This will require much closer and more systematic collaboration between the State Department and the War and Navy Departments than has existed in the past. Through the mechanism of inter-departmental committees at policy-determining levels, supported by close liaison between the research offices where trends are followed and memoranda are prepared, some kind of skillful planning can be made to take the place of the hit-and-miss arrangements of the past. At best, security is a complicated thing; but its protection is the first responsibility of any government and the first concern of any Foreign Office. One thing, moreover, is clear. The days of indifference and improvisation have gone; the days of planned security are here.

IV. THE RÔLE OF CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN FORMULATING FOREIGN POLICY

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There is a popular expectation in the United States that the peace settlement of the major United Nations will be as effectively and loyally executed by the United States as by Great Britain and Soviet Russia. This over-confidence of the American people in the prowess of their President is partly due to: (1) the successful conduct of the war, (2) the popular credence placed in the Chief Executive as national leader in time of war, (3) the immense personal prestige of President Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and (4) the belief that, in case the November election should bring the Republican party into control of the White House, Governor Dewey would continue with vigor the Rooseveltian policy of full participation and leadership on the part of the United States.

A warning that the American Senate might shatter this peace settlement was sounded by Senators Arthur H. Vandenberg and Robert A. Taft and other somewhat isolation-minded Republicans in September, 1943, in the Mackinac Declaration.[1] The "constitutionalism" proposed by this declaration meant nothing else than that the peace settlement must be in the form of a treaty which would require the consent of two-thirds of the members of the American Senate. Senators Vandenberg and Taft controlled the resolutions committee of the Republican national convention in July, 1944, with the result that the Republican platform concluded its proposal regarding the peace settlement with the following pronouncement: "Pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, any treaty or agreement to attain such [international] aims made on behalf of the United States with any other nation or association of nations, shall be made only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur."

Since the Big Four is expected to seek a peace settlement with far-reaching commitments for the maintenance of an effective international organization, the threat of the Republican senators means that such commitments must either be watered down sufficiently to please one-third of the most isolationist-minded of the American Senate or else they must face almost certain rejection by that body. Of course, it would be possible for the President to defy the Senate, to place the American commitments in the form of executive agreements, and to trust that public opinion would disregard the charges of the Senate minority that he had violated the Constitution and assumed the rôle of dictator. Few presidents would relish this risk. In the event that public opinion supported the senatorial charges, the presidential position would be painful if not untenable.

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[1] For the text of the Mackinac Declaration, see *Cong. Rec.*, Sept. 14, 1943, pp. 3499–3500.

I. THE LEGAL AND THE REAL TREATY-MAKING POWER

The Fathers of the Constitution provided that the President should have "power to make treaties by and with the advice and consent of the Senate provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." This provision created an undemocratic procedure inasmuch as it ignored the House of Representatives in which the people of the United States are represented, and created a system which permits a minority in the upper chamber to thwart the will of the majority of the people in foreign relations. More than this, the Constitution obviously required the President to consult the Senate as an advisory body at every step of the negotiation of a treaty.

All that was the letter of the law. But evasions of the Constitution obliterated the letter of the law and created the reality. The first such evasion began in 1789, when the Senate repulsed the attempt of President Washington in person to seek the advice of the Senate on treaty-making, whereupon the President initiated the practice which has continued until today, namely, the complete negotiation of a treaty by the executive before presentation of it to the upper chamber.[2] Another evasion occurred in 1845, after the Senate, by a partisan vote, rejected the Calhoun treaty for the annexation of Texas. On this occasion, Congress, at the suggestion of President Tyler, brushed aside the Senate prerogative and annexed Texas by virtue of a joint resolution, passed by a simple majority in the House of Representatives and Senate.[3] Similar evasion of the Constitution occurred in 1897, when the Democrats in the Senate blocked the ratification of a treaty negotiated by a Republican president for the annexation of Hawaii. Again, Congress accomplished by a joint resolution what could not be achieved under the treaty-making process.

On the basis of these evasions of the Constitution, frequently repeated, Dr. Wallace McClure has been able to construct a convincing argument for the substitution of executive agreements for treaties which require the Senate's consent for ratification.[4] In much the same way, an eminent constitutional jurist, Professor Edward S. Corwin, viewing the Constitution as the *constitutional document* that means only what judicial review says it means, maintains that the fundamental law constitutes no bar to the entrance of the United States into almost any sort of international organization.[5]

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[2] Compare J. R. Hayden, *The Senate and Treaties, 1789–1817*, Chaps. I, II.

[3] *Cong. Globe*, Vol. 58 (Feb. 27, 1845), p. 362. Cf. Justin H. Smith, *The Annexation of Texas* (1911), Chap. XIV.

[4] *International Executive Agreements; Democratic Procedure under the Constitution of the United States* (1941).

In spite of many eloquent precedents for evading the Constitution, President Woodrow Wilson did not resort to the executive agreement and the joint resolution when a minority in the Senate in 1919–20 defeated the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, including the Covenant of the League. One of the tragic aspects of the collapse of the peace system of 1919 was the fact that the minority in the Senate which blocked ratification was partially composed of members of the Democratic party bound to their stubborn course by the President himself.[6] While the reservations attached to the treaty through the cunning tactics of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge were designed to destroy the effective participation of the United States in the League, ratification of the Treaty of Versailles would have brought some measure of American coöperation in the peace system. This would have been better than no participation whatsoever.

Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles without amendments was defeated in the Senate, in November, 1919, by a vote of 38 to 53.[7] Of the 38 yeas, 37 were from Democrats and only one from a Republican. In March, 1920, ratification of the Treaty with the Lodge reservations, which had been adopted by almost solidly Republican votes, was defeated by 49 to 35.[8] In other words, the Treaty with reservations had a majority, but not a two-thirds majority. Twenty-one stubborn Democrats joined with twenty-eight irreconcilable Republicans to defeat the Treaty. Under these circumstances, it was not to be expected that the President, even if not striken with paralysis, would seek to bring the United States into the League of Nations by means of a joint resolution, inasmuch as such a resolution would necessarily have been expressed in terms of the Lodge reservations, which were anathema to him.

Two years later (1922), when the Democratic minority in the Senate threatened the ratification of the treaties of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armaments, President Harding toyed with the scheme of placing the commitments in the form of executive agreements. Fourteen years later, under the leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the United States became a member of the International Labor Organization, created by Part XIV of the Treaty of Versailles. This was accomplished, not by a new treaty, but rather by a joint resolution which passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 233 to 109, and which the Senate adopted without a record vote.[9]

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[5] *The Constitution and World Organization* (1944).

[6] See statement of Senator Hitchcock in Nicholas Murray Butler, *Across the Busy Years* (1940), Vol. II, p. 201.

[7] *Cong. Rec.*, Vol. 58 (Nov. 19, 1919), Pt. 9, pp. 8786 and 8803. For an analysis of this vote, see W. Stull Holt, *Treaties Defeated by the Senate* (1933), pp. 295–298.

[8] *Cong. Rec.*, Vol. 60 (Mar. 19, 1920), Pt. 5, pp. 4598–4599.

II. THE VANDENBERG-GREEN-SAYRE FORMULA

During World War II, when the Department of State began to formulate plans for the peace settlement, a considerable number of American experts leaned toward the use of executive agreement rather than treaty as the legal basis for the universal international organization. It was foreseen that various parts of this organization would be created from time to time. It was even said that the international structure might be established piecemeal by means of separate executive agreements without alarming the Senate minority, bent on mutilation of any formal treaty with military commitments submitted for approval. Legislative support for any such series of agreements, if necessary, would be secured by means of joint resolutions requiring only a simple majority of both houses of Congress.

Acting on this premise, in the spring of 1943, the State Department negotiated the draft text of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration Agreement with Great Britain, Soviet Russia, and China. In June, President Roosevelt summoned the majority leaders of the Senate and House (Barkley, McCormack, McNary, and Martin) to a White House conference, and their consent to the proposed procedure in the case of the U.N.R.R.A. Agreement was obtained.[10] In other words, the leadership of both parties in both houses of Congress acquiesced in the proposal to give legislative sanction to the executive agreement after its negotiation with the various members of the United Nations. This plan had the merit of avoiding the treaty-wrecking predilections of the one-third minority in the Senate. But, at the same time, it was destined to give offense to the committees in Congress particularly concerned with foreign affairs. The members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations were bound to resent any failure to consult them in a matter of this importance; and such resentment might even block a favorable report when the supporting joint resolution was laid before Congress. In particular, the new procedure threatened the vested interest of the Senate in treaty-making.

Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg raised the alarm by introducing a resolution demanding the submission of the U.N.R.R.A. Agreement to the Senate.[11] Even the Democratic chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Tom Connally, was ready to desert the President and lead a revolt. A sub-committee of five was appointed by the Committee with instructions to confer with the Secretary of State, included in it being three Democrats, namely Tom Connally (Texas), Elbert D. Thomas (Utah), and Theodore Francis Green (Rhode Island). One Republican, Arthur H. Vandenberg (Michigan), and one Progressive, Robert M. La Follette (Wisconsin), completed the list.

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[9] *Cong. Rec.*, Vol. 78 (June 13 and 16, 1934), Pt. 10, p. 11,343, and Pt. 11, p. 12,241. See also Manley O. Hudson, "The Membership of the United States in International Labor Organization." *Amer. Jour. of Internat. Law* (Oct., 1934), Vol. 26 pp. 669–674.

[10] An account of this conference reached the press. See *New York Times*, June 10, 1943, p. 28.

Reluctant as were State Department officials to submit a carefully negotiated pact to senators whose hands itched to revise all executive papers, Secretary Hull gave complete coöperation.[12] In his appearances before the sub-committee, he was accompanied by the negotiators of the pact, namely, Dean Acheson (Assistant Secretary of State) and Francis B. Sayre (Deputy Director of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations). Suavely and patiently, he heard the complaints of senators who felt that their prerogatives had been ignored.[13] He even submitted the agreement to the committee for revision, and drastic changes in its text were made before the final formula for procedure was developed by Senator Green and Francis B. Sayre.[14] The achievement of peace between the executive and the legislature was largely due to the sagacity of the Secretary of State. The event went practically unnoticed in the press. But in reality it was of equal significance with the diplomatic victory that the Secretary was destined to achieve three months later in the Moscow Conference.

The gentlemen's agreement between the executive and the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was simply this: In return for the submission of the draft text to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the members of the Committee tacitly pledged that they would support a resolution authorizing the United States to participate in the work of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The enabling act was to be simply a joint resolution, requiring for its adoption only a majority vote in both houses.

III. THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION AGREEMENT

Accordingly, the Department of State re-opened negotiations with Great Britain, Soviet Russia, and China in order to win approval for the revised agreement; and when this was accomplished, negotiations with the remaining states in the United Nations were undertaken. The agreement was finally signed on November 9, 1943,[15] and on the following day representatives of the forty-four nations met in Atlantic City and organized the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.[16]

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[11] *Cong. Rec.*, Vol. 89 (July 6, 1943), Pt. 5, p. 7237.

[12] See the account by Senator Vandenberg in the *New York Times*, Aug. 18, 1943, p. 1.

[13] For further details, see the author's *The American Senate and World Peace* (1944), Chap. II.

[14] See *New York Times*, Aug. 25, 1943, p. 1.

It now became the duty of Congress to fulfill the understanding with the Department of State. On January 17, 1944, the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives reported favorably a resolution (H.J. Res. 192) offered by Sol Bloom, chairman, authorizing the appropriation of $1,350,000,000 to the President for participation in U.N.R.R.A.[17] The inclusion of the text of the U.N.R.R.A. Agreement in the resolution also constituted a tacit approval of the agreement by Congress. On January 25 the resolution passed the House, and on February 17 the Senate adopted it with amendments.[18] By March 22, the compromise offered by the conference committee on the resolution had been accepted by both houses, although this was not accomplished without necessity of averting several reservations demanded by the Senate.

IV. EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL SANCTION

Even prior to Pearl Harbor, the Department of State envisaged the ultimate peace settlement as a series of specific agreements rather than as a single comprehensive treaty. These non-treaty agreements might be either with or without special Congressional sanction. As we have seen, the U.N.R.R.A. Agreement, originally intended as an unsupported executive agreement, finally fell into the former category. In the latter category have come the American entrance into the military alliance of the United Nations (Declaration of the United Nations of January 1, 1942) and the American participation in the United Nations Interim Commission of Food and Agriculture in 1943, while the Anglo-American Oil Agreement of 1944 was submitted as a treaty to the Senate.[19]

Every one of these agreements has required, or will require, Congressional support in order to make it effective. But in each case the agreement was made without reference of the text to Congress, and each one had its legal base in the powers of the President as chief executive and commander-in-chief, or else in powers already conferred upon him by Congress.

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[15] *Department of State Bulletin,* Vol. 9 (Nov. 13, 1943), No. 229, pp. 317–319. The text of the agreement had been published in the *Bulletin* of Sept. 25, 1943, No. 222, pp. 211–225.

[16] *First Session of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Atlantic City, New Jersey, November 10–December 1, 1943* (Washington, 1944), pp. 115, 205–206.

[17] House of Representatives, Report No. 994, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. Without the specific authorization, H. J. Res. 192 had been introduced in the House in November, 1943. See *Cong. Rec.*, Vol. 89 (Nov. 15, 1943), Pt. 7, p. 9557.

[18] *Cong. Rec.*, Vol. 90 (Feb. 17, 1944), pp. 1837–1840.

[19] Senate Executive Doc. F, 78th Cong., 2d sess. (Aug. 24, 1944).

Even so, uneasiness was expressed in certain Congressional circles over the procedure of executive agreements. For instance, Senator Francis Maloney, chairman of the Senate Special Committee on Gasoline and Fuel-Oil Shortages, expressed resentment that the Department of State had failed to inform his committee of the progress of the negotiations with the British government regarding the control of the supply of petroleum; and on July 11, 1944, two weeks before the Monetary Agreement was signed at Bretton Woods, Senator Taft announced that the agreement of this conference would be defeated in Congress.[20]

The above-mentioned events suggest the possibility of a dangerous impasse between the Senate and the Department of State; and this danger, which always lurks in the presidential as contrasted to the parliamentary form of government, has recently become a matter of great public concern. There has been widespread assumption that the Department of State, while aware of the danger, has done little to obviate it. As a matter of fact, within the past three years, the Department has made notable efforts to improve its relationship not only with Congress, but also with the American people. These efforts may be described under the following heads: (1) Executive-Congressional coöperation in the formulation of policy and conduct of foreign relations, (2) government-public relations in terms of education of citizens by governmental agencies, and (3) public pressure on government policy.

V. EXECUTIVE-CONGRESSIONAL COÖPERATION

By October, 1940, the Department of State was aware of the fact that the large acquaintance of Secretary Cordell Hull with members of Congress was not sufficient to maintain the proper contact between the legislature and the executive in foreign affairs. A member of Congress for twenty-two years before his appointment to the secretaryship of state in 1933, Mr. Hull had many personal friends in both houses. But need for coöperation between Congress and the Department was too complicated to be met by mere personal contact of the Secretary with individual members of the two houses.

In October, 1940, Breckinridge Long was appointed Assistant Secretary in charge of Congressional relations; and with the approval of the Secretary, Mr. Long inaugurated a series of conversations with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in order to take the members into the confidence of the Department in regard to general policy and current problems. These conferences were not held at regular intervals, but rather from time to time. The same procedure, with less frequent conferences, was followed with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The activities of the Assistant Secretary have assumed the following pattern:

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[20] See *Chicago Sun*, Aug. 10, 1944, and *New York Times*, July 12, 1944, p. 1.

(*1*) *Advice on Bills and Resolutions.* Committees in both houses refer to the Department of State for advice all bills and resolutions concerning foreign relations. After study is given to the matter, a reply is made. The reply is then checked with the Bureau of the Budget in order to ascertain whether the Department's advice is in line with the President's general policy. If it is found to be so, the Department's letter is dispatched to the committee which initiated the inquiry.

(*2*) *Hearings before Committees.* After this correspondence, a committee may desire the personal appearance of an officer of the Department for further examination of the subject. Unless the Department requests an executive session, such hearings are generally public; the press is permitted to attend, and the record is published.[21]

(*3*) *Informal Conferences on High Policy.* From time to time, conferences on high policy are called between committees of Congress and ranking officers of the Department; and often these include the Speaker and the majority and minority leaders of the House of Representatives and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate. Indeed, the most important ones may include the President, in which case the meetings take place at the White House.

In recent years, emphasis has been placed upon the non-partisan features of foreign relations; indeed, a distinct effort has been made to divorce foreign affairs from party politics. As a result, the Department has sought full and free conversations with members of the opposition party as well as members of the majority party. Such members have been taken into the confidence of the Department as officers of the Government, and not as members of a political party—and with gratifying results.

Incidentally, it should also be said that the Department has always performed numerous errands for members of Congress. There is a considerable volume of correspondence by senators and representatives with the Department about matters in which their constituents may be interested and which involve the rights of Americans abroad or the property of Americans in foreign lands; and correspondence of this nature tends to create legislative confidence in the Department and to facilitate coöperation of legislature and executive.

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[21] Compare *The State Department Speaks* (Department of State Publication, No. 2056, Washington, 1944), pp. 56–58.

VI. PUBLIC INFORMATION ON FOREIGN POLICY

Education of the public is a function of the Department of State that has been tardy in development.[22] Traditionally the most conservative of the executive departments, the State Department has been loath to make public explanations of policy and action, even at times when national security was at stake. Too frequently, ranking officers of the Department have believed that their duties were best performed by a strict attention to the conduct of foreign affairs, leaving entirely to the Secretary or the President the task of offering a public justification of Department policy.

The change in the Department's attitude toward propaganda was caused partly by the provision of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 requiring the renewal of the President's power to conclude such agreements at the end of three years. Disappointing as was this limitation to the friends of reciprocity, it possessed a special virtue. It actually compelled the Department to initiate a public information program to promote understanding of trade pacts; and this ultimately redounded to the credit of the Department. The lowering of tariff schedules is a complicated matter, not easily understood by the man in the street. Nevertheless, the efforts of Secretary Hull and his able assistants in awakening popular interest in the reciprocal trade agreements was little less than spectacular. No one can read the record of the hearings on the Trade Agreements Act before the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance without a feeling of admiration for the work done by the Department in stimulating public interest in the Act.[23] The majority of the civic and business organizations that undertook studies of the trade pacts expressed themselves in favor of reciprocity; and by 1943, over 94 per cent of press opinion in the United States approved the Trade Agreements Act.

The educational work on the Hull agreements eloquently proved the necessity for creating special means for educating citizens regarding all policies of the Department. Indeed, this experience was largely responsible for the subsequent creation of the Office of Public Information, and, in particular, the Division of Public Liaison of that Office.

VII. THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

Throughout the years 1940–43, the Department was subjected to an increasing barrage of criticism in the press as well as in Congress for alleged inefficient administration. The brilliant achievements of Secretary Hull at the Moscow Conference in October, 1943, effectively answered the political criticism, while the reorganization of the Department on January 15, 1944, met many of the objections of experts who knew what they were talking about. The reorganization affected the entire Department; at the same time, the changes in the functions and organization relating to popular education were one of the most conspicuous features of it. Department Order No. 1218, issued January 15, 1944, established the Office of Public Information, charged with securing a "full understanding of the foreign policy and relations of the United States, within this country and in other countries."[24] Specifically, the Office of Public Information was made responsible for development and coördination of policy and execution of programs in matters pertaining to: (a) the Department's relations with private organizations interested in the formulation of foreign policy, and with the domestic press, radio, news-reels; (b) the collection and analysis of materials relating to public attitudes on current foreign policy questions; (c) research on international affairs and publication of official documents; (d) the cultural exchange program of the United States government with foreign countries; and (e) liaison with the Office of War Information, the Office of the Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs, and other government departments and agencies engaged in related activities.

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[22] Compare a statement by Secretary Hull on "Need for Alert Public Opinion," in *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 10 (July 16, 1944), No. 264, p. 60.

[23] See, in particular, *Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, Seventy-eighth Congress, First Session on H. J. Res. 111, Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act* (Washington, 1943), and also *Hearings before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Seventy-eighth Congress, First Session, on H. J. Res. 111, Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act* (Washington, 1943).

The function of maintaining relations with the press remained in the hands of a Special Assistant to the Secretary, Mr. Michael J. McDermott, the veteran representative of the Department in all contacts with newspapers, who was not placed under the jurisdiction of the Office of Public Information. All other functions of public education and propaganda were distributed among the following divisions: (1) Research and Publication; (2) Motion Pictures and Radio; (3) Science, Education and Art;[25] (4) Central Translating; and (5) Public Liaison.[26]

(*1*) *Division of Research and Publication.* The Department of State is the only federal department that does not publish an annual report of its activities; and for many years this lack of reporting remained a serious defect in American foreign policy. Moreover, the publication of selected diplomatic correspondence in the yearly volumes, *Foreign Relations of the United States,* today lags thirteen years behind the current date. In 1928, under the leadership of Professor Manley O. Hudson, the Conference of

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[24] The order is published in full in the *Department of State Bulletin,* Vol. 10 (Jan. 15, 1944), pp. 45–65. For a chart of the Department as reorganized, see *ibid.,* pp. 66–67; and cf. Walter H. C. Laves and Francis O. Wilcox, "The Reorganization of the Department of State," in this REVIEW, Vol. 38, pp. 289–301 (Apr., 1944).

[25] Now, Division of Cultural Coöperation.

[26] The Division of Public Liaison, not included in Departmental Order 1218, was established by Departmental Order 1229 of February 22, 1944.

Teachers of International Law and the American Society of International Law urged the Department to adopt a more extensive program of publication.[27] One result was the speeding up of the publication of *Foreign Relations;* another was the launching of a periodical called *Information Service,* consisting chiefly of the press releases of the Department as issued from day to day. In 1938, the *Information Service* became the *Department of State Bulletin,* published weekly and containing somewhat more detailed information regarding the operations of the Department. Printed with an attractive format, this periodical seeks to acquaint the citizen with every phase of American foreign relations. For several years, E. Wilder Spaulding, chief of the Division, has maintained close contacts with learned and professional societies, as well as with colleges and universities, in order to ascertain what types of information are most desired by them.

(*2*) *Division of Motion Pictures and Radio.* Modern methods of communication and transportation have forced governments to assume responsibility for the dissemination abroad of information that will contribute to an understanding of their peoples and their policies. The United States has belatedly recognized what other governments have long realized, namely, that motion pictures, radio, and publications of all sorts are essential media for encouraging peoples of foreign countries to entertain a friendly view of the United States and its policies. Some deplorable mistakes have been made in the types of movies produced in American studios and shown in Latin American countries, and to counteract such blunders, it is the part of wisdom to seek the coöperation of all interested parties in the dissemination of movies abroad which are not distortions of American life. The same consideration applies to broadcasting and publications. The Division of Motion Pictures and Radio coöperates with the Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs and the Office of War Information in their overseas informational projects, costing about twenty million dollars annually.

(*3*) *Division of Cultural Coöperation.* This bureau has the task of formulating and operating the Department's activities designed to encourage and strengthen intellectual coöperation and cultural relations between the people of the United States and those of friendly foreign nations, including (a) facilitation of communications between students, interns, trainees, teachers, experts, and persons of prominence in such fields as education, technology and the arts, crafts, sciences, and professions; (b) exchange of books and scientific equipment; (c) assistance to centers of American culture abroad, such as educational institutions, libraries, museums, social-service agencies, and cultural institutions; (d) assistance in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of educational and cultural institutions in devastated areas; and (e) coöperation with official agencies of the United States and of foreign governments, with international agencies, with private organizations of all countries, and with private commercial enterprises participating in international cultural activities.[28]

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[27] See the writer's "Expansion of the Publications of the Department of State," in this REVIEW, Vol. 22, pp. 69–77 (Feb., 1929).

(*4*) *Division of Public Liaison.* The latest division to be formed in the Office of Public Information, the Division of Public Liaison[29] attempts to meet the demand upon government made by the broad popular interest in international events and foreign policy; and in many respects, the creation of this bureau has been one of the most important episodes in the reorganization of the Department. The Division undertakes the task of: (1) developing means for bringing to the people a closer insight into the operations, aims, policies, and methods of the Department and into the problems and complexities involved in the settling of specific international situations, and (2) increasing the Department's knowledge of public attitudes, by conducting studies and analyzing public opinion polls and the materials supplied by the press and periodicals, radio commentators, political leaders, and private groups and organizations on current questions of foreign affairs.

Today, in the field of international affairs, public opinion is mobilized in fraternal, educational, labor, business, and religious groups whose aggregate membership runs into the millions, and whose influence affects the general public in a most profound manner. The Division of Public Liaison undertakes to answer the numerous requests of organized groups for information and advice in the field of foreign affairs, and to make full use of these groups for promoting a more complete public understanding of the conduct of foreign relations; and this requires the maintenance of personal contact with secretaries and directors of outstanding national organizations and groups.

Educational materials on foreign affairs supplied by the State Department are adapted for use by these organizations in publications sent to their members and to their local officers. Examples include statements on foreign commercial policy prepared by the Department for business organizations and statements on international organization matters for foreign policy groups, etc. The materials take many forms, ranging from information about particular countries to information on specific problems of foreign policy. The Division frequently coöperates with the officials of these organizations by bringing them into contact with departmental experts, and arranges also for the participation of officers of the Department in meetings and conferences arranged by such organizations.

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[28] See *The Cultural-Coöperation Program, 1938–1943,* by Haldore Hanson (Department of State Publication, No. 2137, Washington, 1944). See also Willys R. Peck, "State Department Aid to Cultural Exchange with China," in *Department of State Bulletin,* Vol. XI (July 9, 1944), No. 263, pp. 36–43; and G. Howland Shaw, "Cultural-Coöperation Program of the Department of State," in *ibid.,* Vol. X (May 13, 1944), No. 255, pp. 429–434.

[29] For the text of Departmental Order 1229 of February 22, 1944, see *Department of State Bulletin* (Feb. 26, 1944), Vol. 10, pp. 209–211.

VIII. PUBLIC PRESSURE AND GOVERNMENTAL POLICY

The analysis of public opinion conducted by the Department is one of the new activities promoted by recent reorganization. It is of prime importance that the Secretary, the Under-Secretary, and other policy-making officials have accurate and timely information regarding public opinion in the country on foreign policy, and it is equally essential that this information be made available to our diplomatic missions abroad. This work is performed by the Division of Public Liaison, which assembles and classifies public opinion data and prepares analytical and interpretative studies of current trends in public attitudes toward foreign policy. Each week, a confidential report, *Public Attitudes on Foreign Policy*, is compiled for the Secretary, the Under-Secretary, and other policy-making officials. This document is prepared from various sources—public opinion surveys of established agencies, Congressional debates on foreign policy, and public opinion as expressed in addresses of leaders and statements of organizations in the fields of labor, business, agriculture, religion, women's clubs and foreign relations groups. Clippings from over 300 newspapers and 40 magazines are received and carefully digested. Letters and telegrams addressed to the White House and to the Department—averaging about a thousand a day—are another source of information regarding the public mind. Experience has shown that such letters assist materially in determining the areas of information and of ignorance in foreign affairs throughout the country.

IX. NON-PARTISAN CHARACTER OF STATE DEPARTMENT POLICY

One remarkable feature of State Department policy in recent years has been its tendency toward non-partisanship. While Secretaries Charles E. Hughes (1920–25) and Frank B. Kellogg (1925–29) presided over the Department, party politics was conspicuously present. On the other hand, Secretary Henry L. Stimson (1929–33) made a valiant effort to raise foreign policy above partisan considerations. From the beginning of his career as Secretary, Cordell Hull has sought to achieve the same end. In twelve years of continuous service, he has gone far. It is not too much to say that, perhaps with the exception of John Hay, Mr. Hull has raised Departmental policy further above partisanship than any other Secretary. Moreover, Mr. Hull has achieved something that John Hay never accomplished, namely, a considerable degree of coöperation with Congress.

Particularly in the preparation of an American plan for the organization of the United Nations, Secretary Hull has ignored party lines. In the study of this problem, which began even before Pearl Harbor, the Department drew upon all shades of opinion. Early in 1944, as the time for calling the preliminary Conference on International Security approached, Secretary Hull requested the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to designate a bipartisan group of senators to advise in the development of the American plan.[30] When, on the eve of the Dumbarton Oaks conference, Governor Dewey made a public statement raising questions about the American plan, the Secretary expressed his willingness to discuss the matter with the Republican nominee.[31] This friendly gesture was almost without precedent. The Governor, while declining personally to confer, designated his foreign-policy adviser, Mr. John Foster Dulles, as his representative. The same non-partisan procedure was used in October, 1943, when the Senate and House of Representatives were requested to name members from both major parties to sit with Department officials on committees to develop postwar policies in ocean shipping, international aviation, and foreign communications.[32] In planning for the International Monetary Conference at Bretton Woods in 1944, the Department of the Treasury employed the same tactics.

X. CONCLUSION

Obviously, twentieth-century methods should be applied to twentieth-century diplomacy. It is a moot question whether the presidential system, with its recurring clashes between the executive and the legislature and its inelastic system of elections is well adapted to the promotion of competence in the conduct of foreign relations. The parliamentary system at least reduces the friction between the executive and the legislature to almost zero. On the other hand, the Senate monopoly over the consent to ratification of treaties, together with the two-thirds rule, is not necessarily an adjunct of the presidential form of government. These defects in the democratic process still cause American direction of foreign policy to remain largely out of the control of a majority of the people. At the same time, the Department has assumed a new rôle of leadership, tempered by a careful awareness of public opinion. Public opinion weighs more heavily with the Department than most people think. Indeed, there is every reason for believing that the Department today is far better informed than ever before, not only upon conditions abroad, but also upon public sentiment at home.

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[30] See the address by Secretary Hull entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 10, No. 251, pp. 335–342 (Apr. 15, 1944). See also the statement of President Roosevelt concerning the non-partisan character of the groups which developed the American plan, *ibid.*, Vol. 10, No. 260, pp. 552–553 (June 17, 1944).

[31] See statement in *New York Times*, Aug. 18, 1944, p. 1.

[32] *Ibid.*, Oct. 14, 1943, p. 1.

MILITARY OCCUPATION

A TERRITORIAL PATTERN FOR THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF GERMANY

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With the military defeat of Germany now assured, it becomes imperative to complete plans for occupation of the country. There is apparent agreement among the United Nations that Germany must be occupied; but, although much work has been done on the subject, by both the military and political branches of the several Allied Governments, to date we have not had any general policy directives from the heads of the three great powers, namely, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States. Presumably, at the Teheran conference Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin came to a preliminary meeting of minds with reference to the various aspects of the war against Germany. At the second Quebec conference, it may reasonably be assumed that the President and Mr. Churchill, keeping in close contact with the Soviet leader, finally came to some definite agreement regarding the measures necessary to encompass the complete defeat and occupation of Germany.

It has been generally agreed all around that Germany must be occupied by the troops of the Allied Nations, but many of the specific details of such an occupation have not yet been thought through. When we speak of the occupation of Germany, we must first of all define exactly what we mean by the term Germany. It is expected that "Germany" will be understood to cover only those territories included within the Republic prior to Hitler's accession to power. It might be better to agree that the boundaries shall be understood to be those of January 1, 1932.

Once having defined the area to be occupied, it becomes necessary to determine who is to occupy the country and how it is to be organized for purposes of occupation. Again it may reasonably be assumed that Great Britain, Russia, and the United States will provide the forces necessary for the military occupation. The important question here is, What parts of Germany shall be occupied by the respective powers? Obviously, that depends in part upon the circumstances surrounding Germany's final collapse. It is not now possible to predict with too much certainty precisely how the war against Germany will terminate. Several possibilities exist. First of all, the Nazis may accept unconditional surrender. At present this seems rather unlikely. Second, capitulation may be agreed to by some authority within Germany which has been capable of ousting the Nazis from power. In this case, of course, the Allied Governments will have to assure themselves of the standing and authority of this successor government. And, third, it is entirely possible that Germany will gradually break up into pieces with different areas surrendering from time to time to one or another of the allied armies advancing from the east, the west, or the south. If this third situation obtains, Germany will be occupied in due time without any prior agreement of surrender with any regularly constituted authority.

Regardless of how Germany actually succumbs to defeat, the three great powers will have to come to an agreement regarding their respective shares in the handling of the German problem, and they will have to be ready for the unexpected surrender of Germany if it should occur. In the last war, the Germans preferred to communicate first with President Wilson.[1] It may well be that in this war also whatever German government might be in power and disposed to enter into negotiations for an armistice would again desire to treat first with the government of the United States. If we are united nations, however, we will have to agree in advance as to the steps to be taken when overtures for peace are made, whether they be made to the United States, to Great Britain, or to Russia.

Our previous experience in such matters should teach us the value of unified action. It would be most unfortunate if we repeated the mistakes of the Rhineland occupation, where instead of one over-all administrative authority in the three zones of occupation, we had three different administrations.[2] There are the most compelling reasons for the establishment within Germany at the end of the fighting of an over-all authority representing the three great powers. Such a governing commission would then be in a position to secure the uniform control of the whole country regardless of what nation's troops are occupying a particular area.[3]

The exact area to be occupied by the troops of each of the three great powers is really a matter of secondary importance. But it seems that this problem has caused the greatest difficulty, especially between Great Britain and the United States. In the deliberations prior to the second Quebec conference, great difficulty was encountered in coming to an over-all agreement regarding the specific areas to be allotted to each one of the powers for purposes of occupation. It is natural to assume that as a result of the conference the proper political and military authorities within the government of each of the three great powers will now have orders to prepare for the occupation of definitely assigned areas.

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[1] Sir Frederick Maurice, *The Armistices of 1918* (London, 1943).

[2] See the Hunt Report on our experiences in the Rhineland after World War I, *American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918–1920* (Washington, D. C., 1943).

[3] See my brochure, *What Shall Be Done With Germany* (Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota, 1944), pp. 26–34.

Pending the issuance of such a policy directive after the Quebec conference, Civil Affairs officers have had to work in the dark. Now at last, on the eve of the German collapse, it is reasonable to assume that the pattern of occupation is being filled in with all of the necessary details. But Germany, unfortunately, is a country with the greatest cultural and historical diversity, and it will not be an easy matter, even with a unified over-all United Nations authority, to handle the sixty-odd million German people in such a way as to bring about their complete disarmament, to start their rehabilitation, and to begin to lay the foundations for a new democratic order.

In this connection, it needs to be emphasized that the occupying powers are at liberty to divide up Germany in any way that will promote proper administration and effective military and political control. Regardless of whether Germany is or is not to be dismembered, it is entirely proper and feasible for the occupying powers to set up areas of administration within the country, as earlier defined, which will assure, or at least make possible, the coöperation of the population and the effective handling of the administrative problems involved. Since Germany, even in modern times, has never been logically divided for political or administrative purposes, it is now possible for the great powers to demonstrate their wisdom and international statesmanship by creating a pattern of occupation of Germany which, with such alterations as experience dictates, would be well calculated to serve as the territorial foundation for a new German government, once the Nazis are eradicated and the German people are again enabled and empowered to create their own system of self-government.[4]

With this end in view, Germany's political and administrative arrangements over a period of years have been studied; and such study yields the results which will now be presented. A careful analysis of the evolution and composition of German political areas points in the direction of dividing Germany into nine regional groupings or states.[5] These areas correspond most nearly with historical, cultural, economic, and political facts, and they are based on a careful study of the component parts included in each area. Contiguous and similar districts are joined together. Administratively, these areas are logical and sound; and in the final analysis any areal arrangement will succeed or fail, particularly during the period of occupation, depending on whether its administrative arrangements are good or bad.

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[4] On the problem of federal reform in republican Germany, see Arnold Brecht, *Prelude to Silence* (New York, 1944), especially Chap. VI; also F. A. Medicus, *Reichsreform und Landerkonferenz* (Berlin, 1930).

[5] Sumner Welles has proposed the partition of Germany into three nondescript areas each containing many heterodox and conflicting units poorly calculated to promote either internal or external harmony. See his *Time For Decision* (New York, 1944). In my analysis, the partition of Germany is rejected as being unsound.

The nine political and administrative regions into which Germany may properly be divided first for purposes of occupation, and later as possible units in a new democratic government, may be listed as follows, with their appropriate names: (1) Hansa-Mecklenburg; (2) Niederrhein; (3) Rheinfranken; (4) Baden; (5) Württemberg; (6) Bayern; (7) Niedersachsen; (8) Obersachsen; and (9) Preussen.


GERMANY
ZONES OF MILITARY OCCUPATION
OSTPREUSSEN
DANZIG
Lübeck
HANSA-MECKLENBURG
HAMBURG
POLAND
NETHERLANDS
NIEDERSACHSEN
PREUSSEN
Berlin
Hannover
BRITISH ZONE
RUSSIAN ZONE
BELGIUM
NIEDERRHEIN
OBERSACHSEN
Dresden
Köln
Koblenz
Frankfurt
RHEINFRANKEN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
AMERICAN ZONE
BAYERN
Karlsruhe
Stuttgart
FRANCE
WÜRTTEMBERG
München
AUSTRIA
BADEN
SWITZERLAND
LEGEND
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
BOUNDARY OF ZONE OF OCCUPATION
BOUNDARY OF REICHSLAND
NATIONAL CENTER OF COMMISSION
CAPITAL OF REICHSLAND
ZONE HEADQUARTERS
SCALE
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 Mi.
JKR/MLT

TABLE OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION AND REICHSLÄNDER

ZONE & REICHSLAND	POPULATION	AREA (sq. km.)	CAPITAL
AMERICAN ZONE	18,296,100	198,167	FRANKFURT
RHEINFRANKEN	6,228,000	44,842	KOBLENZ
BADEN	3,397,300	20,561	KARLSRUHE
WÜRTTEMBERG	3,645,800	30,615	STUTTGART
BAYERN	5,025,300	52,199	MÜNCHEN
BRITISH ZONE	21,099,600	129,107	HAMBURG
HANSA-MECKLENBURG	4,178,800	36,147	LÜBECK
NIEDERSACHSEN	7,017,300	67,438	HANNOVER
NIEDERRHEIN	[illegible]	25,522	KÖLN
RUSSIAN ZONE	25,329,300	190,253	DRESDEN
OBERSACHSEN	9,256,800	43,000	DRESDEN
PREUSSEN	16,062,500	147,253	BERLIN

As will be seen from the accompanying map, this division of Germany accomplishes the break-up of Prussia and establishes strong, natural, and workable areas for state and local self-government. This division of the Reich into nine Reichsländer, or states, has the added advantage of producing areas of relatively even balance politically.[6] All kinds of political views, in other words, will be included in fair measure in each of the proposed regions. The following description of each of the nine proposed areas reveals the illogical groupings of administrative units within the present Germany, as well as the possibilities of future efficient administrative organization.

1. Hansa-Mecklenburg is so named because it includes the old Hanseatic cities of Hamburg and Lübeck, and the former German states of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz. Logically included in

[6] See this Review, Vol. 38, pp. 89–95.

the same administrative area is the district known historically as Vorpommern, once an appendage of Sweden, and in modern times referred to as the Regierungsbezirk, or administrative district, of Stralsund in the province of Pomerania. The Prussian province of Schleswig-Holstein also forms a natural solidarity with the above listed units.

2. Niederrhein includes all of the province of Westphalia except the administrative district of Minden; also three of the administrative districts of the Rhine province, namely Käln, Aachen, and Düsseldorf. This is Germany's greatest industrial area and its densest in population.

3. Rheinfranken includes the two remaining administrative districts of the Rhine province, namely, Koblenz and Trier. Also attached to the same area are the former state of Hesse, the Prussian province of Hesse, and the Bavarian administrative district of Mainfranken. The Rhine-Main manufacturing district is an important part of this area.

4. Baden consists of the former state of Baden plus the Bavarian Palatinate, which forms a logical unit with the Badenese Palatinate.

5. Württemberg consists of the former kingdom and state of Württemberg, the Prussian territory of Hohenzollern, and the Bavarian administrative district of Schwaben. The latter is a cultural part of the Swabian territory of the state of Württemberg.

6. Bayern is a natural entity by itself, requiring no description.

7. Niedersachsen, or Low Saxony, includes principally the Prussian province of Hannover, together with the administrative district of Minden belonging to the present province of Westphalia, and the administrative district of Magdeburg belonging to the present Prussian province of Sachsen. Attached to it also are the former German states of Brunswick, Lippe, Schaumburg-Lippe, and Oldenburg, and the Free City of Bremen.

8. Obersachsen consists of the state and province of Saxony with the exception of the administrative district of Magdeburg; the state of Thuringia; and the state of Anhalt. This is a rich agricultural area and includes the central industrial triangle which, after the Ruhr, is the most important in the Reich.

9. Preussen includes all the remaining areas included in the former state of Prussia, specifically the provinces of Brandenburg, Pomerania, and Upper and Lower Silesia. It is assumed in this list that the province of East Prussia and the Free City of Danzig will not remain parts of Germany after the treaty of peace, and that a part of Upper Silesia and small boundary areas along the Corridor in Pomerania will also be taken from Germany.

Coming finally to the question of the allocation of these specific areas to each of the three great powers for purposes of occupation, the following apportionment seems most logical and proper.

A. Areas to be occupied by British troops: (1) Hansa-Mecklenburg; (2) Niedersachsen; and (3) Niederrhein.

B. Areas to be occupied by Soviet troops: (1) Preussen, including East Prussia, Danzig, and Silesia; and (2) Obersachsen.

C. Areas to be occupied by American troops: (1) Rheinfranken; (2) Baden; (3) Württemberg; and (4) Bayern.

The following table, arranged by zones of occupation, shows the population, area, and natural administrative center for each of the nine proposed areas.

TABLE OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION AND REICHSLÄNDER

Zone and Reichsland	*Population*	*Area (in sq. km.)*	*Capital*
American Zone	18,296,400	148,167	Frankfurt
Rheinfranken	6,228,000	44,842	Koblenz
Baden	3,397,300	20,561	Karlsruhe
Württemberg	3,645,800	30,615	Stuttgart
Bayern	5,025,000	52,149	München
British Zone	21,044,600	129,107	Hamburg
Hansa-Mecklenburg	4,178,800	36,147	Lübeck
Niedersachsen	7,017,300	67,438	Hannover
Niederrhein	9,848,500	25,522	Köln
Russian Zone	25,324,300	190,253	Dresden
Obersachsen	9,256,800	43,010	Dresden
Preussen	16,067,000	147,243	Berlin

It can be seen that the areas proposed to be allocated to each of the three great occupying powers contain approximately equal numbers of people and approximately equal territory, the Russians receiving a slightly larger share. Also, each one of the occupying powers would have control over both agricultural and industrial resources. Each occupation zone includes a major industrial area and substantial agricultural areas. Furthermore, the areas proposed to be occupied by Soviet Russia are nearest to Russia, and the areas proposed to be occupied by Great Britain are nearest to and most conveniently connected with Great Britain. If at any time in the future the three great powers should tire of the job of occupying Germany, their responsibilities could be taken over most conveniently by the bordering nations of Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark.

If it is necessary to occupy Germany for many years, it is better that the original occupation be accomplished by the great powers which have encompassed Germany's defeat. Thereafter, as the smaller powers recover their strength and position, they would be available to assume any responsibilities of occupation which the great powers might see fit to hand over to them, or which might be required if Germany should fail to reorganize her life along peaceful lines.

MILITARY OCCUPATION AND GERMAN REVOLUTION

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In discussing the problems of military government, some writers have recalled critically the fact that in 1918 the armies of occupation did not coöperate with the workers' and soldiers' councils in Germany. Did this really mean that the commanding officers hampered Germany's transition from a half-absolutist monarchy to a democratic republic? What was the position of the workers' and soldiers' councils in the total population? How did the occupation armies act toward the democratic movements in Germany? As one of the leaders of the revolution against the Emperor, and as a close observer of the foreign armies in my home province, the Rhineland, I may be justified in presenting some facts and experiences.

When on November 11 I read in Paragraph V of the armistice agreement that "the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under the control of the troops of occupation," I informed my friends in the Cologne workers' and soldiers' council that this undoubtedly meant the end of that council on the day of the arrival of the foreign troops. It was clear that we were no "local authorities." Nowhere had the councils replaced the civil servant administration of the former régime. Why not? Simply because the social-democratic labor movement, which alone backed the councils, was in most places, on the left bank of the Rhine, a small minority. Only by using terror against a large majority of the population could we have eliminated the existing civil servant administration. Such terror was against the democratic principles and traditions of our movement. Incidentally, even the wildest radicals knew in those days of threatening chaos that a sudden break-up of a centuries-old civil servant administration would mean grave disaster, especially in shipping the necessary supplies to the exhausted population. In Germany, civil servants make up a rank and file of many hundreds of thousands of employees in the following administrative authorities: federal, state, provincial, and local governments and courts of all types; all social security agencies and insurances; all railroads, postoffices, telegraph and telephone systems, street-car and all other kinds of public traffic; most public utilities (gas, water, and electricity); government-owned mines, etc. Knowing the difficulties, the workers' and soldiers' councils never aimed at more than supervising the civil servants during the short transitional period between the revolution and the election of a National Assembly. The decision on the future political and social set-up seemed to rest with the democratically elected national parliament, not with the rather irregular instruments of the revolution. This may have been a political mistake. If so, it was not caused by the occupation armies.

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[*] The author, exiled from Germany for political reasons in 1933, was from 1920 until that date a member of the Reichstag, and was secretary of the interior in the two cabinets of Chancellor Stresemann.—MAN. ED.

Already, five weeks after the outbreak of the revolution, a national convention of all workers' and soldiers' councils in Berlin passed, by 344 votes among 442 delegates, a decision against the permanent existence and authority of the councils. An overwhelming majority of German workers and soldiers were passionately opposed to the Russian soviet system, and were eager to establish a parliamentary system after the example of the Western democracies. Incidentally, the convention did not even take notice of the refusal of the occupation armies to deal with the councils of the revolution. No protest was heard, The only demand was that the foreign armies should not interfere with the impending free elections.

As to the American army, it had entered a section (Trier-Coblenz) where the Social Democratic party as the only sponsor of the workers' and soldiers' councils was truly insignificant. In the elections to the National Assembly on January 19, 1919, the Social Democrats in that area mustered only 58,361 out of the 388,469 voters who went to the polls. How could the occupation armies have accepted a minority of one-seventh of the population as its legal representation? Whatever the feeling of the Americans may have been towards the German revolution, it was impossible to recognize worker's and soldier's councils as instruments of democracy. The British, French, and Belgians in the neighboring constituency of Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle, where I was elected to the National Assembly, found a similar situation. The Social Democrats had only 253,000 out of 971,000 votes, a minority of one-fourth. As followers of democracy, we accepted this political decision, and the foreign armies did the same.

The historical truth is that the first democratic elections in Germany were freer in the occupied zone than in some parts of unoccupied Germany, where leftist radicals tried to upset the elections by armed revolts. Actual civil war raged in some large cities and industrial territories. Nothing of the kind could happen in the occupied zone. Naturally, there were some restrictions. For instance, public meetings required military authorization. However, with some exceptions in the French and Belgian zone, the election campaign was completely unhampered. I addressed nearly one hundred meetings in the occupied territory, and I do not remember even encountering interference by the troops. It was well known to us political leaders that the American Army Headquarters had ordered the members of the armed forces not to express any preference for, or opposition toward, any political party. In truly classical democratic spirit, the American commander-in-chief expected from the German authorities that they should "secure a full, free, and fair expression of the will of the voters of Germany in order that the constitution now about to be written and the government now about to be established might be founded upon the immovable foundation of the will of the people." Was there ever a more liberal statement by any occupation army in history? Is more fairness possible toward a defeated enemy? And did the Americans live up to their announcement? If they had not, I, as the leader of the Social Democratic party, would have known it. No serious complaints came to the headquarters of our party.

It is true that the occupation armies prohibited the local elections, i.e., of municipal, county, and provincial councils. It seems that the Americans did not perceive in time that some French generals hoped to abuse parts of the old local administrations for their plans to separate the Rhineland from Prussia. The Americans, however, corrected their mistake by resisting with complete democratic fairness several attempts to force an autonomous republic on the Rhinelanders; and after a few months' delay, the local elections were held in absolute freedom.

There can be no doubt that nine-tenths of the Rhenish population, including the workers, were grateful to the occupation armies for having prevented violent outbursts of the revolution. Whether this mentality of the Rhinelanders, a population with very long democratic traditions, was politically wise or unwise, is not under discussion here; it was a reality.

Although I may claim to know the German people by virtue of many years of traveling throughout the country, and of contacts with all groups from Junkers to workers and from archbishops to communists, I would not venture to make any prediction about the future relations between them and occupation armies. Probably most Germans will be bitter, and their nerves will be shattered after the destruction of practically all of their cities and industrial sections. After the crushing defeat of their armies, they may be outwardly subdued and submissive, but inwardly they will be restless and hypercritical toward everyone and everything. There is no doubt in my mind that national elections will not be possible soon after the end of the hostilities. A nation completely unbalanced mentally cannot govern itself. One of the first and most difficult tasks of the occupation armies will be to find contacts with the honest anti-Nazis for the gradual democratic reconstruction of Germany. In facing this problem, there will be two pitfalls: (1) There exists a certain danger that the occupation armies will accept outright Nazis, either because they cleverly conceal their true convictions (perhaps by maintaining that they were forced into the Nazi party), or because they assert that they are indispensable to the smooth running of the administration—although the number of really convinced Nazis is so small that their immediate dismissal would not upset the offices. Incidentally, the elimination of Nazis will not make the control, and the gradual purging, of the administration unnecessary. After all, there are many sympathizers with the Nazis everywhere in the offices. In some cases, the Nazis may denounce people as "Communists," because they want to prevent them from getting into touch with the occupation armies. Quite rightly, the Nazis may report that such people had been in penitentiaries for years—but without explaining that they were imprisoned because of their loyalty to democracy. (2) Occupation authorities may accept the now widely fashionable belief that everyone who is not a left-winger is a fascist. In postwar Germany, this would be harmful. There exist (now, of course, without organization) between the Social Democrats and Communists on the left and the irreconcilable Nazis and Pan Germans on the right very strong democratic forces in the center (Roman Catholics), and even more to the right: Conservatives and Social Christians with constructive political ideas. Not everyone who is critical of parliamentary democracy, of certain systems of social security and economic planning, is a "fascist."

The one absolute political necessity clearly predictable for postwar Germany is broad coöperation of all social groups, political philosophies, and religious creeds, the Nazis and their fellow-travelers, of course, excluded. A heavy responsibility will rest upon the occupation armies, especially during the first days after their arrival. The best parts of the population will not dare to come into the open if they see that the armies are coöperating with Nazis or half-Nazis. A wrong approach in the first few days might ruin, or at least delay, confidence in the intentions of the occupying forces. It may be inevitable that the first contact of the troops will be made with the present chiefs of the local administrations. Some of these may be Nazis. However, the armies of occupation should do their best to get into touch immediately with men and women inside Germany who had leading positions in the democratic Republic before 1933. The local commander, for instance, could summon a conference of persons who held the following positions before January 30, 1933: the former mayor and his assistants; all members of the federal, state, and provincial parliaments and of the county and city councils (with the exception of Nazis and Deutschnationale Volkspartei), the presidents of the chambers of commerce, artisans, and farmers, and of the employer associations; the local officers of the dissolved unions; the presidents of the coöperatives; the leading Roman Catholic priests and such Lutheran clergymen and school principals as were dismissed or imprisoned by Hitler; the former editors of the liberal, Social Democratic, Roman Catholic, and Communist newspapers; the former presidents and executive secretaries of the dissolved political parties; and, of course, delegations of revolutionary bodies, which may have been established.

It will not always be easy to find the right persons. Some will have died, or may have been scattered to other parts of the country. However, the survivors will try to come home as fast as possible; and at any rate, a substantial number will be available immediately. With their advice and help, it will be possible to separate the Nazis and their accomplices from the decent part of the population and to begin the setting up of local democratic administrations. It will be only a beginning, but an orderly and constructive one, acceptable to the disciplined mind of most Germans. They will acclaim the restoration of "law and order" against the Nazis and other wild groups. It is doubtful whether the Germans have as little democratic understanding and tradition as is widely believed now. However, we may be certain that any democratic system in postwar Germany will need strong authority. At the start, such an authority can be offered only by the occupation armies. The Germans will probably realize this necessity. Many of them will even hail the occupation as a liberation from Hitlerism. It will, however, be a somewhat prolonged period before the German people will have recovered sufficiently to govern themselves democratically.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

COMMUNITY OF THE PARLIAMENTS OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES: FIRST STEPS

H. DUNCAN HALL

British Raw Materials Mission, Washington, D. C.

In the past year and a half, first steps have been taken toward the building up of a community of the parliamentarians of the English-speaking peoples. The development in the past thirty-two years of a community of the parliamentarians of the British Commonwealth to the point where it has become a central institution of the Commonwealth was dealt with in a previous article.[1]

A Shrine of Family Reunion. Those who were present in the Canadian House of Commons at Ottawa on June 26, 1943, at the first conference between a duly appointed delegation from both houses of the American Congress and delegations from the Parliaments of the British Commonwealth felt that they were witnessing an important event; it was a development, they believed, which might prove hardly less important in history than the obscure first meetings of knights of the shire and burgesses out of which parliamentary institutions emerged in the thirteenth century. A remark in the last moments of the Conference by Mr. Sol Bloom, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives, expressed this feeling. He spoke of the room as "a shrine of family reunion"; the thought had come to him, he said, that this room in which this historic first conference had been held should be made a shrine, for within those four walls ideas had come forth that day that should lay everlasting foundations for the future of the peoples of the world.

A Series of Parliamentary Meetings. The Conference at Ottawa and the subsequent meeting at the Capitol in Washington on July 1, in which heads of the British Commonwealth met some hundred members of the United States Congress,[2] were the high crest of an entire series of meetings, each of which had some parliamentary character, in the war years after Pearl Harbor.[3] Most were "off the record," save for two appearances of Mr. Churchill before Congress. What Senator Warren R. Austin said of the Ottawa Conference applies to all of these meetings: "No obligations were sought or undertaken, but consequences of high value in mutual understanding were realized."[4]

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[1] "Community of the Parliaments of the British Commonwealth," in this Review, Vol. 36, pp. 1128–1135 (Dec., 1942).

[2] This latter meeting was an outcome of an invitation given by Senator Connally at the final meeeting of the Conference. Eleven leading members of the British Commonwealth delegations returned with the Congress delegation for the purpose. The meeting took the form of a two-hour luncheon discussion, with members of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees and other members of Congress. It was convened by Senator Connally and Congressman Sol Bloom, and presided over by the former.

The Empire Parliamentary Conference was held in the House of Commons at Ottawa, from the 23rd to the 29th of June, 1943. It was attended by representative all-party delegations from the following Parliaments: United Kingdom 8; Australia 6; New Zealand 2; Bermuda 2; Canada 80 (including most of the members of the Cabinet).[5] The Conference (and the visit of inspection of the Canadian war effort in several of the eastern provinces of Canada) was held at the invitation of the Dominion of Canada Branch of the Empire Parliamentary Association.

The Empire Parliamentary Conference: Ottawa, 1943. At the Conference the delegates from the five Commonwealth Parliaments discussed on successive days the following subjects relating to the war and postwar problems: (1) "Principles of Foreign Policy, Defense, and Communications, War and Post-War" (opened by Sir John Wardlaw-Milne [U.K.].); (2) "The British Commonwealth's Functions in a Peace System" (opened by Hon. Ian Mackenzie, Canadian Minister of Pensions and National Health); (3) "The Joint British Commonwealth-America War Organization" (opened by Colonel the Rt. Hon. J. J. Llewellin, then British Cabinet Minister, Resident in Washington for Supply.) All of the discussions, those in the conference rooms and the many around the dinner tables, represented, as Mr. Churchill said in the House of Commons, "an exchange of private and quite unofficial views."

Up to this point, the Conference was on the same pattern as the many which had played such a notable part in the previous thirty-two years in giving the British Commonwealth a common understanding and outlook on world affairs. The arrival on June 26 of an all-party delegation, appointed unanimously by both houses of the United States Congress by concurrent resolution, gave the Conference a place in history.

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[3] Among the more important of these occasions were the historic first addresses of a British Prime Minister to Congress (December 26, 1941, and May 19, 1943); Mr. Anthony Eden's meeting, March 19, 1943, with the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees of Congress (of which, because of its "parliamentary character," he gave a "special account" to the House of Commons on April 8, 1943); and the visit in February, 1944, of a British Parliamentary delegation on its way to the West Indies, and of a similar delegation on its way to Australia. The New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr. Peter Fraser, and the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Walter Nash, took part in the latter meeting on March 17, 1944.

What was in effect a conference of governments and of parliamentary leaders took place on June 24, 1942, when a strong Congressional delegation met in the Pacific War Council with President Roosevelt and three British Commonwealth Parliamentary leaders—Mr. Churchill, Mr. Mackenzie King, and Mr. Walter Nash (*New York Times*, June 25, 1942).

[4] *Cong. Rec.*, Vol. 89, No. 126 (July 3, 1943), p. 7149.

[5] Attendance of delegates from other British Commonwealth Parliaments was not possible, owing largely to difficulties of wartime transport.

The Historic Congress Resolution. "The Resolution itself," the Canadian Prime Minister told the Canadian House of Commons, "will, in time, become an historic document." Its passage through both houses of Congress without dissent was noteworthy. Since in the matter of historical "first things," out of which institutions grow, the way in which the thing is done is important, we should note the details of the arrangement set out in the resolution as passed by the Senate on Friday, June 18, 1943.[6]

> "Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring): That the Senate and the House of Representatives hereby accept the invitation tendered by the Speaker of the Senate of Canada and Joint President of the Empire Parliamentary Association, Dominion of Canada Branch, to have four Members of the Senate and four Members of the House of Representatives attend a meeting to be held in Ottawa, Canada, during the period June 26 to July 1, 1943, at which the Dominion of Canada Branch of the Empire Parliamentary Association will be host to a delegation from the United Kingdom Parliament and to delegations from the legislative bodies of Australia, New Zealand, and Bermuda. The President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are authorized to appoint the Members of the Senate and the Members of the House of Representatives, respectively, to attend such meeting and are further authorized to designate the chairman of the delegations from each of the Houses. . . ."

The resolution concluded by authorizing payment of the expenses of the United States delegation, up to $2,000, from the contingent fund of both houses. Naturally, there were informal approaches and discussions at least a year before this formal step was taken. The very formality of the step marked its importance; but it would have been difficult to take such a step informally, as is done through the machinery of the Empire Parliamentary Association, since Congress does not possess any association uniting congressmen of all parties in both houses in a common body officially recognized and empowered to act for them in their common capacity as parliamentarians.

The delegation from the United States Congress was composed of the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tom Connally (Democrat, Texas); the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Sol Bloom (Democrat, New York); the deputy leader of the Republican party in the Senate, Warren R. Austin (Republican, Vermont); the ranking Republican member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,

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[6] *Cong. Rec.* (Senate), June 18, 1943. The resolution passed the House of Representatives on June, 22.

Charles A. Eaton (Republican, New Jersey); and other well-known senators and congressmen: Senator Harold H. Burton (Republican, Ohio), Congressman Luther Johnson (Democrat, Texas), and Congressman John M. Vorys (Republican, Ohio).[7]

Parliamentarians of the Anglo-Saxon Family. The two-day discussions (June 28 and 29) between the parliamentarians of "the two branches of the great Anglo-Saxon family" (to use the words of the Speaker of the Canadian Senate, the Hon. Thomas Vien, who presided at the opening meeting) were devoted to the following subjects:[8] (1) "Democratic Government in War and Peace," opened by Hon. L. S. St. Laurent, Canadian Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, followed by Senator Warren R. Austin; and (2) "British Commonwealth-American Relations," opened by Senator Harold H. Burton, followed by Sir John Wardlaw-Milne (U.K.) and Congressman Luther Johnson. These subjects were chosen as unlikely to be controversial—for no one quite knew what would happen when the parliamentarians of the Anglo-Saxon family had their first meeting face to face.

As soon as the delegates met, however, it became clear that what mattered to them was not the subjects on the agenda, but the fact of being together. They were plainly glad to be together, to discover that they had so much in common and had such a will to agree. One thing that helped was that with the partial exception of Canada the delegates were not cabinet ministers, but back benchers, "the rank and file of our legislative bodies," as Mr. M. J. Coldwell described them in the Canadian Parliament.[9] The delegates discovered their fellow-feeling as parliamentarians. All were elected by the people to serve as guardians of parliamentary institutions; as one American delegate put it, they were engaged together on a great parliamentary crusade. The last American word spoken gave their "finding" on the Conference: that it showed a unity of purpose—a meeting, not a division, of minds.

One of the leaders on the American side spoke of all members of the Conference as engaged in an exchange of views "with the curtain of formality removed, with hearts open and candor prevailing, with men disclosing their own problems to each other." This interchange revealed that under the impact of the same realities the minds of parliamentarians in their different countries were moving in the same direction and to similar conclusions. The delegates were fully alive to the fact that later conferences, less under the emotion of this first meeting and with the shadow of imminent danger lifted, will find plenty of healthy differences to discuss. But in this first gathering, and in the ensuing two days' discussions in the Capitol in Washington, all the parliamentarians who shared in the event were preoccupied with the greatest single fact in the present political structure of the world—that the United States and the nations of the British Commonwealth are branches of the same family tree.

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[7] Senator Walter F. George (Democrat, Georgia), chairman of the Finance Committee of the Senate, who was also a member of the delegation, was prevented by official business from attending.

[8] In accordance with the unbroken custom of these informal gatherings of Parliamentarians, the press was not admitted and no report has been published. A full verbatim *Report of Proceedings* of the whole Conference was, however, printed and privately circulated under the authority of the Empire Parliamentary Association (Dominion of Canada Branch).

[9] House of Commons Debates, July 29, 1943, Vol. LXXXI, No. 99.

"New Acquist of True Experience." To what degree there was "new acquist of true experience from this great event" is not easy to assess because the experience was so much in the realm of the political imponderables. But it was evident to those who witnessed the event that the delegates learned much in several directions.

From this first massive personal contact with many of the elected representatives of the American people the British Commonwealth delegates gained invaluable insight into the trends and cross currents of American thinking about international affairs, including American relations with the Commonwealth as a whole and its individual nations. This understanding was further aided by the issuing early in 1944 of a new quarterly journal, circulated to members of Parliament throughout the Parliaments of the British Commonwealth, summarizing Congressional proceedings and legislation with special emphasis upon discussions on subjects of interest to the British Commonwealth.[10] This new journal and the long-established quarterly *Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire* themselves form an important link between the parliaments of the English-speaking peoples; they are circulated in each of the Parliaments and give each member an authoritative quarterly summary of the debates and legislation of all the Parliaments.

The British Commonwealth Family System. The American delegates on their side passed through a new political experience. They found themselves caught up in the family life of the British Commonwealth as exemplified in the community of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth. They were able for the first time to explore as a reality, from inside, what hitherto had been seen as in a glass darkly. They were able to see with their own eyes, pushing aside the cloudy lens of the national tradition which held it to be against nature for daughter states to remain attached to a mother country in a closely knit political organization. They heard delegates from each of the Commonwealth's Parliaments refer repeatedly and with deep feeling to their pride in, and loyalty to, the Commonwealth and their determination to keep their family system intact for many reasons, and especially because it is the one successful international mutual security system in history. It is no secret that all the American delegates came back to Capitol Hill deeply impressed by the political and spiritual unity of the Commonwealth and Empire, and with the living demonstration they had seen that fervent patriotism is quite compatible with deep pride in and loyalty to a wider association of nations.

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[10] *Summary of Congressional Proceedings, U.S.A.*, Vol. 1, No. 1, issued under the authority of the Empire Parliamentary Association (United Kingdom and Dominion of Canada Branches); published by the Oxford University Press, Toronto, Canada. The first number appeared in May, 1944, and dealt with debates from September to December, 1943.

On one practical point there was agreement on all sides—the importance of holding further similar parliamentary meetings. The general feeling on this point, both of those present at Ottawa and of the number of Congressmen who voiced their regret at having missed this experience, was summed up in a remark of an American delegate on July 1 that there was "an infinite amount of unfinished business" left over at Ottawa and they must get on with it. Sensing this feeling, the chairman of the Conference in Ottawa refused to close the meeting and declared it "adjourned sine die."

The Parliamentary Angle of Peace. The experience as a whole impressed the delegates with the importance of a neglected aspect of the problem of an international peace organization, namely, its parliamentary angle. If, as some of them reflected, close interparliamentary relations have played such an important rôle in maintaining the unity of the British Commonwealth and its effectiveness as an international organization, it is surely necessary to pay more attention to the parliamentary angle of peace machinery than has yet been done. Senator Austin's judgment on this point as expressed in two speeches in the United States Senate is referred to below.

In the Parliaments of London, Ottawa, and Washington, these events aroused considerable interest. Each Parliament noted and commented upon the discussions in the others, thus producing an intermeshing series of statements.

Discussions in the Parliaments and Congress. The series began with a statement by the Canadian Prime Minister, on the closing day of the Conference, on its historic significance. The leaders of all parties in the House made supporting speeches. On July 3, the entire text of this Canadian discussion was read into the *Congressional Record* for the House by Congressman Eaton, and for the Senate by Senator Austin; and the latter made a speech dealing with the significance both of the Conference and the visit to the Capitol. This in turn echoed back into the Canadian Parliament on July 7, drawing an appreciative reference from the Prime Minister and a summary by Mr. Diefenbaker of the main points made by Senator Austin.

London followed suit. On its return, the British delegation made a report on the Conference and visit to Washington, to which was appended the full text of the concurrent resolution of Congress, the Canadian discussions, June 29 and July 7, and Senator Austin's speech in the Senate on July 3.[11] This was followed on October 28 by a statement on the Conference to the House of Commons by the British Prime Minister, and a long discussion on the same day in the House of Lords, with noteworthy speeches by Viscount Stansgate, leader of the British delegation at the Conference, Lord Marchwood, a member of the delegation, and Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for the Dominions. These statements, in turn, echoed back into the Capitol at Washington, and Senator Austin read them in their entirety into the *Congressional Record* for the Senate on November 12, prefacing them with an important speech.

The discussions in the two houses of the British Parliament took as their point of departure the resolutions of both houses of the United States Congress accepting the invitation to Ottawa and noting the reports made on its results. Mr. Churchill dwelt upon the two historic first occasions marked by the event: the first attendance of an American delegation at such a Conference, and the first admission of a group of British Commonwealth Parliamentarians to the floor of the United States Senate. In the House of Lords, Viscount Stansgate took as his theme the contribution made by the meeting towards the closing of the ancient rift in the family. The British delegation had reminded their American colleagues of the rôle played by Lord Chatham on the eve of the American War of Independence and of "the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons denouncing the war." The presence of Dominion representatives had helped to drive home to the Americans an understanding of the closeness of the Commonwealth to the United States. "We had amongst us," Viscount Stansgate said, "representatives of the sovereign Dominions, men of pioneering courage and downright speech, cast in the American mold, each mindful of his national interest, but all united under the common crown and by a common belief in freedom. I believe that unity greatly impressed our American friends." Parliament followed up this debate by passing unanimously on March 14, 1944, a private member's resolution inviting a Congressional delegation to visit Parliament.[12]

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[11] *Report of United Kingdom Delegates upon the Parliamentary Visit and Conference, Dominion of Canada, including a Congressional Reception in Washington, D. C., and a Subsequent Visit to Bermuda* (June–July, 1943.) (Printed for private circulation.) For the discussions of June 29 and July 7 in Canada, see *Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire*, Vol. XXIV, pp. 568–571. For the discussion on November 12 in the British Parliament, see *ibid.*, pp. 752–757.

[12] The resolution, which is still before Congress and will be acted upon probably after the presidential election in November, was moved by Major A. N. Braithwaite. It reads as follows: "This House, desiring to promote closer association between the

The Rôle of Parliaments in a Peace System. Mr. Churchill, in his speech on November 12, had touched upon one of the secrets of the British Commonwealth system of a union of freely associated states, namely, the intensive cultivation of the element of personal contact and interchange of opinion at all working levels. In closing the discussion for the Government on the same day, Viscount Cranborne reverted to this point in words which touch the heart of the whole problem of conducting international relations in a world of sovereign states. "After all," he said, "free and frank personal discussion remains, even in these days of telegraphs and wireless, the only entirely effective way of removing misunderstanding between men."

Senator Austin's mind was working actively on the same point. He touched on it in his first speech on July 3 by saying that he saw "endless possibilities of understanding and achievement" from such a conference of parliamentarians as had taken place at Ottawa, because Parliaments "are closest to the people of the democracies." But the point emerges with the clarity of final conviction in his subsequent speech on November 12. "I now repeat," he told the Senate, "with more confidence than ever, that the progress of the world toward law and order established upon the spiritual foundation of that power that resides in the people themselves, could be attained more expeditiously, and be placed upon a more secure basis, if the peace-loving nations would establish a habit of meeting through committees of their parliamentary bodies." He thought that to give the people in each country a continuing understanding these meetings ought to be held frequently. "I am firmly persuaded," he told the Senate, "that the representatives of the people on the parliamentary level are better equipped to inform the people than is any other branch of government." The value of this new practice would increase, he suggested, as the end of the war came closer.

This conclusion manifestly represents a mingling of two streams of experience. On the one hand, there is the experience on the American side of the difficulty of conducting foreign relations on the executive level unless congressmen are more actively in touch with international affairs so that they can play their rôle under the Constitution in conjunction with the executive power and at the same time educate their constituents. The second stream of experience is that of the British Commonwealth in which, even though under the cabinet system ministers are parliamentary leaders, it has been found necessary to supplement conferences

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British Parliament and the Congress of the United States, requests Mr. Speaker, on its behalf, to invite the Congress of the United States to send a delegation of its members to visit Parliament at as early a date as may be convenient." See *Cong. Rec.* (Senate), Vol. 90, p. 3198 (Mar. 28).

of the governments and personal contacts at the official level with relations at the parliamentary level.

The Ponderables and the Imponderables. It is important that the lesson of this experience be read aright if it is to be applied steadily amongst the English-speaking peoples, as well as to the development of interparliamentary relations in a wider sphere. Success in the British Commonwealth and in the special sphere of British Commonwealth-American parliamentary relations has been due to several factors. Some cannot be transplanted because they are of a spiritual character, deeply rooted in history; among them in the British Commonwealth is the common allegiance to the crown, with the common citizenship springing from it which has far-reaching psychological as well as political and legal significance. Another, which is shared in part with the United States, is the common background and family relationship. These factors, which are not matters of mechanics, are likely to continue to make for a specially close relationship between British Commonwealth Parliaments and Congress—which between them are the founders and continuing mainstay of parliamentary institutions in the world.

But there are others of a more mechanical kind, which can easily be applied in a wider field, and are yet of such importance that they can make all the difference between relative success and failure. Among such factors, which were seen in action at Ottawa, the following may be mentioned: the selection of representative all-party delegations where possible through an all-party association of members bringing together members of both houses in their common capacity as parliamentarians; the holding of all meetings in private and "off the record"; free and untrammeled discussion, combined with a careful avoidance of specific proposals or resolutions; and the giving by each Parliament of every possible facility in the intervals between regular conferences for close personal contact with visiting parliamentarians.

NEWS AND NOTES

PERSONAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

Compiled by the Managing Editor

The nominating committee of the American Political Science Association, aided by suggestions from members of the Association through the canvassing ballot which closed on June 15, has completed its work and will submit at the January meeting the following list of nominees for officers for 1945: president, John M. Gaus (University of Wisconsin); first vice president, Robert T. Crane (Social Science Research Council); second vice president, James K. Pollock (University of Michigan); third vice president, Dorothy Schaffter (Connecticut College for Women); members of the Executive Council: Edward F. Dow (University of Maine); Robert J. Harris (Louisiana State University); John G. Heinberg (University of Missouri); Walter H. C. Laves (University of Chicago); and Chester C. Maxey (Whitman College). The nominating committee consists of Lloyd M. Short (chairman), Francis W. Coker, Denna F. Fleming, James Hart, and Charles McKinley.

Upon his resignation, in July, as price executive of the Consumer Durable Goods Branch of the OPA, Mr. Alfred Auerback was succeeded by the former associate price executive, Dr. Harvey C. Mansfield, who before joining the OPA's staff in 1942 was on the faculty of Yale University.

Dr. Harold W. Stoke, professor of political science and recently acting dean of the graduate school at the University of Wisconsin, has accepted the presidency of the University of New Hampshire. When elected to the post, he was on leave from Wisconsin and holding a research appointment in the U. S. Bureau of the Budget.

Professor Clarence C. Ludwig, of the University of Minnesota, addressed the annual convention of the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, August 15, at Parrsboro, Nova Scotia, on "How a University Bureau Can Serve Municipal Government."

Professor Clarence A. Berdahl returned in September from London, after completing his work there with the Office of Strategic Services, and has resumed the chairmanship of his department at the University of Illinois.

Professor Howard White is on leave from Miami University until September, 1945, and during the interval is serving as educational adviser for the Southern Regional Training Program for Public Administration conducted jointly by the Universities of Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee.

A new program emphasizing graduate work in the George Washington University School of Government was inaugurated this fall under the direction of Dr. William C. Johnstone as dean and Dr. Arthur E. Burns as assistant dean.

Dr. Shepherd L. Witman, formerly of the New Jersey College for Women, has become director of the Council on World Affairs in Cleveland and also associate professor of political science at Western Reserve University.

Professor William S. Stokes, of Northwestern University, visited Cuba during the past summer in quest of materials pertinent to a study of parliamentary government in Latin America on which he has for some years been engaged.

Professor Ray F. Harvey, of New York University, has recently been appointed head of the research and planning division of the New York State Veterans Commission, an agency established by action of the state legislature in the spring of 1944 to study veterans' problems and make recommendations to the legislature in the spring of 1945.

Dr. Charles Prince has resigned his visiting professorship at Indiana University and accepted an appointment as chief analyst, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D. C.

Dr. Donald B. Edgerton has become a member of the department of American government and politics at Eau Claire State Teachers College, Wisconsin.

At Western Reserve University, Dr. Christian L. Larson has been promoted from an assistant to an associate professorship.

Dr. Hans Aufricht gave instruction in German history and institutions in the A. S. T. P. at Cornell University last winter and spring, and lectured at New York University during the second term of the 1944 summer session on twentieth-century diplomatic history.

Dr. Benjamin E. Lippincott, former associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, has been promoted from Captain to Major by the 13th AAF at an advanced Southwest Pacific base. Major Lippincott has been overseas since January of this year.

In the absence of Professor Henry Reiff, Professor Richard L. Power is serving as chairman of the department of history and government at St. Lawrence University.

Dr. John B. McConaughy, formerly of Duluth State Teachers College, has been appointed associate professor of political science at the University of South Carolina.

Professor Walter R. Sharp, of the College of the City of New York, has been appointed chief of organizational planning on the staff of the United Nations Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture. Professor Sharp has charge of the preparation of administrative and procedural documentation for the first meeting of the Conference of the projected Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, which will probably take place early next year.

Professor Edward H. Buehrig, of Indiana University, has been appointed to a position with the Division of International Security and Organization in the Department of State. He has a leave of absence for the academic year 1944–45.

Dr. James K. Eyre, Jr., recently assistant professor of government at Sweetbriar College, has accepted appointment as special assistant to President Sergio Osmena of the Philippine Commonwealth and to Colonel Carlos P. Romulo, Philippine resident commissioner to the United States.

A new contingent of men in the Far Eastern Area and Language Program has been assigned by the Army to the University of Minnesota. Professor Harold S. Quigley continues as program director.

Dr. Earl G. Latham, now serving as assistant director of the Division of Field Operations of the U. S. Bureau of the Budget, has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at the University of Minnesota, and Charles H. McLaughlin, First Lieutenant in the Army Air Corps, has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor.

Lieutenant Philip B. Willauer, of the U. S. Navy, now on leave from the University of Pennsylvania, has been ordered to Hawaii.

The twenty-fourth annual meeting of the National Council for the Social Studies will be held in Cleveland, November 23–25. The sessions will be focused upon the problems and issues facing social studies teachers in the forthcoming transition from war to peace.

At the ninth annual Institute of Government, held at the University of Washington between July 24 and 28, a record number of sections were arranged and the active participation of a large number of public officials was secured, among them Governor A. B. Langlie, Senator Mon Wallgren, and Congressman Warren Magnuson. Mr. Lloyd Schram is director of the Bureau of Government Research which sponsored the Institute.

Under the United States Office of War Information, thirty-eight Information Centers have been prepared for England and the Continent in order to provide information for the liberated countries whose libraries have been looted and destroyed during the war years. In July and August, a unit was put on view in Manchester through the coöperation of the Manchester Central Library, and under the supervision of Professor Irwin M. Tobin, on leave from Rhode Island State College as Information Specialist, O.W.I. The American Information Centers on the Continent are to be the foundation of reference libraries on the United States for the use of all groups of individuals—particularly local officials, libraries, leaders of professional and civic organizations, publishers, writers, and speakers, in the locality where they are set up, as well as for military and civilian personnel of all the United Nations. In addition to a basic reference library, indexed materials files contain pamphlets, background articles, maps, charts, government documents, picture files and exhibit kits, radio scripts for reference, and a small library of 16 mm. and film-strip pictures and projectors. Copies of professional and popular magazines, which will be received regularly at each operating Center, will be on display, together with special exhibits of children's books and textbooks. Dr. Richard H. Heindel, formerly of the University of Pennsylvania, and at present in charge of the American Library in London, has been one of the persons interested in developing the Information Center Units.

Since its original appointment in 1941, the American Political Science Association's Committee on Congress (now known as the Committee on American Legislatures) has been the spearhead of an effort to stimulate Congress to study and reform its machinery and procedure; and a few months ago this effort bore fruit in the concurrent passage by the Senate of the Maloney-Monroney Resolution under which the two houses should set up a Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress charged with studying and reporting on all aspects of Congressional operation. Further to encourage and assist in the project, the Association's Committee, under the chairmanship of George B. Galloway, has launched an incorporated Commission on the Organization of Congress, with officers, a board of directors, and an advisory council; and various distinguished persons—political scientists, newspaper editors, and others—have indicated their willingness to coöperate in such capacities, the general chairmanship having been offered to President Clarence A. Dykstra of the University of Wisconsin. As set forth in the certificate of incorporation, the objects of the Commission will be "to distribute throughout the United States authoritative information on the existing organization and operation of the Congress of the United States and on changes in legislative machinery and methods proposed by members of Congress and by private citizens and groups with a view toward strengthening the Congress, simplifying its operations, improving its relationships with other branches of the United States government, and enabling it better to meet its responsibilities under the Constitution, and to coöperate generally with all bodies or groups in such measures."

Supplementary List of Doctoral Dissertations. A number of items were erroneously omitted from the 1944 list of doctoral dissertations in political science now in preparation in American colleges and universities, published in the August, 1944, issue of this REVIEW. To the published list the following dissertations, all in progress at the University of Minnesota, should be added:

Political Philosophy and Psychology:
- *Carroll Hawkins;* A.B., West Virginia, 1934; A.M., Minnesota, 1937. The Political Philosophy of Harold J. Laski.

Government and Politics of the United States and its Dependencies:
- *Asher N. Christensen;* A.B., Minnesota, 1924. A Study of the Legislative Settlement of Contested Election Cases.

Constitutional and Administrative Law in the United States:
- *Roy Miller;* A.B., Hamline, 1927; A.M., Minnesota, 1928. Municipal Civil Service Law in Minnesota.

American State and Local Government and Politics:
- *Ira Polley;* A.B., Indiana, 1938. The Politics and Administration of State Labor Relations Acts.

Foreign and Comparative Government and Politics:
- *James W. Miller;* A.B., Amherst, 1936; A.M., Minnesota, 1938. Political Organization for Women and Young People in Great Britain.
- *Solomon Milner;* A.B., University of Alberta, 1936; A.M., *ibid.*, 1938. Governmental Control of Radio Broadcasting in Canada.

International Organization, Politics, and Law:
- *George W. Anderson;* LL.B., University of Petrograd (present Leningrad), 1917. Aspects of Russian Policy in the Far East.
- *Nicholas Efimenco;* A.B., Minnesota, 1937; A.M., *ibid.*, 1940. The Mandate Principle and Its Future Application in International Organization.
- *Clayton D. Ford;* A.B., Minnesota, 1929; A.M., *ibid.*, 1930. The Open Door Doctrine in Sino-British Relations.
- *Robert G. Neumann;* A.M., Amherst, 1940. Extradition and the Political Offender.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

An American Dilemma; The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. By Gunnar Myrdal, with the assistance of Richard Sterner and Arnold Rose. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1944. 2 vols. Pp. lv, iv, 1483. $7.50.)

In this book, a Swedish economist presents his views of the race-relations problem in the United States after some two years of intensive study, during which he had the benefit of a large research staff and an ample travelling fund. The idea for such a study originated in the Board of the Carnegie Corporation, which decided that it appeared wise to seek as the responsible head of the undertaking some one who could approach his task with a fresh mind, uninfluenced by traditional attitudes or by earlier conclusions. The search was limited to countries of high intellectual and scholarly standards, but with no background or traditions of imperialism which might lessen the confidence of the Negroes in the United States as to the complete impartiality of the study and the validity of its findings. When an American foundation approaches a foreign scholar with a blank check, it must be ready to adopt a liberal spending policy. I have been informed that this study cost a third of a million dollars. It might be interesting to speculate whether an all-American research staff could have done as well or better for the money. However, in this case, it is my opinion that the result is admirable. Here is an outstanding social science treatise, brilliant, stimulating, and provocative.

Mr. Myrdal is friendly and sympathetic toward the United States, but at the same time he is a severe critic; and he is not patronizing, after the manner of some British observers of the American scene.

While the book deals with the economic, social, psychological, historical, and anthropological aspects of the problem, it does not neglect the political. As a matter of fact, I think that the book is one of the best political commentaries on American life that has ever been written, because it places its discussion of politics in a well-rounded social science setting.

There are many things in the book that some American readers will not like. No one enjoys having his faults revealed in all their nakedness. Mr. Myrdal does not spare us. He finds our Constitution impractical in many respects and ill-suited for modern conditions, our respect for law and order lacking, our administrative standards low, our interest in government deficient, our popular election of officers of the law and our jury system obstacles to impartial justice, our economic programs ill-considered in some cases, our legislation based upon insufficient research, and our political culture rudimentary. All of these criticisms are furnished in a friendly constructive spirit, and Mr. Myrdal does not hesitate to offer suggestions for the improvement of our institutions and practices.

Mr. Myrdal also finds many things about the American scene that he likes. He is particularly impressed with what he calls the American Creed, and he thinks that the idealism in this creed will ultimately triumph over the materialism and selfishness in American life. As he puts it, "our problem is the moral dilemma of the American—the conflict between his moral valuations on various levels of consciousness and generality. The 'American Dilemma,' . . . is the ever-raging conflict between, on the one hand, the valuations preserved on the general plane which we shall call the 'American Creed', where the American thinks, talks, and acts under the influence of high national and Christian precepts, and, on the other hand, the valuations on specific planes of individual and group living, where personal and local interests, economic, social, and sexual jealousies, considerations of community prestige and conformity, group prejudice against particular persons or types of people, and all sorts of miscellaneous wants, impulses, and habits dominate his outlook." Mr. Myrdal's discussion of American political theory and its application in American life makes the Creed stand out as a living, dynamic influence.

As well as laying bare facts about American life, Mr. Myrdal is diligent in laying bare the assumptions which underlie American thinking about such an important problem as race relations. He points out that many American social scientists, posing as scientists, have really not been as objective as they thought they were. *Laissez faire* philosophy has been as common among American sociologists as among American economists.

Mr. Myrdal disclaims that he is writing a general treatise on American civilization. He says that he is discussing the Negro problem in its relationship to American democracy and America's place in world affairs. The more he got into the subject the clearer it became that this problem could not be discussed apart from the total setting.

As a member of the Swedish Senate, Mr. Myrdal thinks that it is not necessary to take a fatalistic view of human affairs. He presents a program for improvement and a challenge to those who have hopes for a better world.

HAROLD F. GOSNELL.

Washington, D. C.

The Use of Presidential Power, 1789–1943. BY GEORGE FORT MILTON. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1944. Pp. xiii, 349. $3.00.)

Here is the fifth book dealing with the problems of the American presidency to be published in half a dozen years. If differs from the other four in not being the product of a university professor and in its approach to the subject. It serves rather to complement what has already been done.

No one need doubt that the author "has covered more than a thousand volumes, a number of which have been continually consulted." His reading has been thoroughly digested and the reflections are presented in well matured judgments.

Doubtless Mr. Milton is entitled to receive from political scientists some such gracious compliment as the late James Harvey Robinson paid the amateur historian when he wrote: "Mr. Wells manages to humanize the past." This is implied in the author's statement: "I have given no elaborate treatment of constitutional contentions or court debates, but have concerned myself chiefly with the personalities who held it and the crises they have had to meet." The method of treatment, then, is episodical rather than philosophical, and events illuminate the subject while they reveal the author's pattern of interpretation and justify his judgment of particular presidents.

While minor incumbents of the office receive at least passing attention, a systematic examination is made of eight "great presidents": Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Cleveland, Wilson, and the two Roosevelts. Each of these in turn is subjected to examination with respect to the way in which he performed his duties as Chief of State, Chief of Foreign Relations, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, Chief of Government, Chief of Party, and Leader of Public Opinion. In the absence of standards for scientific measurement of presidential competence, the author's judgments are inevitably subjective, but throughout he has maintained a judicial poise and given opinions inviting but few dissents.

Of course the author never set out to make a mere scientific study of the presidential office. No essay that gives twenty-two pages to Thomas Jefferson and sixty to Franklin D. Roosevelt could ever be quite that. It is rather a book with a motive implied in the fact that not much less than half the pages devoted to the eight "great presidents" are lavished on the last two, Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The culminating theme becomes that of the experience of the great office in two world wars. What guiding light can that experience throw upon the coming paramount issue as once again we come to grips with the problem of permanent peace?

Whatever inclination toward hero worship Mr. Milton may have is tempered by a salutary awareness of feet of clay. Cleveland failed to "perceive the great new duty upon the national government affirmatively to undertake these economic and social policies which the public from time to time concludes essential." As to Woodrow Wilson: "The unruly demons of the subconscious often overpower the guards which reason posts over man's unconscious mind." In his second term, Franklin D. Roosevelt "preached a new social gospel," but actually turned "from moving mountains to building molehills." This "veritable genius in planning combined operations in the planetary war" has been a "genius in disorder" on the home front.

WILFRED E. BINKLEY.

Ohio Northern University.

The Atlas of Congressional Roll Calls. Volume I: *The Continental Congresses and the Congresses of the Confederation, 1777–1789.* EDITED BY CLIFFORD L. LORD. (Cooperstown, New York: New York Historical Association. 1943.)

This is the first volume of an *Atlas of Congressional Roll Calls* which, if published in full as planned, will run over forty volumes and will contain maps portraying, by a uniform legend, all yea-and-nay roll call votes in Congress from 1777 to 1937. The manuscript copy of the entire *Atlas* has been accumulated. The project was made possible by the existence of the WPA program and was accomplished by five years' coöperative labor by a large number of workers on the Historical Records Survey in New York City and New Jersey. Designed as a research tool for many types of historical study, the *Atlas* purports to include every recorded vote during the period covered by it. Every roll call has been mapped, including executive session votes, impeachment votes, and votes for the election of officers in each House. Each map is accompanied by a summary, giving the date, the name of the mover, and the gist of the motion, with citations to the published records of debates in Congress and to the House and Senate *Journals.* In addition, so runs the Introduction by Mr. Lord, "under the summary is the roll call, arranged by states (and districts for the House of Representatives), giving the name of each Congressman, his state (and district for Representatives), his party, and his vote on that particular question. Each volume in indexed by name, subject, and bill and resolution number. For the unicameral Continental Congresses and the Congress of the Confederation, the maps are published in chronological order: for the bicameral Congresses since 1789, they are arranged chronologically for each house, Congress by Congress. Each volume, for purposes of interpretation, also includes, where the information is available, maps showing the distribution of party strength in the two houses, the density of population, and the industrial development of the nation at the time of the Congress or Congresses covered."

With respect to the project as a whole, one may well agree with Mr. Lord that "it is impossible to probe at all deeply into this material without glimpsing the fields of research it opens up," both in testing the validity of existing theories of American history and political science and in providing the data for all sorts of new studies. Space does not permit reference to the many valuable suggestions for use of the *Atlas* made by Mr.

Lord. His Introduction should be read in full by all students of American history and government. This reviewer would also invite attention to the bibliography (pp. 19–25), wherein are listed the sources used in preparing the *Atlas*. The bibliography covers federal laws and court decisions and state laws, comprising a very handy bibliographical tool.

Referring more specifically to the first published volume of the *Atlas*, Dr. Dixon Ryan Fox, who supplies the Foreword, rightly asserts that "it is safe to say that no one will attempt to write extensively of American affairs in that critical time between the Declaration of Independence and the establishment of federal government under the Constitution without consulting the maps and roll calls that are before us—unless he is indifferent to criticism."

It could hardly be expected that in a coöperative work of the magnitude of the *Atlas*, criticism of format and details could be avoided. Here, however, the reviewer is largely disarmed by the explanations and frank admissions of Mr. Lord. He states that the small type used for the summaries and roll calls in the first volume resulted from a desire to reduce the size and cost of the completed work. He promises that the size of type in later volumes will be much larger and that other improvements will be made. A correction sheet lists errors of omission and commission made by the printer and by the editing staff. This list ought to accompany each copy of the *Atlas*. Numerous additions might be made to this list, but instead of dwelling on such details, I prefer to commend the scholarly skill of the directors and editors of the project and the industry of the individuals engaged in the research. The *Atlas* is an excellent example of what can be accomplished by systematic coöperative effort. It is to be hoped that the entire *Atlas* will be published in the near future.

EVERETT S. BROWN.

University of Michigan.

Public Spending and Postwar Economic Policy. BY SHERWOOD M. FINE. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1944. Pp. vi, 177. $2.50.)

Sufficient time has now elapsed to permit objective analysis of the New Deal public spending program of the 1930's and scientific evaluation of it in terms of the objectives sought. This compactly written, well-documented volume attempts such an analysis and evaluation. The author, who is Principal Economic Analyst for the Foreign Economic Administration, begins with an examination of contemporary theories on public spending and its place in the economy of the nation. The efficacy of a properly timed and planned "pump-priming" spending program in leveling off cyclical business depressions and setting in motion recovery impulses, as expounded by the Keynes school of thought, is first explored critically. Then follows a fuller exposition and criticism of the still more unorthodox fiscal theories of Professor Alvin H. Hansen, under whom as a Littauer Fellow at Harvard in 1939–1940 Dr. Fine carried forward this study in its earlier stages. The pupil is not ready to accept in full the "secular-stagnation" thesis of his preceptor, with its contention that the system of private capitalism has evolved to a point in America where it is no longer capable of absorbing the full productive energies of the nation without a very substantial and continuing compensatory public spending program.

In the light of this theoretical background, the author proceeds to an examination of the New Deal fiscal and public spending program of 1933–1940. Although he does not assess it as a complete failure, he finds in it much to criticize. Among the many flaws noted are: (1) too great attention to work relief considerations at the expense of economic recovery aims; (2) inadequate coördination of federal taxation and spending policies; (3) over-emphasis upon wholly self-liquidating projects at the expense of socially useful, but non-self-liquidating and partially self-liquidating, projects; (4) failure to induce resumption of normal public-works spending by state and local units of government, with a resultant assumption of a disproportionately large share of the financial burden by the national government; and (5) a timidity of approach and uncertainty of aim which resulted in achievement of only a partial and insecure business recovery by 1940.

On the possibility of full utilization of the nation's economic resources in the postwar era, the author strikes a subduedly optimistic note. Chief reliance must be placed on private enterprise. More fundamental than lavish expenditures on public works in bringing about full production and employment in the postwar period are, he contends, an overhauling of the national tax structure so as to encourage the venture of private capital into new enterprises; governmental measures designed to insure a more efficiently functioning competitive price system; and, on the international front, exchange stabilization, reduction of trade barriers, and financial aid to industrially backward nations. He sees for governmental spending only a secondary and residual rôle in bringing about full utilization of the economic potential.

The study might be criticized for its rather narrow confinement to issues and problems of a purely economic character. Political factors which are inextricably involved in the planning and execution of a public spending program under our form of government are for the most part merely recognized, not discussed. However, the author fully acknowledges the limitations of his work in this respect. As a timely analysis of the economic factors involved in public spending to achieve and maintain full production and employment, this is a most penetrating and thought-provoking work. It deserves the earnest attention of the professional student of public affairs, the government planner, the business man, and, above all, of those who determine in our legislative halls our public spending policies.

Joseph E. Kallenbach.

University of Michigan.

Federal Grants for Vocational Rehabilitation. By **Mary E. Macdonald** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1944. Pp. xiii, 404. $2.50.)

This monograph is the result of a study of the federal grant-in-aid program for vocational rehabilitation from the beginning of the program in 1920 to 1943. Based on an examination of documentary materials, the volume is devoted primarily to the history of federal legislation for vocational rehabilitation, and to the federal administrative machinery and federal administrative practices and policies which have been evolved to carry out the program. One chapter is devoted to state administration, but emphasis is placed on only those aspects of state vocational rehabilitation programs which have been affected by federal policy through the grant-in-aid system.

According to the story here told, the federal program has been far from satisfactory. The number of disabled persons who have been served is found to have been "extremely small in comparison with estimates of need" (p. 329), and the types of services rendered are found to have been insufficient to meet the needs of the persons being rehabilitated (p. 331). The program has been handicapped by the fact that it has been treated largely as only a phase of the vocational education program, with its administration largely in the hands of vocational education authorities on both federal and state levels. Vocational rehabilitation, it is convincingly argued, "is a problem of individual adjustment in which vocational training is only one of many resources to be utilized" (p. 96).

Federal administrative authorities are blamed for having too narrowly restricted the services for which grants to states could be used when the law would have permitted a wider range of services. The author adopts the view that vocational rehabilitation should be defined in terms of unrestricted service with a specific objective, i.e., placing the disabled person in employment. It is insisted that the disabled person's vocational adjustment frequently requires not only services which are strictly vocational in nature, but also numerous other services, such as medical and surgical care. However, as a result of administrative rulings, the services embraced have been confined principally to vocational guidance, training, and the giving of placement assistance. By amendments adopted in 1943, Congress has gone far toward correcting the deficiencies of administrative policy by providing for a more comprehensive program; but the program must still be limited to a specific list of services as set forth in the new law.

The volume should be of great interest to social workers, and it should be of considerable value to political scientists interested in federal-state relations. The author has performed a useful service in pointing out the major shortcomings of the federal vocational rehabilitation program, and in directing attention to some of the more important problems of federal grants-in-aid. She demonstrates the importance of extreme care in the determination of federal policy where, in grant-in-aid programs of this nature, federal policy sets the pattern for state action.

WALTER H. BENNETT.

University of Alabama.

The Settlement of Industrial Disputes. BY KURT BRAUN. (Philadelphia: The Blakiston Company. 1944. Pp. xii, 306. $3.50.)

The purpose of this book, the author states, is "to present as comprehensive a survey as possible of ideas, theories, problems, regulations, and practical experience pertaining to labor disputes and their settlement." This sounds like an appallingly large order, but the logical and systematic approach of the author reduces the task to one of workable proportions. Naturally all of the blood, sweat, and tears characteristic of this field are organized right out of the subject, but that is one of the consequences of the scholarly method.

There are four basic ways, under the author's classification, for settling industrial disputes—direct negotiations, mediation or conciliation, arbitration, and litigation. Direct negotiation is of course basic in industrial relationships, and it is only after it has broken down that the more specialized methods of handling disputes, calling in outside persons and machinery, are invoked. The three parts of this book are devoted to a consideration of those three specialized types of settlement.

In the first part, the author sets down the "principles" of mediation, that is, he defines the process and describes in general terms the procedures, types of agencies, methods, parties, etc., typically found in mediation, as well as the relation of this to other forms of settlement. These principles are followed by accounts of the actual experience of conciliation agencies in the United States (the U. S. Conciliation Service and the National Mediation Board) and Germany. There are also short chapters on state systems, based on analysis of statutes, and on the scanty experience of municipalities in this field.

The somewhat longer second section on arbitration is organized on the same pattern, with a general statement of principles, followed by the experience of federal, state, municipal, and private systems. A final section deals with labor courts, and since there are none in the United States, the experience emphasized here is that of the German labor judiciary.

The book is a systematizing and synthesizing job done with great skill.

The most timely contribution is undoubtedly the excellent treatment of the War Labor Board, a war agency which, the author believes, is yielding experience valuable for the post-war period. He examines the status and weaknesses of the National Defense Mediation Board, out of which the War Labor Board evolved, and analyzes the composition, jurisdiction, and procedure of the present Board. He notes the peculiar position of the Board with respect to enforcement of its orders through presidential seizure, but expresses no views as to possible alternatives.

The author points out in his conclusion that machinery for settling labor disputes is usually set up in a piecemeal fashion to deal with difficulties apparent at the moment. He argues for the eventual consolidation of these single steps into an integrated system, so that disputes will move smoothly along the line from direct negotiation to mediation, then to arbitration, and finally to judicial decision and enforcement. Government must provide the machinery for the last stage; for the other stages, it need act only where private methods do not exist or are incomplete.

C. Herman Pritchett.

University of Chicago.

Omnipotent Government; The Rise of the Total State and Total War. By Ludwig Von Mises. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1944. Pp. iv, 291. $3.75.)

Professor Von Mises introduces this book with complaints that academic reviewers deal unfairly with authors who oppose governmental regulation of private enterprise. An attempt will be made here to follow closely the author's own statement of his views.

The author's stated aim is to consider the international aspects of omnipotent government. Yet he deals generally with our recent disorders, internal as well as international. His thesis is that omnipotent government, which makes international coöperation impossible and war inevitable, is itself the consequence of the domestic economic policies of governments. Our troubles have been brought on by our abandonment of "liberalism." The essence of liberalism is private enterprise. All the other vaunted values of liberalism—free elections, freedom of conscience, religion, and the press, freedom in research, art, and literature—are only the consequences or "corollaries" of free enterprise, the "market society," "capitalism." There is no middle ground. "There can be no mixture of socialism and capitalism." The aims of middle-of-the-roaders ("interventionists") may be, not to do away with private enterprise, but only to regulate its operation "through isolated measures of interference"; but the results are the same. Governmental interventions for the benefit of one group can be carried out only by taking benefits away from other groups; government-sustained living standards can be safeguarded in one country only by keeping out imports and migrants from other countries; such aids and restraints can be supplied only by omnipotent and ultimately war-making governments. Thus the inevitable movement is from social legislation through economic nationalism to totalitarian government and war. "If Europeans and the peoples of European descent in other parts of the earth had not yielded to *étatism*, if they had not embarked upon vast schemes of government interference with business, our recent political, social, and economic disasters could have been avoided."

Who have been responsible for the disasters? Not "the lower classes"—"workers," "proletarians," "farmers." There has been no "revolt of the masses." Generally the anti-liberal, anti-capitalist leadership has come from "the upper middle class" or from "aristocratic families." The instigators have usually been doctrinaire "intellectuals," "scholars," "writers," "orators," "social scientists," "omniscient professors," aided by "philosophers," "historians," "lawyers," "the clergy," "the Roman Church," "churches of all creeds." The whole débâcle is "the outcome of cool though misguided reasoning. The carefully elaborated, although erroneous, doctrines of scholarly and thoughtful books have led to the clash of nations, to bloody wars and destruction." Thus the distinctive mark of National Socialism is not economic nationalism or totalitarian and repressive government, but only the search for *Lebensraum*. "*The fundamental tenets of the Nazi ideology do not differ from the generally accepted social and economic ideologies*. . . . It does not matter that the British call these principles an outgrowth of liberalism and economic democracy, while the Germans, on better grounds, call them anti-liberal and anti-democratic. It is not much more important that in Germany nobody is free to utter dissenting views, while in Great Britain a dissenter is only laughed at as a fool and slighted."

The present war is not a product of the treaty arrangements following World War I. "The mischief was not that the treaty of Versailles was bad, so far as Germany was concerned, but that the victorious powers permitted Germany to defy some of its most important clauses." Reparations were not responsible for Germany's economic distress; if she had been forced to pay them, she would simply have had that much less to spend on rearmament. Inflation in Germany was the result of policies advocated by her academic socialists—the price controls, exchange restrictions, expanded bank credits, etc. Thus Germany's internal troubles were of her own making; she was able to start a war to cure her troubles because the Allied powers failed to stop her from arming; and their inaction was the result of their preoccupation with their own economic nationalism.

When the Allies win this war, what can be done to reduce the chances of another early war? To prevent the Axis powers from starting war again, the Western democracies should form a "permanent union"; they should totally disarm Italy, Germany, and Japan, prevent them from manufacturing armaments, force them to pay indemnities for their territorial and other "robberies," and punish the leaders responsible for the "tortures and murders." The author is not hopeful that the democracies will long avoid warring among themselves, because he is not hopeful that they will move back far enough towards an order of free domestic markets, unrestricted foreign trade, and free migration between the democracies. He is certain that an order of durable peace and freedom can be made sure only in a world of "pure, perfect, and unhampered capitalism."

The actual limitations on capitalism, existing everywhere and becoming more obvious during the past two generations, afford, most readers will probably agree, a proper subject for thorough and dispassionate study. We ought to consider critically the methods employed, the results accomplished, the difficulties and possible dangers ahead. Professor Von Mises believes that he has made such a study; and he finds the results unmitigatedly bad. He believes that we ought not to have any price controls, wage or hour regulations, health or unemployment insurance, redistributive taxes, or protective tariffs. He should be commended for his forthrightness. Others who urge us to restore free enterprise are not so rigorously consistent. Thus in the United States in 1944 the Republican party has adopted a platform that endorses a score of governmental regulations and aids, including the long familiar protective tariffs. Indeed Von Mises might well have included business men in his historical enumeration of the instigators of interventionism.

The author, here as in his earlier analysis of socialism (first published in 1922), displays considerable dialectical skill. Readers cannot well deny the effectiveness of some of his challenges of the whole complex of recent socialist and liberal-collectivist ideas. Yet (the reviewer believes) Professor Von Mises has not considered, broadly and dispassionately, either the moral implications or the practical economic consequences of his own extreme doctrine. For we have always had mixtures of private enterprise and governmental regulation. And if it is true that we do not think enough about what a purely socialist order would be like, it may also be true that we do not think enough about what an order of pure, unhampered (and unaided) capitalism would be like.

FRANCIS W. COKER.

Yale University.

Prelude to Silence; The End of the German Republic. BY ARNOLD BRECHT. (New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. xxi, 156. $2.00.)

Our libraries are full of books on present-day Germany. Many of these make interesting, even sensational, reading. Very few of them contribute material to the research of political scientists and historians. It seems that the authors either despair of unraveling the complex problems of German domestic policy before Hitler or try to over-simplify them so as not to ruin the market for their books. The result is a growing confusion and superficialty in the discussion of the German question.

Arnold Brecht's book belongs to a quite different type of publication. It is probably the first successful attempt at re-telling and re-analyzing the story of the loss of personal freedom in Germany as a problem of constitutional law and fateful mistakes and shortcomings in the German parliamentary and party system. Nobody is better equipped to write about the long crisis and final ruin of the German constitution than Mr. Brecht. As an outstanding expert in German constitutional law and one of the highest civil servants for many years, he has not only seen the German and Prussian parliaments at work, but has attended cabinet councils and witnessed many political events from the inside. Thus it is understandable that his analysis and conclusions differ widely from certain now popular assumptions.

As probably all Germans who studied German politics, not only from textbooks, but through active service and hard political fights inside Germany, Brecht does not subscribe to the assertion that the Germans are inclined toward totalitarianism. His book is full of material for the opposite view, depicting in some detail and with scholarly precision the struggle against National Socialism in the years before Hitler became chancellor. Moreover, it was the state of Prussia that to the very last led in this resistance. Incidentally, Prussia was practically the only German state which had, nearly without interruption, a strictly democratic government from 1918 to July, 1932. Prussia's capital, Berlin, had voted overwhelmingly democratic and socialist under the Empire, and it continued this tradition under the Republic. The democratic Prussian government had to be eliminated by a *coup d'état* in 1932. And why did the supporters of the Republic not revolt against Hindenburg's and Papen's violation of the constitution? Brecht answers by reconstructing with great and detailed exactness the situation as it then was. It was very complex and hazardous indeed. Any success for an uprising was out of the question. However, it may be difficult to convince everyone that revolt was hopeless and could have been attempted only by groups of adventurers.

In analyzing the situation from the viewpoint of constitutional law and domestic policy, Brecht might have stressed one fact which is mostly overlooked, but was somewhat decisive for the development of the crisis: the Social Democrats and the Roman Catholics, as the leading political groups in the Republic, were strictly parliamentary parties, very legalistic, and had never prepared their followers for civil war against governmental power. It is correct to state that a majority of Germans, especially through the Free Labor Movement, have struggled for democracy almost a century. But it was a movement with highly civilized methods, humanitarian and non-violent. No one should have expected such old political movements to change their character in a day. They fought in the spirit of human culture in which they had entered history, and were defeated by rising barbarism, as has happened very often before in many periods of history and in many civilizations.

In this reviewer's opinion, Brecht makes a splendid, scholarly contribution to the understanding of German politics.

WILLIAM F. SOLLMANN.

Pendle Hill, Wallingford, Pa.

The Nazi Economic System: Germany's Mobilization for War. BY OTTO NATHAN, WITH THE COLLABORATION OF MILTON FRIED. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1944. Pp. viii, 378. $4.00.)

Until a few years ago, the American literature on German economic institutions was scanty indeed. Thorstein Veblen's *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*, still the best study of German politics and economics, was published in 1915. Since 1938, we have had several outstanding studies by W. F. Bruck, Gustav Stolper, and Maxine Sweezey. Otto Nathan's book is a worthy addition to the list of these distinguished works on recent German economic policies and practices.

In a short introductory chapter on "The Impact of Fascism," the author states that the coming of Nazism into power resulted in three major economic consequences: the replacement of the market mechanism by a coördinated system of government intervention, the destruction of free and independent trade unions, and the establishment of ruthless political dictatorship in lieu of political democracy. In the opinion of this reviewer, Professor Nathan probably tends to over-estimate the extent to which the "market mechanism" of the cartel-ridden pre-Nazi German economy actually operated in the framework of German society. The techniques of government regulation of the economy are not an invention of the Nazis, but a re-emphasis of German economic traditions that had been prevalent in Prussia since the seventeenth century, and in the Second Reich since its very foundation in 1871.

As late as 1939, the Cambridge economist C. W. Guillebaud was able to write a book on the Nazi economy in which the military aspect of that economy was dealt with perfunctorily in a short foot-note. Fortunately, this period of intellectual paralysis is gone for good. Professor Nathan performs a real service in stressing throughout his work the basic fact in appraising the Nazi economy: that war is its main objective, and that the categories of Western welfare economics of either socialism or capitalism cannot be applied to an economic system which is to be understood only in terms of a society geared to permanent war and international revolution. Thus, in his discussion of government regulation of industry and agriculture the author analyzes the techniques of public and semi-public agencies in utilizing the available industrial and agricultural resources to the fullest extent from the viewpoint of the German *potential de guerre*. Many of these techniques and conceptions did not make sense when viewed from the logic of Western economic theory, but as long as they made sense in terms of a higher war potential they were utilized anyway. Likewise, the banking, money, and credit policies of the Nazi system were quite unorthodox, so unorthodox, in fact, that we used to be periodically assured, in the years 1933–1939, that the financial house of cards of Germany would not last another six months. The introduction of compulsory labor for the whole German population years before the actual outbreak of military hostilities, the channelling of the available labor force into particular trades and localities long before the war, the freezing of labor where its presence was considered essential—all these measures transformed the German people into a nation of permanent war-workers. Professor Nathan's discussion of the methods and practices utilized in pursuance of these objectives is first-rate throughout. While it is primarily intended for economists, no political scientist will want to miss it. Nietzsche and Treitschke are not enough.

At the end of his book Professor Nathan justly remarks that the Nazi claim to have brought economic security to German labor and business was a travesty, considering the complete loss of personal freedom and human decency under the Nazi régime. In addition, it may also be asked what economic security the Germans are expecting to enjoy after their attempt to despoil and enslave the world has failed. The ruins of Berlin, Cologne, and Hamburg must show at least some Germans that Nazism was not such a brilliant economic venture after all, despite the temporary supplies of caviar, champagne, and silk stockings in the years of conquest. Professor Nathan could perhaps have further stressed another fundamental point about the Nazi economic system. Its one objective was to assure military victory for Germany. In this it failed in the Second World War, as the German economy had failed in the First World War. One wonders how many world wars the Germans will have to lose before they realize that they know all about war except how to win.

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN.

University of Wisconsin.

German Radio Propaganda; Report on Home Broadcasts during the War. BY ERNST KRIS, HANS SPEIER, AND ASSOCIATES. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1944. Pp. xiv, 529. $4.00.)

This book is the teamwork of seven authors, who coöperated so closely that, as the preface points out, the authorship of some chapters cannot be specifically established. These chapters, however, are in no way inferior to those for which individual authors are responsible. Credit is due to the two senior authors for having achieved so excellent a collaboration that the book presents, amid the variety of subjects, a uniform line of thought.

The study confines itself to German broadcasts to the German people. The first chapter depicts the Nazi propagandist as both supporting and relying on a régime of violence. Hitler needs Goebbels, but Goebbels needs Himmler. Whenever Goebbels cannot bend the German people, Himmler breaks them. "If Hitler were wholly popular, Goebbels would be virtually unemployed" (p. 48); but equally true: "If Goebbels were entirely successful, Himmler would be unemployed" (p. 49). The fact that Himmler has plenty to do indicates that German propaganda falls short of its aim. The author claims that the Nazis, contrary to popular opinion, are not at all masters of psychological warfare, that they have originated little, and that their views on the subject are "the traditional views of all demagogues" (p. 23). True as this may be, one is inclined to assume that by their use of certain techniques, such as the slanting and fabrication of news, imagery (the projection of the world to the audience), and the exploitation of stereotypes (of which the index enumerates more than seventy), they must hold a firm grip on an audience that is denied the privilege of free men to form their own judgment on the basis of trustworthy reports.

Although Nazi propaganda springs from the totalitarian master-mind, it is by no means consistent. This is well illustrated in the arresting chapter on "The Enemy." His image is based on the old Nazi idea (suppressed only during the neutrality pact with Russia) that capitalism and Bolshevism are fundamentally the same, as both are creatures of world Jewry. Yet the Nazi radio keeps telling the Germans (and the world) how disunited the Allies are; Allied disunity is one of the leading stereotypes, especially in foreign propaganda. Likewise the Nazis boast of being a young nation as compared with the Allies, but at the same time they represent old European culture in contrast with the Russians (and with the American "terror bombers"). England is attacked with respect to her leaders, while Russia is the absolute, i.e., the collective, enemy. The neutrals, too, as quoted in the German radio, have a function in Nazi propaganda. "They are the chorus. Their press seems to exist for the sole purpose of glorifying Germany" (p. 280).

The task of the German propagandist becomes more amd more difficult as the fortunes of war turn against the Axis. The chapter on "Situations" describes in detail how the Germans were told of the defeats in the battle over Britain, in Africa, and in Russia. A series of euphemisms were invented to break the news of retreats. These have become stereotypes;

they reappeared recently during the campaign in Italy (not covered in this book), and are already appearing with reference to setbacks in Normandy. The study of Nazi propaganda in defeat reveals its inherent weakness: that only a free people can stand the truth in adversity. Hitler could never afford to tell the Germans that he had nothing to offer but "blood, sweat, and tears."

The volume contains thirty-six charts illustrating studies of quantitative analysis; and an appendix lists the major events of the war up to December, 1943. The book will be indispensable to the student of totalitarian propaganda and also exceedingly valuable as reference material.

HEINZ GURADZE.

Park College.

The British Empire, 1815–1939. BY PAUL KNAPLUND. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1943. Pp. xx, 850. $4.00.)

This volume is the fruit of mature scholarship and of many years of teaching of British history. For convenience of treatment, the author divides the century and a quarter into four periods: From War to Peace, 1815–1837; The New Course and *Laissez-Faire,* 1837–1871; Commonwealth and Empire, 1870–1901; Storm and Stress, 1901–1939. The history of the Empire, both as a whole and in its major parts or areas, is reviewed in each of these periods.

It is not the function of a textbook to present new material, but to present the whole subject in due proportions. This Professor Knaplund does admirably. Due attention is paid to the world setting in which the Empire evolved into the Commonwealth, to economic, social, and political forces at work in each of its major parts, as well as to constitutional developments. The book is singularly well-balanced in its evaluation of facts and forces, well-proportioned in its distribution of space, and complete in subject-matter. Professor Knaplund writes in a clear, straightforward style, without straining after literary effect, and he achieves an objectivity which no national of any member state of the Commonwealth could be expected to attain.

A few slips in a book of such scope are perhaps inevitable. There are a few misspelled proper names: Colborne, not Coleborne (p. 51); Innis, not Innes (pp. 815, 817). A few statements are a bit sweeping, e.g., "Laurier stood firm in advocating aid to the Imperial cause" (in 1899). "Wavered" would be more apt. There were no numerically important foreign language groups in Western Canada before 1901, as a statement on page 387 would imply. A good select bibliography of some twenty-five pages might have been improved by inclusion of a few more modern secondary works, such as Handcock's *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs* and R. McG. Dawson's *Constitutional Issues in Canada, 1901–1931.* Prowse's *History* *of Newfoundland*, the standard work, is overlooked, as is also the Royal Commission Report of 1933.

But these are minor imperfections. I know of no other single volume, or indeed of any other book, which so fairly and clearly presents for the period the history of the Empire-Commonwealth as a whole, in its lights and shadows, its unity and diversity, its traditionalism and its adaptability, its complexity of conflicting interests, loyalties, and ideals.

R. A. MacKay.

Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

Civil Service Staff Relationships. By E. N. Gladden. With a Foreword by Sir Horace Wilson. (London: William Hodge and Company, Limited. 1943. Pp. xi, 184. 12s. 6d.)

Dr. Gladden's study is one of a research series promoted by the British Institute of Public Administration. Completed on the eve of the war, to it the author has prefixed a brief account of the experience of the Civil Service Associations and Whitley Councils from 1939 through the autumn of 1942.

In the latter years of the Frst World War, there were many evidences of new practices and ideas in social organization, especially in industrial relations, in Great Britain. The shop stewards' movement, the Guild Socialist theory, doctrines of pluralism, and the restatement of Labour party aims were signs that a new set of assumptions concerning social organization would be explored. There appeared, from a committee of the Ministry of Reconstruction, under the chairmanship of the Speaker of the House of Commons, the Right Honorable J. H. Whitley, a series of reports on the relations of employers and employed, in which joint industrial councils, based upon organizations of employers and employees for the purpose of coöperation in dealing with questions of mutual concern in management, were recommended. In a sense, one may say that the Whitley Committee sought to institutionalize certain long developing tendencies that had been accelerated by the mobilization of the nation for war, in part to meet the difficult problems of postwar readjustment, but also to provide a permanent new constitutional basis of industrial organization. Similar councils were proposed for the government, both by department and by trade. While only a limited success was achieved for the general plan, somewhat surprisingly the program was realized for the civil service of the national government. In 1932, Leonard D. White published an account of this development in his *Whitley Councils in the British Civil Service*.

Dr. Gladden first reviews briefly the history of civil service associations in Great Britain (of which there are over 300), and then the evolution of the councils, which are federal in that the respective spheres of the national and the departmental councils are separate, while the industrial employers of the state, as well as local government officials, do not come within this particular scheme nor Dr. Gladden's account. Two "sides" are represented, the "staff" and the "official," the former being the representatives of the associations, the latter of higher civil servants, "chiefly heads of departments," appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (for the National Council). The author then discusses the aims and achievements of the Councils, the development and activities of the staff associations, the experience with arbitration, staff participation in administration, and in conclusion, after a brief account of civil service organizations in other countries (where he finds no comparable general scheme), he briefly generalizes on the institutional significance of these developments for British government and on their limits, dangers, and contributions. His style, with its employment of rather guarded and complex sentences, approaches an official report standard, and it is sometimes not easy to determine the ultimate purport of his words. A study of the chapter on "Jargon" in *The Art of Writing* by the late Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch might help him clarify his meaning, one thinks, as such a sentence as this (p. 86) appears: "Nevertheless from the general administrative standpoint it cannot be said that there has been no negative account."

Dr. Gladden has, however, substance to relate that is important to the political scientist and the student of social institutions generally. There are the relations peculiar to the government as employer with the civil servant as employee; the unique success, in government, of organizations of "white collar" employees; the problems of representation and procedure in the composition of the "staff side" of the Councils; the integration of legislative policy and administrative discretion under the British cabinet system; the problems created by the General Strike; and the formulation of an adequate political theory to fit the changes brought by the expanding functions and personnel of government. While not all of these are explored by Dr. Gladden, and the study would profit also from some biographies of both staff and official representatives, he gives us a sympathetic account of the relevant developments and concludes with a favorable opinion of the participation of the British civil service in them. Appendices include the "Constitution of the National Council for Civil Service (Non-Industrial)," and a list of civil service staff associations and journals.

An article by "a temporary civil servant" entitled "Government Administration and Efficiency" in *The Political Quarterly* of April-June, 1944 (Vol. XV, No. 2) may usefully be examined by those interested in some of the problems discussed by Dr. Gladden.

JOHN M. GAUS.

University of Wisconsin.

The Super-Powers; The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union—Their Responsibility for Peace. By William T. R. Fox. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1944. Pp. 162. $2.00.)

The Great Decision. By James T. Shotwell. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1944. Pp. 234. $3.00.)

Both of these books are important additions to the literature of postwar international relations. Both have the merit of extreme brevity, are direct and concise in their argument, and should command a wide public.

The Super-Powers makes an important contribution to the analysis of the central problem of the postwar world. As the author rightly says: "Too great emphasis in contemporary discussion on the mechanical or structural aspects of international coöperation to preserve the peace obscures the really vital problem, how to develop among the super-powers a disposition to consult and to agree." Nearly half of the book is devoted to a careful and penetrating analysis of the relations between the United States and Britain. Despite the mutual interdependence of the two countries, there are intangible elements, Dr. Fox points out, which magnify out of proportion to their real importance certain tangible points of difference on matters such as commercial policy. Anti-British sentiments in America, he observes, "still strike a tremendously responsive chord." A scientific analysis of these intangibles, tracing them back to their deeper psychological roots, would be of the greatest service to Anglo-American relations. But that is beyond the scope of the present book.

In suggesting that "only a Britain which can with certainty count upon American support in case of renewed general war can continue to evoke the spontaneous collaboration of Australia and New Zealand," the author under-estimates the strength of the cohesive forces of the family system of the British Commonwealth, and the value to its members of the far higher degree of certainty of mutual aid afforded by the family ties than is attainable outside. Why should the pattern of the future differ from that of the past—immediate support of each other in a crisis in the hope and expectation that they will find America on their side? Moreover, in calculations for the future, allowance has to be made for the fact that the Dominions, and also a number of the colonies, are areas of great potential expansion, and that their present strength is no index of what their strength will be as a result of the cumulative effects of a series of "five-year plans" of national development. Dr. Fox urges close Anglo-American coöperation in the development of colonial areas, pointing to the successful experiment of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission.

As regards a "form" for Anglo-American collaboration, he rejects alliance, in favor of "a unilateral declaration by the United States of its determination to uphold a strong, friendly, independent, and democratic Britain and a reciprocal declaration by Great Britain of a determination to support the American position in the Western Pacific." He advocates also an exchange of identical notes directing the British-American Combined Chiefs of Staff to continue joint planning for joint action against aggression. These "forms" would be part of a wider system comprising the Anglo-Soviet Treaty and a non-coercive general security organization containing all the United Nations.

Collaboration between the Big Three should, he thinks, "be developed strictly *inter se* . . . outside the general international organization." He concludes that the U.S.S.R., like Britain and America, is non-expansionist and would definitely prefer its European neighbors, especially Germany, to be democratic rather than communist. He envisages a Europe of stable independent states—those in central and eastern Europe being within a Russian sphere of interest, whilst the Atlantic states from France to Norway would lie within the Anglo-American security sphere. Provided the Big Three can avoid the emergence of any European or Asiatic hegemony (e.g., a German-dominated European federation), he thinks the Great Powers so widely separated as to make it "enormously difficult for one super-power to defeat another."

In *The Great Decision,* Dr. Shotwell puts forward a solution which, as he says, "already rests upon the experience of history"—an experience in which he has played a noteworthy part for several decades. His book is in large measure a summary of the conclusions of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, of which he is chairman.

The liquidation of the war will bring us, he points out, face to face with the problem of the relations of small and great powers, for which the League's method of constituting Council and Assembly is, he concludes, the only workable solution. He discusses the rôle of the "fraternal association" of Britain and America, between which he sees "no possibility of future warring conflict." Their "understanding" should not, he thinks, "be cast in the form of a treaty." He then considers the relation of the U.S.S.R. to the Western world, devoting his main attention to the Molotov nationality decrees of February 1, 1944. In explaining their significance, he makes some surprising incidental references to the British Commonweatlh. His description of it as "little more than a mystical expression of spiritual affinities" is misleading in the light of its rôle in two world wars and its success in achieving common action by intricate and highly developed, even if informal, machinery. The reference to "Lord Halifax's suggestion that their [the Dominions'] foreign affairs ought to be more unified under the aegis of the Foreign Office" is misleading, since the speech made no such suggestion.

The second part of the book is devoted to the organization of peace after the war. Not all those who lived through the Geneva experience may agree with his view that the setting up of a permanent Commission on the Reduction and Control of Armaments to bring about progressive limitation and prevent clandestine re-armament is "perhaps the most urgent single problem confronting the postwar world." As a prior condition, however, he proposes an international air police force recruited by voluntary enlistment, together with an adequate number of international air bases. The force "would only be called upon by the unanimous consent of the executive committee, which would include the Great Powers." The Big Four which signed the Moscow Declaration might, he suggests, form a Defense Committee of a Council "resembling very much the Council of the League of Nations." In short, in his view, the "General International Organization" of the Moscow Declaration "would take the form of a revised and revived League of Nations." But the process already begun of setting up on "functioning lines" international organizations of a technical character (food and agriculture, health, cultural relations, etc.), on which he has some interesting chapters, he regards as a partial divergence from the Geneva experience. There is a cryptic reference to "backward areas," suggesting the application to them of a revised form of the League mandate system.

H. Duncan Hall.

British Raw Materials Mission,
Washington, D. C.

The League to Enforce Peace. By Ruhl J. Bartlett. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1944. Pp. ix, 252. $2.50.)

This is one of the most important books on American politics published since the last war. It is an outstanding example of sound historical research that will have a wide popular hearing. No student of politics can afford to miss it, and those who are deeply concerned that we shall not lose the peace again will put it high on their list. It is an absorbing story and one that is as pregnant with importance for the future as it is timely.

Professor Bartlett, of Tufts College and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, has written a long-needed history of the League to Enforce Peace—that immense citizen organization which had so much to do with the creation of the League of Nations. Most Americans have forgotten what a great campaign this body waged. It was an exciting story then, and it is none the less so in Bartlett's book.

The author has had access to the central office files of the League to Enforce Peace, its *Bulletin*, the papers of Root, Taft, and Wilson, and many other sources. This vast mass of material is used with great skill and telling effect. There may be ten footnotes on a page and 140 in a chapter, but they do not impede the sweep of the narrative, and they reinforce it powerfully. The story moves smoothly to its tragic end.

The chief impact of the book is the conclusive evidence in it that political partisanship defeated the League of Nations Convenant. Few have ever doubted that deep political and personal passion motivated Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge. In this narrative, the rôle of Elihu Root stands out clearly as the conservative attorney of the Republican party who steered it through every crisis in the long fight. That Root sacrificed the League to advance the party will not surprise many. The big surprise of the book is the way in which William H. Taft let his dislike of Wilson and his desire for the return of the party gradually pull him from the chief leadership on the League side over into Lodge's camp. In the end, Taft was as confused and deceived by Lodge's strategy as were multitudes of his countrymen.

Another outstanding element in the book is the overwhelming proof in it that a majority of our people were for the League Covenant three months after it was published, that is, in May, 1919. "This," says the author, "is as certain as anything in the realm of public opinion can be." How this situation was gradually changed is the theme of the last half of the book. The volume is an indispensable corrective to Bailey's *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace*. In all probability, some of Bailey's judgments of Wilson's "mistakes" would have been softened had he had this mass of evidence before him.

Denna F. Fleming.

Vanderbilt University.

Woodrow Wilson Still Lives; His World Ideals Triumphant. By J. Eugene Harley. (Los Angeles: Center for International Understanding. 1944. Pp. xiii, 193. $2.00.)

Durable Peace; A Study in American National Policy. By Ross J. S. Hoffman. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1944. Pp. vii, 120. $1.75.)

Searchlight on Peace Plans. Compiled by Edith Wynner and Georgia Lloyd. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 1944. Pp. lx, 532. $5.00.)

To a world searching for a satisfactory peace program, these three books will be extremely helpful. Professor Harley would have us return to Woodrow Wilson's ideal of the League of Nations. In a spirited eulogy of the World War president, he tells the familiar story of how the isolationists frustrated Wilson's postwar settlement. Despite this failure, Harley points out, the world is going back to the League. However, he recognizes that some revision is necessary. For example, he recommends that the system of applying sanctions be improved so that the aggressor nations will know in advance what their punishment will be.

The book is frankly a eulogy, as no mention is made of Wilson's errors which contributed to the Senate's rejection of the League. However, President Roosevelt's recent announcement of his intention to support the creation of a world organization very similar to the old League of Nations gives Professor Harley's book added importance at this time.

Professor Hoffman's book is an extremely able analysis of the problems which will face the postwar world. The author convincingly explains how vitally essential it is for us to reach an agreement with Soviet Russia on postwar issues. Failure to do so, he feels, would alienate her and force her into the isolationist course she pursued from 1917 to 1941. Germany and Japan found it possible to pursue their aggressive policies to a great extent because of the estrangement between Russia and the Western powers during the 1930's. Pointing out that Russia did much to save the democracies in 1914, and again in 1941, Hoffman holds that peace in Europe and in Asia cannot be maintained without Russia's help. Hence Russia's political alliance is more important than a chastised Germany or Japan. Eastern Poland, Bessarabia, Bukovina, and the Baltic States, he would leave with Russia because we cannot prevent it. His chapter on "The West and Russia" should be read by all who are apprehensive about our future relations with the Soviets.

As for Germany, Professor Hoffman thinks that after their defeat the German people may wish to revive the German monarchy. If they develop it with a liberal democratic constitution, he feels that we should have no objection. If the Hohenzollerns were restored, however, many people would insist on some satisfactory assurance that they would reign but not rule. Professor Hoffman would prevent future German aggression by an alliance of Spain, Portugal, Italy, Britain, Russia, the United States, and France. The revival of France as a great power should be a primary objective of both Britain and the United States.

Regarding our relations with London, he points out that neither Britain nor the United States "can desert the other without imperiling its own safety." Britain has been the backbone of the international community to which we belong, and we cannot permit her fall.

In the book by Wynner and Lloyd is found a summary of the different peace plans that have been suggested since the days of ancient Greece. The salient points of all plans that have been suggested for an international government based on the confederation, federation, and union types are given in concise form. Such a compilation is helpful.

ROBERT S. MCCORDOCK.

Lincoln Memorial University.

Russia and the Peace. BY SIR BERNARD PARES. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1944. Pp. xiv, 293. $2.50.)

Imagine a very shrewd and much-travelled English gentleman, seventy-six years young, urbanely reasonable and full of wit and wisdom. Imagine that he has devoted almost half a century to the study of Russia and the Russians, journeying often over the steppes in the company of the late Professor Samuel N. Harper of the University of Chicago and publishing half a dozen scholarly books and innumerable articles on various phases of Slavic life and thought. Imagine him as an official British war correspondent on the Eastern Front in World War I and as an eyewitness of the great revolution. Imagine him, further, dropping into your study for several hours of highly informal but informative conversation, spiced with anecdotes and reminiscences, about the Russian past, present, and future as they concern Americans today. Imagine, finally, all of this reduced to book form with no loss of intimacy and vigor. The result is *Russia and the Peace.*

So far is he from being an ivory-tower historian that Sir Bernard Pares has known personally most of the people and places in Russia's tragic and inspiring drama. He has carried non-partisanship to the point of never voting in a British election. Yet he is an ardent partisan of parliamentary democracy and at the same time a sympathetic and discerning observer of Soviet Socialism. His theme is that fear of Moscow is the fruit of ignorance, that World Revolution is as dead as Trotsky, that the U.S.S.R. is less a Marxist Utopia than Russia resurrected and renewed, and that peace is impossible without Anglo-American-Soviet collaboration on a basis of equality and mutual trust.

Seldom has this theme had a more persuasive and illuminating presentation. These twenty-three chapters, dedicated to "The Honorable Joseph E. Davies, who opened that door," range from lucid essays on religion, nationality, and patriotism to helpful reviews of Russian relations with Poland, Finland, the Balkan and Danubian states, Germany, Japan, England, and America. All readers, including Russian specialists, will learn much from each chapter. Scholars will particularly profit from the essay on "Study and Access," pleading for a synthesis of linguistic and social disciplines, for a student exchange to break down secrecy and suspicion, and for an extension of the type of integrated area study in which Sir Bernard has participated for the past two summers at Cornell. Whether philosophers should be kings, as Plato hoped, is doubtful. But this small volume leaves no doubt that historians ought to be (and can be) statesmen.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN.

Cornell University.

Ten Years in Japan; A Contemporary Record Drawn from the Diaries and Private and Official Papers of Joseph C. Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan, 1932–1942. (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1944. Pp. xii, 554. $3.75.)

The recent American ambassador to Nippon has more nearly succeeded in embodying a review in the title of this important autobiographical segment than perhaps any other writer since the eighteenth century. The more one weighs the title, the more one admires the ability of the author as a packer, and opines that should he ever be forced to fly without luggage he would—with luck—arrive at his destination sartorially equipped for business, golfing, banqueting, presentation at court, and the practice of diplomacy. The more one meditates upon the contents of the *Record*, the more one admires the skill of the diarist as a diplomat—and the wisdom of the dispensers in Washington, D. C., of patronage in 1933 in retaining him at his post. Accredited to Tokyo by President Hoover (to whom in marked contrast to his numerous and warm references to President Roosevelt, he most infrequently alludes), Mr. Grew was in Japan during the years in which that country, having tortuously ascended the volcano, perched irresolutely on the crater's edge and finally plunged therein.

In his Foreword, Mr. Grew makes clear several important facts and conditions. First: his story is, basically, that of one man, an ambassador (hence an alien), from one vantage point, an embassy (hence a bit of extraterritorialized territory), with great informational advantages and almost equally great disadvantages. Second: while Mr. Grew offers convincing evidence here, and throughout the book, of his resolution never to give up hope or to cease striving for peace ("Our foreign service is our first line of national defense," pp. x, 446: *N.B.* Congressional budgeteers), he warned the United States government time after time "of possible action by Japan of dangerous and dramatic suddenness"; for example (p. 368): "January 27, 1941. There is a lot of talk around town to the effect that the Japanese, in case of a break with the United States, are planning to go all out in a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor. Of course I informed our Government." (*N.B. All* Americans.) Third: "This book contains only a small fraction of the original diary which, . . . fills thirteen large typewritten volumes quite apart from many other volumes [of pertinent material]. . . . I have avoided cluttering up the text with asterisks and footnotes, but have selected and arranged the original diary entries together with other contemporary material in such a way as to present a smooth-flowing chronological narrative." (*N.B.* Students of historical method.) Attention is directed to the two volumes entitled *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941*. Fourth: while reiterating the absolute necessity for destruction of Japan's "power to wage war," and remarking upon the "cumulative evidence of unmitigated subtleties, trickery, brutality, and cynical faithlessness on the part of the Japanese military caste and machine, and . . . the medieval character of the Japanese military mind and temperament," Mr. Grew, wisely and humanely, calls attention to the fact that not all Japanese are militarily and imperialistically inclined, and that there were those who suffered assassination while endeavoring to prevent their country from committing suicide.

The volume abounds in bits and chunks of material valuable from innumerable points of view. Much of it is gloomy in outlook; some of it is hopeful; not a little is side-splittingly mirthful (e.g., p. 110); none of it is dull. Many of the statements should be meditated upon during day as well as night watches; for instance, Mr. Grew's remarks (March 27, 1933, pp. 84–85) *re* Japan's fortifications of its mandated islands—"of which we have abundant firsthand evidence. . . . This whole question . . . is full of potential dynamite . . . "—and, therefore, one supposes the United States government bravely did nothing about it. Elsewhere (p. 257), the author somewhat fatiguedly remarks: "But unless or until the Japanese have reason to feel that the United States will *do* something about it, we can expect few constructive results." Again and again the survival on a considerable scale of liberal elements among the Japanese population is remarked. Equally often is indicated the Ambassador's warnings to Tokyo of the extreme probability of American participation in "World War II." Had Tokyo and Washington and their respective cohorts—military, naval, and civilian—listened to the advice of the extremely hardworking, capable, and not unjoyous Mr. Grew, the "course of history would have been changed." But how dull would life be without Cassandras—and how drab the "course of history" without change!

HARLEY FARNSWORTH MACNAIR.

University of Chicago.

The Vatican and the War. BY CAMILLE M. CIANFARRA. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 1944. Pp. 344. $3.00.)

The Church and the Liberal Society. BY EMMET JOHN HUGHES. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1944. Pp. xvi, 307. $3.00.)

The present Pope has repeatedly declared the Vatican's strict neutrality in the present world struggle. A political neutrality on the part of the Vatican would be entirely understandable, but a moral neutrality on the part of a spiritual power seems to many in the camp of the United Nations less justified, especially if it is so emphatically stressed. The recent plea of the Pope for a negotiated peace was made at the very moment when it was entirely in line with the present desires and needs of the fascist powers and their friends. Again, a plea for a compromise peace by the Prince of the Church will evoke only general sympathy, yet such a plea was sadly missed during Italy's aggression against Ethiopia or Franco's aggression against the Spanish Republican government. Non-Catholics will always clearly understand that the policy of the Vatican throughout the centuries has not been binding upon all the members of the Church, yet its influence is tremendous. Therefore books which help to clarify the attitude of the Church in the present great world conflict, especially its moral and ideological position, will be most welcome to non-Catholic readers who wish to know where the Church stands on the great issues of our time. Two recent books will be found helpful in this task of clarification.

The first of the two has been written by an American newspaper correspondent who was educated in Italy and specialized in the decisive years from 1935–42 in studying and reporting Mussolini's adventures in fascist imperialism and the attitudes and personalities of the Vatican. His book is written frankly and openly as a justification of the policy of the Vatican. But this does in no way diminish the value of the book. It is much less concerned with ideology than with diplomacy. The Vatican appears above all as a political power. Even the critical reader who may interpret the many events and utterances differently from Mr. Cianfarra will read the book with pleasure, for it is well written and colorful, and with profit, for it contains many first-hand observations.

According to Mr. Cianfarra, the Pope sees the possibility of realizing his ideal postwar order only through a victory of the democratic powers, Britain and the United States. The Pope's past actions justify the belief "that he will wish to contribute directly to the establishment of peace. Since the Vatican is no longer seeking territorial aggrandizement, it will be the religious interests of the Catholic faith that it will wish to defend and make internationally recognized." These interests, the author believes, will be threatened by a victorious Russia, which "will automatically become the most dangerous enemy, not only of the Catholic Church, but of all other faiths as well." According to Mr. Cianfarra, the Vatican hopes that the United States and Britain will not accept Russian hegemony over Europe. The Pope will support the restoration of the independence of the smaller eastern European states, in order to create "not only a political but a spiritual barrier against Communism. Such a solution would enable the Catholic Church to carry out its mission without the opposition of Communism—its deadly enemy."

While the first of the authors regards Communism as the deadly enemy of the Catholic Church, Dr. Hughes, who is now with the American Embassy in Madrid, regards rather the liberal society, as represented above all by the liberal British Empire and American capitalistic democracy, as the arch enemy of the Church. His book is ideological, but it has its portentous political implications for the present world conflict. He defines liberalism as ruthless economic individualism. It is a strange book, accepting the well-known arguments which leftist writers like Harold J. Laski and many German and fascist writers have freely used in the last twenty years against liberal democracy. Like many books of this kind, it opposes the ideal on the one hand to the sordid reality on the other. It idealizes the Church, which "stood forth as the only supernatural power when war struck the Western world in 1939," and whose "popular base is the laboring masses." "Between the ethic, the world perspective, of the bourgeoisie and that of the Church, there has never been, nor can there be, compromise." The picture drawn, on the other hand, of liberal society is as one-sided and crude as the caricatures which some anti-Catholic writers draw of the Catholic Church. The paragraphs devoted to Versailles and to Munich afford really remarkable reading. One may easily get the impression that the enemy fought in the present war, and the great criminal, is the British Empire. This kind of violent and passionate criticism of liberalism and of Western man is not new (Dr. Hughes relies mostly on secondary sources); it is characteristic of a certain trend of thought which the non-Catholic Western man sincerely hopes is not shared by many Catholics in the United States, Britain, and France, but which is in no way, even not predominantly, confined to Catholics. Especially in the past seventy years, it has been voiced often, although not so much in the United States nor always with such one-sidedness.

HANS KOHN.

Smith College.

International Labor Conference. Twenty-Sixth Session. Reports I–VII. (Montreal: International Labor Office. 1944. Eight volumes, paper. $4.50.)

These *Reports*, prepared by the staff of the International Labor Office for the Philadelphia conference from April 20 to May 12 of the present year, provide at once a systematic view of the work of the I.L.O. since the Twenty-fifth Session in June, 1939, and an indication of the important part it will have in postwar international government. The *Record of Proceedings* of the Conference, soon to be published, is the necessary complement to these *Reports*, since the latter constitute only the items on the conference agenda and set forth the texts proposed for deliberation and action by the delegates. The texts of the declaration of policy, the recommendations, and the resolutions are accompanied, however, by extensive and informative commentary which illumines the background and provides a thorough rationale for the proposals. This commentary represents the collaboration of many minds and rests upon the foundation of wide experience and research. The effect of the whole is, therefore, to open up a vast panorama of practicable international solutions in a way not ordinarily achieved in the popular blueprinting of the postwar world found in best-sellers.

The "Declaration" in *Report I*, entitled "Future Policy, Programme, and Status of the International Labor Organization," reaffirms the basic principles that "labor is not a commodity," that freedom of association and expression are essential, that "poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere," and that "the war against want" requires continuous and concerted international effort "in which the representatives of workers and employers, enjoying equal status with those of governments, join with them in free discussion and democratic decision with a view to the promotion of the common welfare." It calls for an independent audit by I.L.O., guided by these principles, of "all international economic and financial policies and measures," urging attention especially to the problems of maintaining full employment, raising living standards, the effective recognition of collective bargaining, and the securing of social minima such as basic income, medical care, maternity and child welfare, adequate nutrition and housing, and educational opportunity.

The implementation of this broad social policy is the subject of *Reports II–V*, inclusive. The first of these consists of "Recommendations to the United Nations for Present and Post-War Social Policy," and calls for the direct participation of workers' and employers' delegates in the peace settlement. *Report III* deals with "The Organization of Employment in the Transition from War to Peace"; *Report IV* (in two volumes), with "Social Security: Principles and Problems Arising Out of the War"; and *Report V*, with "Minimum Standards of Social Policy in Dependent Territories."

There have been registered 887 ratifications of the 63 conventions proposed by I.L.O. *Report VI* lists all the countries which have reported upon the application of these conventions since 1939, but does not give the usual summary of these reports on account of wartime difficulties. The last volume is the Director's report, which presents compactly the background of economic and social developments and a summary of the work of the International Labor Organization since 1941.

JAMES J. ROBBINS.

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BRIEFER NOTICES

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Clarence E. Ridley and Orin F. Nolting, editors of *The Municipal Year Book, 1944* (International City Managers' Association, pp. x, 646, $8.50), continue to supply municipal officials and students of city government with their invaluable compilations of facts and statistics on our municipal governments and their activities. In addition to bringing the regular features up to date, the present edition includes several new sections. Particularly welcome at this time is the material on long-range planning of municipal activities supplied by nearly 900 cities. Included here is information on the organization and expenditures for planning, the extent of planning for postwar capital improvements, the estimated value of such improvements to be built within five years after the war ends, and the extent to which cities have established reserve funds and reduced their bonded debts. There is a new section covering the organization, activities, and expenditures of local public health agencies. Another new section presents per capita revenue and expenditure for all cities over 25,000, with a detailed analysis and comparison between population groups and by types of revenues and expenditures. Some of the regular sections have also been expanded to include new types of data. The range of subjects covered comprises too long a list to permit an enumeration in a brief review, but there is hardly an aspect of municipal activity upon which some data are not supplied. The customary summary and interpretative articles prepared by authorities in the respective fields aim to give the highlights on municipal developments during the year. With few exceptions, however, these articles—chiefly because of space limitations—present such a sketchy account that they can hardly be regarded as adding anything of great significance to the volume. In the opinion of the reviewer, the editors have done a superb job, not only in bringing together such a wide variety and quantity of municipal information, but also in organizing and arranging the contents in a manner that will assure a maximum of usefulness. The *Year Book* is without a doubt, as indicated on the title page, "the authoritative résumé of activities and statistical data of American cities." —MARTIN L. FAUST.

The biography of any prominent citizen inevitably throws light on the period and the locale in which his activities took place. In *McCarthy of Wisconsin* (Columbia University Press, pp. x, 316, $3.50), Edward A. Fitzpatrick presents a clear and vivid picture of Charles McCarthy, the creator of the legislative reference library. The author presents also a clear and vivid legislative history of Wisconsin during the first two decades of the century. It was during this period that the elder La Follette placed Wisconsin in the national spot-light by pioneer legislation in a wide variety of fields. LaFollette and McCarthy were not close friends, but each admired the other. At times, they were in disagreement. LaFollette was a native of Wisconsin; McCarthy came to the state, drawn thither by the reputation of some of the teachers at the University. McCarthy's choice of Wisconsin for graduate study was a fortunate thing for both McCarthy and Wisconsin. It is doubtful whether any other state would have given the vibrant public-spirited McCarthy the unusual opportunity for the type of service he was so well qualified to give as did the Badger state. It is equally doubtful whether the Wisconsin Idea now generally accepted as a genuine contribution to American politics would have been developed so fully without McCarthy. The Wisconsin soil had the fertility and the state's political climate had the elements nurturing the growth of ideas which McCarthy could enthusiastically espouse. The legislative reference library, for the invention of which McCarthy will always be known to students of legislation and political history, was of course his outstanding contribution. This service played an important part in a long series of significant pieces of legislation in the fields of utility regulation, labor, income taxation, water power, and many others. In spite of his honesty, humility, and spirit of helpfulness, McCarthy was the target of many bitter attacks. His biographer points out, however, that he regularly won over his critics, and even an anti-La Follette and anti-McCarthy administration which later gained political control in Wisconsin respected and admired him. Like La Follette, McCarthy believed that the University should serve the state by training public leaders, both political and non-political. La Follette personified the college-trained political leader, McCarthy the college-trained non-political public servant. An important collateral contribution made by McCarthy was the development of respect for the legislature and the legislative processes as vital parts of a democratic government. Incidentally (or is it incidental?), McCarthy, to quote the author, "had faith in the common man, faith in him in spite of ignorance, stupidity, and perversity." To all students of politics and political history, this volume is highly recommended for careful study.—BEN A. ARNESON.

In a slim volume, *A Guide to Public Opinion Polls* (Princeton University Press, 1944, pp. xvii, 104, $1.50), George A. Gallup has sought to make available to a general audience a great amount of basic information concerning public opinion polls and polling techniques. This he has done by a method deliberately chosen and conscientiously followed. In fact, a new shorter catechism has been procreated. The questions most frequently asked about opinion polls in general have been categorized, set forth, and provided with answers satisfactory in character and scope. As is true with all catechisms, the questions have been propounded at the proper places, and the responses meet the implications of the pertinent query which provokes the particular reply. Unity is thus assured, and the strength of the work seems proof against all tests. The chief peril lies in the possibility of yet one more question excluded already from the catechism as foolish, unnecessary, or dangrous to the case of the catechizers. These criticisms apply to the method utilized, not of necessity to the result attained. The distinguished author designed the book for service as a reference work and not as a definitive study. As such, it merits a high rating. The special student will either know the subject-matter of the volume or will search for it elsewhere. For the inexperienced undergraduate, the casual reader, the person who reads while he runs, this is a commendable volume.—CHARLES W. SHULL.

The competence of the electorate is the basic assumption of American democracy. Coming at a time when popular government is contending in both the military and political arenas, Winston W. Crouch's *The Initiative and Referendum in California* (Haynes Foundation, 1943, pp. 32) is very timely. Since 1911, the people of California have voted on 390 state-wide proposals in addition to the charter amendments, ordinances, bond issues, etc., submitted in most localities. Such measures as "ham and eggs," chain-store taxes, and anti-vivisection have brought unfavorable publicity, but the worst fears of the alarmists have not been justified. Although these devices have sometimes appeared to be costly and clumsy methods of formulating public policy, Professor Crouch finds that they have been used by business, professional, and civic groups, as well as by those of lesser standing, and that the voters have shown little inclination to approve the more bizarre proposals. The initiative and referendum have done much to educate the voters without having produced notably harmful results, and "the representativeness of the groups that continue to use [them] in the state and in local matters would indicate that [they] are soundly embedded in political customs of the state."—ROGER V. SHUMATE.

Workmen's Compensation for Public Employees (Public Administration Service, pp. iv, 43, $1.50), by Leifur Magnusson, is a concise analysis of federal and state workmen's compensation legislation affecting public employees. The study was prepared under the direction of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress for use by the United States Senate Committee on Education and Labor. It indicates the degree of progress that has been achieved toward the application of the workmen's compensation system to public employees, and, at the same time, it directs attention to some of the problems for future workmen's compensation legislation for both public and private employees. Its value is considerably enhanced by the inclusion of seventeen tables of pertinent data, and also a bibliographical note on the materials relating to workmen's compensation.—WALTER H. BENNETT.

Whoever wishes to learn readily the methods by which employers and employees bargain collectively should read Neil W. Chamberlain's *Collective Bargaining Procedures* (American Council on Public Affairs, 1944, pp. 141, cloth $2.00, paper $1.50). In simple, lucid language, Chamberlain describes the selection of bargaining agents and explains improvements in bargaining procedures, including the determination of attainable objectives, careful preparation of agenda, utilization of research data, and employment of informed and impartial umpires. It is notable that most accounting, designed for internal control of business, is little suited for collective bargaining needs. Public interests are so involved in collective bargaining that modern and effective bargaining procedures should be required by law. This book is based largely on interviews with labor and employer representatives. In publishing it, the American Council on Public Affairs has performed another useful service.—GARLAND DOWNUM.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

A group of Canadian experts have collaborated, under the editorship of Professors Alexander Brady and Frank Scott, to produce an able, comprehensive survey of policies for Canada in the postwar period, in *Canada After the War* (Macmillan Co. of Canada, Ltd., 1943, pp. ix, 348, $4.25). The essays cover economic, social, and political aspects of postwar Canada, international as well as national, and are prescriptive as well as analytical. A considerable range of Canadian opinion is represented, and a tone of critical realism is evident throughout most of the studies. A balance has been well struck, in the volume as a whole as well as within individual contributions, between the national and international problems facing Canada after the war, and stress is laid on the close relationship between these two sides of each problem. One is indeed struck throughout by the absence of any evidence of isolationism and by the obviously great dependence of Canadian internal policies on developments in the world at large, in particular in the United States. A reading of this book by Americans is indeed valuable, not only as a source of information concerning wartime trends in the northern neighbor, but as a salutary reminder of the potent, even determining, influence which American policies will have on the rest of the world, in particular on small countries such as Canada. Somewhat paradoxically, another feature common to most of the essays is a strong Canadianism, a reflection of the increased stature of the country as a result of wartime developments and of the complete independence which it now enjoys as a member of the Commonwealth. Traces of the earlier dependence on Great Britain and on the United States remain in the almost complete ignoring of the rôle of other than the English-speaking countries, such as Soviet Russia, even in the essay entitled "Canada and the World." Various American specialists will be interested in individual contributions on such problems as regionalism and national interest, social control and free enterprise, the impact of war on parliamentary democracy, the inadequate constitutional basis for Canadian postwar policies, the reconstruction of the social services, problems of attaining full employment and international economic organization, and policies for Canadian agriculture and industry. On the whole, there is evident a considerable readiness to accept far-reaching social controls, both national and international, and state intervention, with a keen awareness of the difficulties surrounding such policies in a system that is predominantly free enterprise and highly dependent on international developments.—Gordon Skilling.

In his *The British Commonwealth: Its Place in the Service of the World* (London: Hutchinson and Co., pp. 174, 7/6), Sir Edward Grigg makes an effective plea for the maintenance and strengthening of the Empire, for the close association of the Dominions with Britain in the responsibility for its government, and for the active coöperation of the Empire, thus invigorated, with the United States, Russia, and China for the preservation of world peace. Only when actively supported by all the peoples of the Commonwealth and of the Empire, the author believes, can Britain continue to play an effective part in the postwar world. Separately, the parts of the Empire will be but pygmies among giants. Combined as one powerful economic unit, and following a mutually agreed foreign policy, they would have an influence second to none. The author does not believe that a super-government of representatives of all parts of the Empire is either necessary or desirable. Empire federalism he rejects as inconsistent with national democracy. Each people must retain its own national sovereignty. The Imperial Conference for continuous consultation, not only by governments, but also by parliamentary delegations in regions is the formula prescribed. Britain's rôle is conceived as a dual one. She must give leadership in Western Europe and protect the Empire's communications in the Mediterranean. And she must play her part in regional systems of security with Canada in the Atlantic, with the South African Union in Africa, and with India, New Zealand, Australia, and colonial groups in the Pacific. The time has arrived when equality of status must be supplemented by equality of function and responsibility. This excellent little book will give little comfort to those who are waiting for "the liquidation of the British Empire."—Elmer D. Graper.

How many Americans who speak, write, or think globally know India? Here is a guide for them. *The People of India* (Sheridan House, pp. 375, $3.00), by Kumar Goshal, tells the story of India, and interprets its social and political ideals from the earliest dawn of history to the present. One of the author's contentions is that India, with all its varied problems, is not a special creation and should not be treated in world politics as unique, absolutely different from other nations, and he draws many interesting historical parallels of development between India and Europe to prove this. The book is divided into four sections. The first is a series of brilliant expositions dealing with the ancient heritage of the race. The second narrates how the British East India Company secured its first toe-hold in India, slowly pushed its domination over the subcontinent, and proceeded with its ruthless exploitation. The third is the heart of the volume. It recounts the passing of India from the British corporation to the British crown, tells of the rich land and poor people, the hamstringing of industrialization under imperialism, and the rise of nationalism. The fourth consists of a number of vivid pictures depicting India in the second World War, the Cripps mission, and after. Mr. Goshal, who is an Indian by birth and now a resident of the United States, asserts that caste, illiteracy, Hindu-Moslem differences, hunger, widespread diseases, and other similar evils spring from the awful poverty in the midst of potential plenty. The cure for these ills is industrialization. And to develop industries, India must first secure its political freedom. To ask the people of India "to rid themselves of these evils before they are free is like asking a sick man to get well before giving him any medicine." The book is richly informative and carefully documented. As a fresh and intelligent interpretation of India, it will rank high.—SUDHINDRA BOSE.

A little book that is almost unique in various respects is Segundo V. Linares Quintana's *Los Partidos Políticos en los Estados Unidos de América, Su Ordenamiento Jurídico* (Editorial Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1943, pp. xviii, 217, $5.00 m/n.). The significant thing about this study is that it was written at all. Sober and scholarly studies of any aspects of United States government, written by authors "down under" for the consumption of their own compatriots, are almost non-existent. Especially in these days when the waters between Argentina and the United States are muddied as much as they are, a study of this kind is welcome. For that reason, if for no other, we owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Linares. There is little in the book that is profound and nothing that will be new to those familiar with the literature of the field in this country; but of course the study must be judged by the contribution it makes to Argentine and not to United States bibliography. Among other aspects, the author deals with the historical development of parties in the United States, with their rights, with legal and judicial control over them, with the internal organization of our parties, and with legislation on corrupt practices. About two-fifths of the book is occupied by a Spanish translation of various federal and state statutes dealing with party regulation. Professor Austin F. MacDonald, of the University of California at Berkeley, himself the author of a notable recent study of the Argentine government, contributes a very useful prologue to the book.—RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

Of recent statements dealing with the problem of *What Shall Be Done with Germany?*, Professor James K. Pollock's lecture under that title (delivered on the Frank B. Kellogg Foundation for Education in International Relations, Carleton College, 1944, pp. 62) is distinguished by the author's thorough understanding of underlying factors and the unemotional quality of his thought. Justifying his digression into forecasting and political projecting, he refers to "the separation of thought from action which has cursed German education," and proceeds to state three goals that should be kept in view: first, to direct German energies into constructive channels; second, to help the Germans to new ways of thought and action; and, third, "to try to fit them into a new world order where they can contribute to rather than interfere with world peace." As the immediate and all-important aim, however, the definitive destruction of the German military machine and the elimination of war-making motives from the German political, social, and economic set-up are postulated. Various ideas for accomplishing these ends are discussed, among them the "harsh" proposals made by Lord Vansittart and the "soft" arguments of anti-Nazi Germans abroad who indulge in easy vistas of a democratic and socialistic postwar Germany. The author's view seems realistic that no ready-made alternative can be expected in Germany when Nazism collapses, and that the deep-reaching effects of twelve years of Nazism on the German population as a whole can hardly be over-estimated. He might also have stressed the fact that German fascism is not a product of late years or, as some think, of "a preposterous concatenation of adverse circumstances," but that it has its antecedents in intellectual history dating back at least a century. If ingrained evils are to be uprooted, the availability of the German administrative machinery in the reconstruction period must be viewed with utmost caution. Long imbued with the traditions of the monarchy, and socially close to army officers, industrialists, and Junkers, the German civil service sabotaged the Weimar Republic under the pretense of "non-political" efficiency. Not even in its judiciary sector did it show much zeal for upholding vital interests of the Republican régime; and the upbuilding of Reichswehr *cadres* in Russia with subsequent secret rearming was done with the connivance of leading officials in most Reich ministries. The long-term application of the tightest control by the International Government Commission is therefore necessary to thwart the German war party and assure permanent disarmament. Pollock is inclined to leniency on that point. Moreover, his assumption that "in perhaps two years" the Germans will "measure up" to the responsibilities of democratic self-government (p. 35) appears to the reviewer too optimistic. Nor can the reviewer find merit in the proposal to "convert a large part of the army into a labor army," unless such a disciplined force is kept under foreign supervision, as the Russian plan provides. The danger of unemployed veterans roaming the country should be banned by a reconstruction program comprising all of Europe. Unfortunately, thus far, no such program seems to be in the offing.

But not every proposal to dismember Germany must *necessarily* be reactionary, and some would make economic planning for Germany and Europe "quite impossible" (p. 17). Whether this is so depends on how that planning is done and by whom. Besides, there is no reason why the Germans should not supply a special guarantee for the peace of Europe by a dispersal of their political power more fundamental than Dr. Pollock suggests. If one believes—as the author does—that through economic and technological integration many a European problem might be solved, the importance of historico-political, ethnic, and cultural frontiers would seem to decrease. On the other hand, the acceptance of peace has to be made profitable to the Germans in the long run. Dr. Pollock's suggestions to that effect, although not elaborate, are interesting. His emphasis on an energetic policy to bring about "a radical transformation of the political, economic, and cultural structure of Germany" is well placed. By publishing the pamphlet, Carleton College has rendered a distinct service. —HENRY P. JORDAN.

In his *Latin America and the Industrial Age* (G. P. Putnam's Sons, pp. x, 277, $3.00), Dr. Fred J. Rippy presents an "introductory contribution" to a segment of Latin American history which has hitherto been revealed in only a fragmentary way despite its essential significance. A main contention of the work is that "capital and technology under corporate control have been, and will continue to be, a very fundamental factor in Pan-American relationships," and hence information on the subject should contribute to the welfare of the hemisphere. Over half of the study is devoted to the establishment and development of transportation facilities, in themselves fundamental necessities to further industrialization. First the steamboat appeared, to link more closely isolated Latin American ports with European and North American markets, and a little later to transport freight on the great South American rivers. Railways and highways followed to open up the interior, and in many cases construction was slow and costly because of great natural obstacles and because of financial complications. As in the days of the conquest of the Americas, men became professionals in the field, and Dr. Rippy's presentation of the whole Latin American scene makes more striking the contributions of a Henry Meiggs, a William Wheelwright, or a Minor C. Keith. A second major field covered in the book is that of development of communication facilities—the cable, the telegraph, and the telephone; radio enterprises have been treated very briefly. The growth of aviation is surveyed, and there are sections on production of minerals and petroleum, sanitation and medicine, electrical services, and on the achievements of such scientists as Charles Frederic Harrt, Orville A. Derby, and John Casper Branner. A chapter, which is painful reading in view of the current rubber shortage, chronicles the failure of the great plantation rubber boom which started shortly after 1880. In the process of industrialization in Latin America, citizens of the United States and the United Kingdom contributed much in both capital and technical knowledge, and Dr. Rippy also gives due credit to the possibly less well-known participation of Latin Americans themselves. Because the author considers his well-written study only an introduction to an extensive theme, he has indicated suggestions for further research in an appended list, and has given ample summaries on materials used in each chapter. It is to be hoped that the story of industrial development in Latin America, to which the present war period has added a series of chapters, will be carried on as it has been started.—DONALD ROLAND.

Tea under International Regulation (Stanford University Press, 1944, pp. vi, 198, $2.50), by Vernon D. Wickizer, is the latest of four volumes prepared by the Food Research Institute of Stanford University. The author first outlines the world tea situation. The British Empire is the chief producer of tea, in two major areas, India and Ceylon, and four minor African areas—Uganda, Kenya, Tangayika, and Nyasaland. More than two-thirds of the Western tea market is found under that flag. There is a good discussion of problems of plantation tea culture. The "black tea countries," India, Ceylon, and the Netherland Indies, are treated separately from the "green tea countries," Japan, Formosa, and China. The larger part of the book is devoted to discussing the International Tea Agreements. The term "international" is rather misleading, since the agreements are not intergovernmental arrangements, but are made between tea producers in black tea countries, India, Ceylon, and the Netherlands Indies, to reduce production and stabilize prices. The first Agreement, for the five-year period 1933–38, included provisions on exports, new plantings, etc., export quotas being based on the three preceding years 1929–31 as standards. The International Tea Committee (ITC) was composed of representatives from the three countries—38 votes for India, 25 for Ceylon, 17 for the Netherland Indies. The three governments backed the Agreement with compulsory legislation. Export quotas for the first year 1933–34 were set at eighty-five per cent of standard exports, and unfilled quotas could not be carried over to the next year. The operation of the Agreement is carefully traced with full statistics, much of the data being taken from the annual reports of the ITC. In 1934, the African areas joined the plan. Interesting analysis of the effect of the Agreement on the non-adhering countries—China, Japan, Formosa, Mozambique, and French Indo-China—are included. The Second Agreement (1939–43) is also fully traced, and the treatment includes those factors which arose as a result of war or prewar conditions. The conquest of the Netherlands

Indies in the winter of 1942 practically terminated the Agreement for that region. The English government took over tea supplies and made contracts with the tea producers. The appendix contains the Agreement of 1938–43 and the Indian Tea Control Act of 1938, but unfortunately not the Agreement of 1933. There are numerous and well selected statistical tables. This excellent book gives a valuable insight into a subject which has hitherto received little attention.—BESSIE C. RANDOLPH.

Symptomatic of the growing importance of international administration was the Conference on Training for International Administration held at Washington, D. C., August 21–22, 1943, under the auspices of the Division of International Law of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the *Proceedings* of which (Washington, D. C., pp. ix, 131) have just been released "for restricted distribution only," for the benefit of administrators, educators, and others specially interested in the subjects. Two prior conferences on "Experience" in international administration, also under auspices of the Endowment, had been held in 1942 and 1943. This is the first on "Training." Twenty-three conferees, drawn from eminent graduate schools, training centers for personnel for military occupation purposes, and the State Department, and from active or prior service in such organizations as the League of Nations, the I.L.O., and the Pan-American Union, participated under the chairmanship of Director George A. Finch. The discussions explored the "practicability of outside training for international administration," the "kinds of training available or desirable," the mechanics and curricula for training, and the "kinds of persons to be selected for training." The discussions were entirely informal. No papers were read. Two memoranda, one on the United States foreign service examinations and another on the School of Interpreters of the University of Geneva, appear as appendices. Much diversity of view appeared on every point in the agenda. The estimates of the demand for administrators in the immediate future (pp. 39–41) appear not to have included the personnel of several dozen unions such as the U.P.U., those on Industrial Property, Telecommunications, etc., or the newer ones already launched or on the ways. The most optimistic of the needs would not, however, "justify every university in the country offering a training program" (p. 39). Stimulating, provocative, informative, these discussions may foreshadow a development in the field of international administration comparable to that of public administration for domestic purposes thirty years ago.—HENRY REIFF.

To enable the I.L.O. to perform for national constitutions a service similar to that already rendered for national laws and regulations, a documentary volume, *Constitutional Provisions Concerning Social and*

Economic Policy (Montreal: International Labor Office, pp. lix, 755, $5.00) has been prepared. The collection contains constitutional provisions concerning social and economic policy in 450 countries and other governmental units. "Both the secular trend of constitutional evolution in the world as a whole, and the current emphasis upon the emergence of the social objective as the principal determinant of public policy, suggest that the new constitutional instruments which we may expect to see framed in such large numbers in all parts of the world will be inspired to an unprecedented extent by preoccupation with social and economic problems." To facilitate the incorporation of such matters in constitutional documents, the I.L.O. has collected the texts of pertinent provisions which have appeared to date. The volume does not aim to suggest a model constitution, or even to outline specific objectives of progressive policy. Rather, it seeks to make possible a synthesis of the constitutional experiences of various governments with these problems. It is intended, as well, to catalyze social and economic realities into constitutional statements. The texts have been arranged by continent; the subject-index makes possible an analysis of existing constitutional provisions by topic, as well as by country; and a penetrating introduction explores the potentialities of socio-economic declarations. The volume will be indispensable to delegates at any coming peace conference who sincerely desire to realize the aims of the peoples of the United Nations.—RITA DAVIDSON.

If Bacon were here today, he would say: "Of the making of speeches and books on postwar problems there is no end." That is the way democracies educate themselves and prepare for action; although sometimes we think that they are prone to talk too much or, at least, that they are slow in decision and action. *Postwar Goals and Economic Reconstruction* (New York University Press, 1944, pp. xii, 297, $3.50), edited by Arnold J. Zurcher and Richmond Page, presents fifteen addresses delivered under the auspices of New York University's Institute on Postwar Reconstruction in the fall and winter of 1943–44. The first four speakers (Leon Henderson, Leverett S. Lyon, Emil Rieve, and Boris Shishkin) discuss the postwar aims of industry and labor; two (Benjamin Higgins and Gardiner C. Means), the short-term problems of conversion of labor, war machinery, and inventory to peace-time needs; three (Mabel Newcomer, Alvin H. Hansen, and Thurman W. Arnold), international postwar problems, including relief, rehabilitation, and foreign trade; and six (Frank B. Jewett, Donald H. Davenport, William C. Clark, Eugene Staley, Abraham Kaplan, and Calvin B. Hoover), general fiscal, economic, and political theory and policy. It is not feasible to discuss each of the addresses, and comparisons would be invidious; but it may be said that perhaps none of the authors is more optimistic or challenging than Gardiner C. Means on "How May Business Enterprise be Expanded after the War" and Thurman W. Arnold on "How Shall We Deal with Monopolies?" In *Postwar Tax Policy and Business Expansion* (Brookings Institution, 1943, pp. 46, $0.50), Lewis Kimmel advocates as the main solution of postwar business and employment problems the encouragement of enterprise by removing or lessening tax restrictions on business, and especially on venture capital. He would even favor new enterprises by some temporary tax exemption, even though this appears somewhat inconsistent with his condemnation of the use of taxation for other than revenue purposes. He realizes, however, that neither taxation nor tax exemption is a panacea.—ROY G. BLAKEY.

The descent to a financial Avernus is easy. Mix two parts of cupidity of international banking and great power diplomacy and one part of local financial irresponsibility, stir well in the cock-pit of Europe at the normal high political temperature for seventy years, and the result is international financial control. This pattern is applied to Greece in John A. Levandis' *The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great Powers, 1821–1898* (Columbia University Press, pp. x, 137, $2.25). As the title indicates, the loans of the war of independence, the guaranteed loan of 1832, and the group of loans from 1879 to 1890 are studied as to circumstances, purposes, onerous terms, defaults, and resulting intervention and control. The analysis is good, although one might suggest that the relation of cupidity to irresponsibility was perhaps nearer one-to-one than two-to-one; also one might emphasize more the legal bases for the "special rights of supervision and control" specifically renounced by Great Britain and France in the Greek minorities treaty of August 10, 1920. Such a picture, viewing primarily the economic side, is necessarily incomplete. While Greece was getting more deeply enmeshed in financial difficulties and control, she was, on the other hand, acquiring recognition from those same great powers of her political independence from Turkey and her irredentist claims to an ever-increasing territory.—WILBUR W. WHITE.

Americans too often belittle the dangers of totalitarian propaganda on the assumption that either we must suppress such propaganda, thus ourselves violating one of the first essentials of democracy, or we must allow such propaganda to flourish, thereby inviting the destruction of democracy by its enemies. In *Combating Totalitarian Propaganda; A Legal Appraisal* (Institute of Living Law, pp. 96), Felix S. Cohen (ed.) and his associates show that this is a false dilemma. "There are democratic ways of defending democracy." This pamphlet brings together a series of three law review articles in which existing federal statutes in the fields of "exposure" and "enlightenment" are analyzed as preferable to the more treacherous method of suppression. The arguments set forth are thought-provoking, particularly Mr. Cohen's belief that all laws and regulations now restricting government publicity and printing should be "decently interred." Those who read these articles will look forward to the publication of the author's proposed "larger study" of the subject.—RAYMOND B. NIXON.

Edgar McInnis, associate professor of history at the University of Toronto, continues in *The War: Fourth Year* (Oxford University Press, 1944, pp. xvii, 409, $2.50) his annual chronicle with the same expertness, objectivity, balance, and lucidity which won so much praise for his first three narratives. Stalingrad, Morocco, Sicily, Salamaua live again, more vividly for the detail available after the event. Primarily an account of military and naval developments, the book contains relatively little on the political, diplomatic, economic, social, or psychological aspects of the war. Most of this will probably emerge after the war in "now it can be told" books, or when official records are available to scholars. Viscount Wavell's Introduction, and also internal evidence, indicates authentic sources, but Dr. McInnis omits citing them. Twenty-three *New York Times* battle maps, a documentary appendix (pp. 361–375), a chronology (pp. 377–386), and a splendidly detailed index enhance the value of this excellent current history.—HENRY REIFF.

POLITICAL THEORY AND MISCELLANEOUS

Benedetto Croce's *Germany and Europe: A Spiritual Dissension* (translated and with an introduction by Vincent Sheean, Random House, pp. 83, $1.25) is a collection of four short essays examining the relationship between Germany's ideals and the basic principles of European civilization. Far from being a systematic hater of all that is German, the Italian philosopher expresses his admiration for those Germans, like Kant and Goethe, whose thought and culture were international and humanistic. He points out, however (p. 62), that after Germany became a united and imperial state her culture and ideals became increasingly narrow, intolerant, and nationalistic, thus creating what Croce terms a spiritual dissent between Germany and the rest of Europe, which Nazism only widened. The reasons for this antagonism are not to be found in certain inherent defects in the German people, but rather in the historical incidents which presided over its cultural development and national unification. Croce seems to accept the view of an unnamed German who felt that three deficiencies had adversely affected Germany's development (p. 43 ff.): addiction to metaphysical thought "with such force of suggestion that it works almost with the primordial energy of passion" and leads to criminal fanaticism; absence of a long foreign domination from which other peoples acquired the idea and love of liberty;

and particularly the fact that Germany never was within the Roman Empire, and therefore "does not have the civilization of Greece and Rome and that of Christianity at the origins of its national history and participation in European history, but rather the ferocity and destructive impulse of the barbarian invasions" (p. 71). Since the cause of Germany's present evil is mainly historical, its remedy must also have its foundations in history; and "toward this end all the forces of European civilization should tend, with all means that present themselves when and as they become necessary, from rigor to indulgence, from exclusion to collaboration, from severity to cordiality, from conflict to conciliation" (p. 47). Any attempt to solve the German problem by mass execution or sterilization or by chopping up Germany into small states is rejected by Croce. For "foolishness can be dissolved only by reasonableness, which alone is capable likewise of resisting the blind impulses of passion even when those were originally set in motion by moral indignation" (p. 47). Croce's essays are suggestive and provocative, but far from exhaustive. There is much in them which is vague, and some inconsistencies might be found. It is to be hoped that other and more important philosophical works of this outstanding thinker will soon be translated into English.—ANGELO PIERO SERENI.

It is a sign of the terrible moral and intellectual confusion of our age not only that the desirability of such fundamental values as justice, truth, and morality is bitterly disputed, but that even their existence is denied. University professors engaged in feverishly burrowing within their professional specialties have certainly contributed to the widely-prevalent indifference to the basic ends of society and government. Whatever may have emanated from Mark Hopkins' end of the log, one may assume that it was not confined to a minute analysis of the platoon system of police administration or the relative merits of the city-manager and commission forms of municipal government. Since several Great Powers have openly challenged the validity of the ends to which a humane civilization should be devoted, proclaiming that "a handful of force is worth a sackful of justice," the study of the great moral issues of our time is by no means an academic pastime. This conflict between justice and force is brilliantly analyzed by Laurence Stepleton, of Bryn Mawr College, in *Justice and World Society* (University of North Carolina Press, 1944, pp. 150, $2.00). This learned little book is essentially a plea for an understanding of the nature and indispensability of a Law of Nature as the underpinning of a humane civilization. The Law of Nature is regarded, quite correctly, as a political and not a legal doctrine, giving purpose and direction to government rather than determining the precise content of positive law. Indeed, it has suffered much in the past at the hands of those who have expected too much from it in the way of concrete legal and political formulas. The author studies the assault upon the concept of a higher law which took the form of relativism or "historicism," focusing attention particularly upon Vico, Buffon, and Herder. They contributed to the development of the essential elements of historicism: "the concept of struggle as being of itself beneficial, the concept of variability beginning to take the place of belief in the unity of mankind, the concept of the importance of group or whole over against that of the individual, the concept of tradition or custom or unanalyzable feeling as being, rather than reason, the characteristic mark of man." The alternative to this "social Darwinism," which lies at the base of fascist activism, is the rational, democratic concept of justice, or the Law of Nature. The Law of Nature, Stepleton demonstrates, is rooted in the belief that justice has reality, intelligibility, representativeness, and universality. In showing that the Law of Nature is founded in experience as well as reason, and that the search for universal moral standards is facilitated by a heightened awareness of differences, the variability upon which historicism foundered is assimilated into the general concept of justice. The "revival of natural law" during the past half-century is touched upon through a brief critical examination of some of the ideas of del Vecchio and Stammler. The idea of justice has had many revivals in the past, for it is a tough idea; let us hope for another revival. And as this book points out, if we are to have real justice, it must be universal justice, justice for all people, whatever their race, color, or present condition of servitude.—David Fellman.

The Political Theories of Modern Pacifism (Philadelphia: Pacifist Research Bureau, pp. 56, $0.25), by Mulford Sibley, is the first in a new series of pamphlets relating to pacifism and government. The author analyzes pacifism in Hindu religious philosophy, in Christianity, and in secular revolutionary thought. He finds five tenets in common, which he discusses in considerable detail. As a result of his study, Professor Sibley points to several "serious deficiencies and omissions" of modern pacifism: (1) the lack of a precise distinction between violence and non-violence, (2) ambiguity about the nature of power, (3) failure to see the implications of non-violence, (4) over-simplification of the economic and political problems involved, and (5) an assumption that the world is about to be won over to the ethics of non-violence. The concluding paragraph asserts the need for a reconstruction of pacifist political philosophy. The author's treatment is scholarly and illuminating, but the reader may be inclined to feel that the subject-matter is too much compressed, that a longer and more detailed discussion of the views of many of the authors mentioned would have produced an even more useful study.—Norman L. Hill.

Those who find the essence of political theory in the writings of men of great mind will welcome a recent doctoral dissertation, *The Theme of Plato's Republic* (St. Louis: Eden Publishing House, pp. ix, 119), by Robert G. Hoerber. The book is an exercise in literary hermeneutics. Successive chapters deal with omissions and inadequacies in Plato's discussion of political legislation, the possibility of actualizing his *Republic*, material in the dialogue contradictory of "basic principles of the state, evidence from incidental statements by Plato and from his letters concerning his visits to Sicily, Plato's admissions of inexhaustive treatment of politics in the *Republic*, the significance of the title of the discourse, a comparison of political material in the *Republic*, the *Statesman*, and the *Laws*, and, finally, an evaluation of the interpretation given by Aristotle. From all this the author concludes (pp. 112–113) that "the theme of the dialogue is the effect of justice and injustice on the soul of the individual." According to the evidence in this dissertation, "Plato did not formulate the state of the *Republic* in order to give political suggestions which he thought were practicable. . . . The purpose of the outlined state is merely to illustrate the soul of the individual." Within the extreme limits of this thesis, the author has made a good case. It is done, of course, by ignoring the influence of Plato, misinterpreted perhaps, but nevertheless profound, upon succeeding generations of men.—ALLAN F. SAUNDERS.

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AND
MARJORIE H. SIBLEY
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This Conference issued, for the delegates taking part in it, some 500 publications of various kinds, mimeographed. For the most part, these consisted of the Journal and press releases, but there were some of more importance. From information at hand, it is doubted that a complete set of these publications now exists, though some lack only very few numbers. A further analysis will be attempted in the next issue of the REVIEW.

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